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Chapter 1 Introduction and goal of the thesis 
1.1 Preface 
The use of gas, flammable vapors and combustible dust within industrial cycles has precise technical reasons 
linked to production needs.  Moreover, many production cycles generate hazardous solid, liquid and gaseous 
final wastes and/or as intermediate products treated in the same facilities. 
 
The presence of these hazardous substances in industrial processes is associated with at least three different 
scenarios of accidents that can affect the safety and health of workers: 
 Fire 
 Explosion 
 Toxic releases. 
 
The dominance of one type of accident with respect to another is a function of both the production cycle and 
the quantity of the substances involved. The chemical industry process may be subject to three types of 
accident in the manner indicated in the Tab. 1.1. 
 
Tab. 1.1: Major accidents in a chemical industry. 
Incident type 
Probability of 
occurrence 
Loss related to worker safety Potential economic loss 
Fire High Low Medium 
Explosion Medium Medium High 
Toxic release Low High Low 
 
 
Prevention and protection measures must be implemented by the employer in order to minimize the level of 
risk and protect the health of workers and the environment. The scope of these strategies is the production 
department of the company Huber Italy, a leading global manufacturer of inks for printing. nitrocellulose and 
volatile organic solvents used for their production, are the critical factors that determine the properties of the 
extremely flammable mixture. 
The strategies aiming to prevent the formation of potential ATEX (ATmospheres EXplosibles) consist of 
technical solutions, among which fall within the three scenarios examined in this thesis that, for reasons of 
simplicity, will be called A, B and C: 
Scenario A or current. localized suction system of volatile gas and powdery generated in process reactors 
from the production and refining of flammable liquids (inks); Chapter 3 contains a description of this 
system. 
Scenario B. Proposal of installation of a new air extraction system that conveys the filtered air to a 
concentration unit, which allows to obtain polluted air with a high concentration of solvent. 
Scenario C. Inerting of production reactors with inert gas in order to eliminate the explosive atmosphere; 
this strategy is the 'subject of study and evaluation of this elaboration. Inerting is the main strategy to prevent 
the formation of explosive mixtures inside the containment process. While the solutions A and B in terms of 
safety and risk are equal, it is proposed to assess the feasibility and improvement that the solution C can 
bring to the workplace in terms of risk, environmental, economic and energy. 
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1.1 Thesis’s purpose 
 
Safety risk at the workplace is an issue which employers and engineers must take the responsibility.  Hence 
they must do their utmost to analyze and manage such risks, possibly preventing them.  
In light of the importance of such aspects, I wanted to investigate the aspects related to the risk of fire and 
explosion in industrial activities. To face a real case, I’ve done my thesis work at a facility of the company 
Huber Italy, in Vicenza, where I spent 7 months. Because of the massive use of organic solvents in the 
production cycle, the risks of fire and explosion can not be excluded. Indeed they may represent a real risk, 
so my thesis is mainly focused on the issue of safety in the workplace in order to possibly improve the 
current situation. To deal with the current problem of fire risk, I analyzed different alternative preventive 
measures which are suited to the current situation. This led me to identify three different scenarios.  
The thesis work has been focused on the comparison of the three different operational scenarios, including 
the one currently used by the company.  
To analyze the risk profile, I used the software CPWin by BMSistemi to calculate the fire risk in order to 
numerically quantify the residual risk to which the spans of the plant of the company are currently subjected.  
I performed the same procedure for the remaining scenarios demonstrating then, numerically, which is most 
advantageous to reduce the fire risk.  
The method of analysis used in this thesis has allowed to classify the different scenarios and identify the 
most appropriate to prevent the risk of fire or explosion in the company. 
In order to achieve an economical evaluation of the three scenarios I’ve evaluated the consumption of 
electricity, natural gas, and the maintenance costs, and the cost for the revamping of the existing plant. I 
considered also the environmental aspects related to the emissions to the atmosphere from the thermal 
oxidizer, as well as the large consumption of electricity and natural gas resulting from the operation of the 
post-combustor.  
These three criteria - safety, economics and environment - used in my analysis are the most significant and 
decisive as they represent, respectively, the priority aspects of company’s development.  
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Chapter 2  The Explosion Risk 
2.1 Introduction 
The explosion is a violent chemical oxidation reaction in which it generates the 
combustion of a substance, called a fuel, in the presence of an oxidising agent. The phenomenon is 
accompanied by a rapid increase of temperature and pressure and by the presence of flames. Supersonic 
explosions created by high explosives are known as detonations and travel via supersonic shock waves. 
Subsonic explosions are created by low explosives through a slower burning process known as deflagration 
(Fig. 2.1.1). 
 
 
Fig. 2.1.1 : Deflagration and detonation.  
 
 
However, it is appropriate to differentiate the phenomenon of the explosion from that of fire: the fire is a 
combustion that is spread in an uncontrolled way in time and in space, while the explosion combustion 
propagation is a very rapid with violent release of energy and it can take place only in the presence of dust or 
gas fumes. In order for an explosion to occur, the explosive atmosphere (ATEX) must be in the presence of a 
source of ignition effective, that is capable of triggering the reaction. This is represented graphically by the 
FIRE triangle (Figure 2.1.2), where the sides of the same indicate the three necessary conditions so that we 
can verify the explosive reaction. The ignition source must be able to provide the explosive mixture, for a 
given concentration of the substance in the air, an amount of energy sufficient for the combustion exceeds 
that critical point beyond which it is capable of self-sustaining, allowing the front of flame to propagate itself 
without supplying energy: energy that is specific to each substance and the minimum value is called the 
minimum ignition energy. 
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Fig. 2.1.2: Explosion triangle.  
 
Many may be the consequences of an explosion to occur in a workplace and it is customary to differentiate 
injury scenarios depending on whether they originate from releases of gas, vapor, mist, spray or by 
combustible dusts, which have characteristics of explosion very different, despite the presence of similar 
properties in terms of parameters of ignition and combustion. All substances originate from an accidental 
release in fact present: 
• Fields of explodibility sufficiently defined (LEL, UEL); 
• Burning rate; 
• The relationship between turbulence and combustion rate laminar; 
• Phenomenon of transition from deflagration and detonation; 
• Ratio of increase of pressure in case of explosion isochoric; 
• Ratio of increase in volume in case of explosion isobar; 
• Minimum ignition energy; 
• Ignition temperature for given test condition. 
 
Regardless of the differences in behavior that the various types of substances present, as part of the analysis 
of industrial explosions is customary to carry out a characterization of dangerous substances through 
quantitative parameters that allow to classify every aspect related to the stability from or reactivity of the 
substance analyzed. Following is a summary of the main parameters used to quantify the risk of explosion in 
substances / mixtures to the state of liquid, vapor, mist, spray or combustible dust. 
 
2.2 Fundamental physical parameters 
2.2.1 Explosion limits 
The explosion limits represent the boundaries of the explosion range in which the concentration of the 
flammable substance in the air can lead to an explosion (deflagration or detonation). The Lower Explosion 
Limit (LEL) and Upper Explosion Limit (UEL) are defined as follows: 
• LEL concentration of flammable substance in air below which the atmosphere does not explode; 
• UEL: concentration of a flammable substance in air above which the atmosphere does not explode. 
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Fig. 2.2.1.1 : Flammability limits.  
 
The explosion limits are measured in mixture with air (Fig. 2.2.1.1). These limits, in the case of gas, vapor or 
mist, they change to changing boundary conditions in which they are measured. In particular: 
 
• Increasing the concentration of oxygen greatly expands the UEL, and therefore the field of explosion, while 
it has little influence on the LEL; 
• An increase in temperature tends to increase the field of explosion with an increase UEL; 
• An increase decided the explosion range is recorded instead with the increase in pressure which causes a 
strong displacement UEL (Fig. 2.2.1.2). 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.2.1.2 : Flammability temperature and pressure dependence.  
 
The LEL (for gases / vapors) is generally used for the sizing of the control systems of explosion while the 
UEL (for gases / vapors) is useful if one wants to avoid the explosion range using the strategy of saturation 
of the vapors in tanks of stoccagiio of flammable. The LEL of dust may be useful to determine the presence 
or absence dell'ATEX flows in pneumatic transport. 
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2.2.2 Limiting oxygen concentration 
The limiting oxygen concentration (LOC) is the maximum oxygen concentration (determined in the test 
conditions specified) in a mixture of a flammable substance and air and an inert gas at which no explosion 
occurs. Below the LOC mixture is not able to generate a reaction that is self sustain and propagate the entire 
unburned mixture. The LOC depends both on the type of substance tested both by gas used for generating 
inert atmosphere. The technical standards of reference for the execution of the test are the ASTM E2079 for 
gases and vapors and EN 14034-4 for combustible dust. The determination of this parameter is used as the 
basis of prevention operations dell'ATEX defined inerting, under study. In the case of hydrocarbons it is 
possible a determination of the approximate LOC through a calculation procedure simplified that requires 
knowledge of the LEL and the stoichiometry of reaction (Crowl et al. 2002). 
 
2.2.3 Auto-ignition Point (AIT) 
The auto-ignition temperature is, conventionally, the minimum temperature of a heated surface, in 
correspondence of which, under specified conditions, takes the ignition of an ATEX (Fig. 2.2.3.1). 
 
 
Fig. 2.2.3.1: Auto-ignition point.  
 
The gases and vapors present a single ignition temperature (Ti) while the combustible dusts present two 
types of ignition temperatures: the ignition temperature of a cloud of dust (Tcl, cloud temperature) and the 
ignition temperature of the layer of powder (Tlayer). It should be noted that this parameter is not an aspect 
uniquely definable and experimentally detectable, but not being of interest in the evaluation is only 
mentioned. In general, the ignition temperature tends to decrease with the increase of the hot surface exposed 
to the ATEX and increases the speed with which the ATEX hugs the hot surface. Furthermore, there are 
substances that exhibit different ignition temperatures depending on the material with which they come into 
contact. The legislation to which reference is made for the execution of the test is the UNI EN 14522 (for 
gases / vapors) and CEI EN 50281-2 (for dusts). This parameter is crucial for the identification of the 
maximum surface temperature of the appliances (electric and non-electric) placed and designed to operate in 
potentially explosive atmospheres. 
 
2.2.4 Minimum Ignition Energy 
The lowest energy required to cause the ignition of the flammable mixture is called MIE (Minimum Ignition 
Energy), it occurs at a specific concentration of the substance in the air and is evaluated in the test conditions 
specified. A source of ignition with an energy equal to MIE is said effective). It is for both gas, vapors and 
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combustible dusts, a sensitivity ignition index useful for  sizing equipment of intrinsic safety and for the risk 
assessment of electrostatic ignition. The minimum ignition energy in the case of vapors and mists, is 
dependent on the conditions of temperature and pressure to which the mixture is subject. In general, this 
parameter is proportional to the pressure, similarly to the temperature (Moorehouse et al., 1974) . The MIE, 
in the case of combustible dust, is correlated to the particle size; the finest tend to own lower ignition 
energies than coarse dust. This parameter also tends to decrease with: 
 The temperature increase of the mixture; 
 Increasing the percentage of oxygen; 
 The reduction of moisture in the dust. 
The test procedures designed to evaluate the MIE, in particular in the case of combustible dust, are made 
through two different experimental mode: with or without inductance in the test circuit. 
Experimental tests of MIE are developed according to ASTM E582 for gases and vapors and UNI EN 13821  
for dust. 
 
2.2.5 Flash point temperature  
A flammable liquid to participate in the chemical reaction of combustion must pass 
from the liquid state to a vapor state, therefore it can be said that the index of greater than or 
lower combustibility of a liquid is supplied from the ignition temperature. The flash point (FP) is one of the 
parameters used for the classification of flammable liquids. The FP is therefore the minimum temperature at 
which, in the test conditions specified, a liquid releases a sufficient amount of combustible gas or vapor 
capable of igniting at the moment the application of a source of ignition effective. There are many devices 
for the determination of this parameter: the liquid is heated slowly and periodically is applied a weak flame 
in the area of the vapors; the FP is the temperature at which it generates a flash in the area of the vapors 
triggered. In general, in a first approximation, it corresponds to the lower limit temperature (TLI) defined as 
the temperature at which the liquid will vaporize, in saturation regime, with a concentration of steam 
corresponding to the LEL [MERARD, 1999]. 
 
 
Fig. 2.2.5.1 : Connection between flammability properties. 
  
Another important parameter which allows a thorough evaluation of ATEX level of prevention inside of the 
storage tanks with the method of the saturation of the vapors, is represented by the Upper Limit Temperature 
(TLS), which represents the temperature at which the vapors saturated reach a concentration equal to the 
UEL (Fig.2.2.5.1). In the case of flammable liquids storage tanks, the internal condition of prevention is 
obtainable, then, only in the case where the storage temperature is sufficiently higher than the TLS or lower 
than the TLI; in these cases, in fact, the vapor concentration is outside the explosion range LEL-UEL and 
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vapors present are not bootable (MERARD, 1999; Ortolani, 1997). Even large excursions of the 
environmental temperatures may cause an increase in the risk: for example mixtures saturated above UEL 
stored in tanks, inert under atmospheric conditions, can generate ATEX internal to the field of explosion in 
the case of a marked decrease of the environmental temperature. The flash point is historically the main 
parameter useful in selecting attitude flammability of liquids. Starting from the flash point, the law in fact 
provides for both the labeling and in the safety data sheets you specify the flammable substances / mixtures. 
Particular attention must be paid to the parameters of pressure and temperature that characterize the presence 
of the substance and / or mixture in the production cycle. It appears possible that the process parameters 
classified as ATEX according  to Regulation EC / 1272/2008 can make locally non-flammable a substance 
with a particular risk phrase. On the  contrary, it is possible that liquids not classified according to the same 
regulation, can generate explosive atmospheres. In fact, plenty of fluids even with high flash point, when 
finely dispersed, exhibit the same characteristics of ignition of their vapors. The case of the mixtures 
represents an exclusive scenario infact, for example, assuming a binary mixture, the Flash Point does not 
necessarily lies between the flash points of the individual adjustment components. In the case of azeotropic 
mixtures, the vapor of the preparation may be greater than that of the individual components, and the flash 
point lower then. Another aspect to consider is related to the level of contamination of flammable used in the 
production cycle; the presence of low boiling components can indeed cause a radical change in the 
characteristics of flammability of the preparation, worsening  the risk of fire/explosion. The main standards 
for determining the flash point are the UNI EN 22592 (open cup test) and UNI EN 22719 (closed cup test). 
There are not, however, standards internationally recognized for the determination of the upper and lower 
limit temperature. 
 
2.2.6 Burning rate 
A further useful parameter to characterize the risk due to explosions is the burn rate of the laminar and the 
speed of the flame front. The laminar burning velocity (Su) represents the speed of propagation of the flame 
measured at the maximum of  combustion gases expansion while the speed of the flame front (Sf) includes 
the expansion effect of such gases according to the following relationship (Genova et al., 2001): 
 
        
 
where E parameterizes the expansion of the combustion gases.The laminar speed varies according to the 
boundary conditions (pressure, temperature, concentrationof flammable liquid). The more relevant the 
release of ATEX from which originates the flame, the more the flame front will accelerate due to thermal 
expansion of the burnt gases. 
 
2.3 Regulatory framework 
2.3.1 ATEX Directive 
At national level, the social directives and product of the European Union in the field of explosive 
atmospheres (ATEX) were implemented in 2003 thanks to the following measures: 
 Product Directive 2014/34/EU for the regulation of equipment intended for use in areas at risk of 
explosion; The directive is aimed at manufacturers of equipment intended for use in areas with 
potentially explosive atmospheres and is manifested by the obligation of certification of these 
products; Directive 94/9/EC is from this repealed with effect from 20 April 2016; 
 Social Directive 99/92/EC  transposed in the first legislative decree. N. 626/1994 and now in Title 
XI, Decree. N. 812008, for the safety and health of workers in explosive atmospheres; It applies in 
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environments subjected to risk of explosion, where plants and certified equipment are ready for use 
and thus relates to the users. 
 
Tab. 2.3.1.1.:  ATEX Regulation  94/9/EC. 
ATEX 94/9/EC 
Correspondance between zones and categories 
Group I 
[Underground mining, methane and 
combustible dust] 
Group II 
[Surface, gas/air or mixture of dust/air, vapors] 
Category M Category 1 Category 2 Category 3 
1 2 
G 
[Gases, 
Mists 
vapors 
Zone 0] 
D 
[Dust, 
Zone 
20] 
G [Gases,mists 
vapors Zone 
1] 
D 
[Dust 
Zone 
21] 
G [Gases, 
mists vapors 
Zone 2] 
D [Dust 
Zone 
22] 
Equipments 
ensuring a very 
high level of 
protection. 
Guaranteed 
operations in 
case of possible 
errors 
Equipments 
ensuring a high 
level of 
protection in case 
an explosive 
atmosphere 
occurs, operation 
interruption is 
possible. 
Equipments ensuring 
a very high level of 
protection. Explosive 
atmospheres are 
present continuously 
for long period or 
frequently. 
Equipments ensuring a 
high level of protection. 
Explosive atmospheres 
are likely to occur. 
Equipments ensuring a 
normal level of 
protection. Explosive 
atmospheres are unlikely 
to occur or, if they do 
occur, are likely to to do 
so only infrequently and 
for a short period only. 
 
This legislation reveals links and interconnections particularly deep. A first “bridge” between the Title XI, 
Decree. N. 81/2008 and Presidential Decree n. 126/1998 is given to Part B of Annex L, Legislative Decree. 
N. 81/2008. It specifies, in fact, that, within the areas classified and extended, must be taken appliances 
(electric and non-electric) with a category of resistance at ignition suitable to the type of area classified as 
follows and in Fig. 2.2.6: 
 In zone 0 or zone 20, category 1 equipment; 
 In zone 1 or zone 21, category 1 equipment or Category 2; 
 In zone 2 or zone 22, category 1 equipment, 2 or 3. 
A second link between the two regulatory areas is provided by the general philosophy of approach to the 
problem ATEX: both the employer (Title XI, Decree. N. 81/2008) and the manufacturer (Presidential Decree 
no. 126/1998) must in fact make reference to or the same principles. This comparison between the two 
legislative provisions highlights a common approach to security explosion that goes back to the following 
principles: 
 Avoid during operation of the equipment and work training ATEX extended and classified; 
 Where this is not possible, it prevents that the potential ignition sources become active and effective; 
 In the remaining situations where not even this requirement is feasible, provide protection against 
explosions. 
An explosive atmosphere in accordance with Directive 94/9/EC is defined as a mixture: 
i) of flammable substances in the form of gases, vapors, mists or dusts; 
ii) with air; 
iii) in certain atmospheric conditions; 
iv) in which, following ignition, combustion spreads to the entire unburned mixture (note that - especially in 
the presence of dust - not always all combustible material is consumed by the combustion). 
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An atmosphere which could become explosive due to local conditions and / or operational is called a 
potentially explosive atmosphere. It 'just to this kind of potentially explosive atmosphere which are intended 
products covered by Directive 94/9/EC. The atmospheric conditions considered for the purposes of the 
definition of an explosive atmosphere provide an oxygen concentration of approximately 21% and reference 
levels of pressure and temperature, respectively, equal to 101.325 Pa and 293,15 K. Compared to the 
reference values of pressure and temperature, are permitted variations, provided that they do not affect 
significantly the explosive properties of the substance flammable or combustible. In this regard, the 
Guidelines of the European Community for the application of the Directive 94/9/EC suggest to consider, for 
applications, a range around the reference values of 0.8 bar and 1.1 bar for the pressure and equal to 20 ° C 
and 60 ° C for the temperature. The combustion air is the substance at which the fuel burns; in our case it is 
the oxygen contained in the air in a percentage of about 21% by volume. The substances, which combined 
with the air can cause the exothermic reaction of said explosion are flammable, with the exception of the 
dust, for which it is preferred to use the term fuels: with these meanings will be indicated from this point on 
these substances. Flammable liquids are classified, for security purposes and in accordance with the 
Ministerial Decree of 31 July 1934, based on the flash point (Ti) in: 
 Category A: highly flammable liquids. Ti <21 ° C. They are the most dangerous products as extremely 
flammable even at room temperature and must be kept away from possible triggers; 
 Category B: flammable liquids have a flash point between 21 and 65 ° C; 
 Category C: (Ti > 65 ° C). 
 
Inks products at Huber Italy are classified, according to the ministerial decree of 31 July 1934, under 
Category A. Directive 94/9 / EC, as product directive, may in each case relate to the marketing of a wide 
range of devices simple or complex systems of autonomous protective, assemblies of equipment, 
components, devices etc. For this reason, the manufacturer will not always be able to know all the 
characteristics of the product or of the final plant to which the product will do their own part. In these cases it 
is understandable the limit of the manufacturer in carrying out the principles of integrated explosion safety. 
The evaluation of the risk of explosion in fact, must take into account in general of the dangers inherent in 
the overall system due to: 
 Equipment, protective systems and components themselves; 
  Interaction between equipment, protective systems and components and the substances covered; 
  The industrial process made specific equipment, protective systems and components; 
  Interactions of individual processes in different parts of equipment, protective systems and 
 components; 
 The surrounding environment equipment, protective systems and components and the possible 
interaction with the processes neighbors. 
For this reason, even after the explanations provided by the European Commission, it is considered as a 
measure imperative to the manufacturer the so-called "assessment of the danger of ignition", notwithstanding 
the possible need to consider additional security measures (in terms of security integrated explosion) 
resulting from the necessary exchange of information between the manufacturer and the user. 
 
2.3.2 Classification of the area in an explosive atmosphere 
The classification of areas at risk of explosion is a useful method to analyze and classify the environment 
where they could form an explosive atmosphere. This operation facilitates, therefore, the adoption of 
measures of prevention and protection in relation to the type of classified zone. It is thus possible to avoid 
effective ignition sources are located in such areas, with the choice of equipment with an adequate level of 
protection and take appropriate security measures of technical and organizational. This classification, shown 
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in Table 2.3.2.1, is in Schedule XLIX of D.çgs. n. 81/2008 and are derived directly from defnizioni included 
in the technical standards CEI EN 600079-10-1 and IEC 60079-10-2 and IEC 60079-102. 
 
Tab. 2.3.2.1 : Definition of explosive areas according to ATEX regulation. 
Type of 
Area 
Description 
0 
Area in which an explosive atmosphere for the presence of gas is present continuously or for long 
periods or frequently (art. 3.6, IEC 60079-10-1) 
1 
Area in which an explosive atmosphere for the presence of gas is likely to be occasionally present 
during normal operation (Art. 3.8, IEC 60079-10-1) 
2 
Area in which an explosive atmosphere due to the presence of gas is not likely to be present 
during normal operation but, if this is done, it is possible to persist only for short periods (Art. 
3.8, IEC 60079-10-1) 
20 
Area in which an explosive atmosphere from dust, in the form of a cloud of dust in the air, is 
present continuously, or for long periods or frequently (Art. 6.2, II period, CEI EN 60079-10-2) 
21 
Area in which an explosive atmosphere from dust, in the form of a cloud of dust in the air, it is 
likely to occur occasionally in normal operation (Art. 6.2, III period, CEI EN 60079-10-2) 
22 
Area in which an explosive atmosphere from dust, in the form of a cloud of dust in the air, is not 
likely is present in normal operation but, if it occurs, it will persist for only a short period (Art. 
6.2, IV period, CEI EN 60079-10-2) 
 
For "normal operation" means a situation in which the operation is within the design parameters comprising 
the steps of starting and stopping; they do not include failures that require repairs and stops. In the 
international arena we have been proposed various tools for the classification of areas at risk of explosion, 
both for gases, vapors and mists is for combustible dust. Are cited, without limitation, the following 
regulatory agencies: 
 The European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization, EU - EN standards produced by 
CENELEC; 
 Energy Institute, UK - IP standards; 
 The American Petroleum Institute, USA - Rules API; 
 National Fire Protection Association, USA - NFPA Standards. 
In Italy is the Italian Electrotechnical Committee (IEC) whose task is to implement the requirements of EN 
and that provides for its application integration and contextualization through the publication of guidelines. 
Even in the face of regulatory references are no longer in force, the obvious intent of the Community 
legislature (first) national and (later) was to direct the employer to a widespread use of the standards of the 
series EN 60079-10 for the classification of areas at risk of explosion. In this sense, the families of 
classification standards issued by the various committees regulators prevednìono types, shapes and distances 
of the areas at risk of explosion is sometimes very different from each other. However, the fulfillment of the 
requirements of Title XI, Decree. N. 81/2008 requires the preferential use of technical standards and 
guidelines developed by CEN and CENELEC (EN). Figure 2.3.2.1 is a representation indicative of how the 
various organizations of international education have addressed the issue of classification of a fixed roof tank 
(production situation in the area) with containment basin, safety valve and spillway of accidental spills.  
 
22 
 
 
Fig. 2.3.2.1: Comparison between the various types of classification of a fixed roof tank, equipped with safety 
valve, the containment basin and duct the exhaust of spills. 
 
The EN 60079-10-1 is based on the effects of ventilation and in particular on the degree of ventilation and 
proposes an analytical method by which it determines the type of zone.  
The guide CEI 31-35 is based on the European standard and proposes a method for the evaluation of the 
extension of the area. Similarly with the dust, for which the standard EN 60079-10-2 proposes a method not 
analytical, wherein the zone type is determined based on the probability that happens  a dangerous 
atmosphere, while its extension is predetermined and It depends on the zone type. The guide CEI 31-56 
proposes, instead, a more elaborate method that leads to the determination of the extent of area. Subsequently 
it will be applied this method for the quantification of possible emissions. 
European standards (EN 60079-10-1 and EN 60079-10-2) identify at least three different types of emission 
sources which, taking place during the production cycle, can give rise to areas classified ATEX. 
 
Tab. 2.3.2.2 : Source of emissions according to EN 60079-10-1 and EN 60079-10-2. 
Typology Description 
Continuous 
The emission of ATEX occurs frequently or for long periods as part of the production cycle. It is 
normally present inside the containment of process where can be generated gases, vapors, mists (eg. 
atmospheric tanks, reactors process) or combustible dust in suspension (eg. silos, conveyors). 
Of first 
degree 
The emission of ATEX occurs periodically or occasionally during normal operation and can originate 
both inside and outside of the containment. Typical examples are the safety valves in the case of gases, 
vapors and mists, or the loading zones FUBC in the case of combustible dust. 
Of second 
degree 
The emission ATEX is not present during normal operation and if it occurs it is possible only 
infrequently. In the case of gases, vapors or mists, it is often associated to failure and seals of flange 
wear and / or improper maintenance of the gasket or, in the case of combustible dust, in the presence of 
layers in storage not managed with periodic appropriate cleaning. 
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From the identification of the degree (or degrees) emission source directly derive the classification of the 
place where the emission source is located. The preparations necessary for the classification of areas at risk 
of explosion are therefore as follows: 
1.  Identify the plants and the stages of the production process object of analysis; 
2. Identify the dangerous substances in the production cycle and their physical state. 
3. Identify the workplace each potential source of release; 
4. Assign each emission source identified the (i) degree (s) of emission (Tab. 2.3.2.2). 
 
2.4 Ignition sources 
Under Article. 289, paragraph 2, of Legislative Decree. N. 81/2008, including strategies aimed at preventing 
explosions are generated in the workplace, prevention of ignition sources is one of the measures most 
frequently adopted. Moreover, the art. 290, paragraph 1, D.Lgs.81 / 2008 provides that in the assessment of 
risks, the Employer gives due consideration to the presence of ignition sources within ATEX. The UNI EN 
1127-1 identifies as many as 8 sources of power, listed in the following paragraph, that can be correlated 
with triggers ATEX extended. 
 
2.4.1 Hot surfaces 
In industry there are described several scenarios that may give rise to localized overheating, but can be 
summarized in two families:  
 Hot surfaces due to normal operation of the process; 
 Failures in mechanical and electrical parts.  
 
The devices that can generate triggers as a result of dysfunction are electrical appliances, pumps, centrifugal 
fans, compressors, bearings, rotary valves, screws, clutches, brakes, steps tree, radiators, dryers, tube sliding. 
 
2.4.2 Flames and hot gases 
The presence of flames and hot gases is incompatible with any ATEX zone classified as the flame 
temperature is always well above the ignition temperature of any mixture ATEX. The presence of fire in the 
classified sites may be due to various causes:  
 Sigarette smoking unauthorized; 
 Electric arc; 
  Grinding; 
  Oxyacetylene welding; 
  Preheat flame; 
  Perform electrical work on the EC-ATEX equipment; 
  Use of internal combustion engines; 
  Heating resistance; 
  The presence of vehicles in hazardous areas. 
The exclusion of such sources of ignition, while it can be easily obtained during the phases of normal 
operation of the production cycle through engineering measures, information of workers, safety signs and 
procedures, it seems more difficult to implement when it is necessary to perform a bypass temporary security 
procedures (eg. maintenance work, changes of cycle, etc.). 
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2.4.3 Mechanically generated sparks 
Sparks of mechanical origin means the generation of hot particles due to the application of mechanical 
energy of solid bodies. The presence of sparks in the workplace, although resulting from a multiplicity of 
operating situations, can be summarized in the following three cases: 
 Sparks due to mechanical friction (eg. Mechanical failure to a machine with moving parts); 
 Sparks caused by operations with abrasion (eg. Grinding, cutting flexible); 
 Sparks due to impact (eg. Collision of particles with the impeller of a fan).  
 
2.4.4 Power Supplies 
The trigger due to electric material is connected, during normal operation, to the presence of glitter between 
the electrical contacts of the switches during their opening / closing or, in case of failure, the presence of 
short-circuits or overloads that may determine both triggers electrical and overheating. 
 
2.4.5 Electrostatic Discharge 
The study of cases of industrial accident includes electrostatic discharge (ESD) among the most common 
sources of ignition ATEX. The generation of static electricity is present in many industrial processes and is 
generally caused by: 
 Contact and separation of solids (including loads due to sliding and friction and Triboelectricity); 
 Flow of liquids or powders and manufacture of spray; 
  Electrostatic induction due to the presence of an electric field. 
ESD considered are listed as part of the guideline CEI CLC / TR 50404 and are as follows: 
 Glitter; 
 Corona discharge; 
  Brush Discharges; 
 Propagating Brush Discharges; 
 Conical  Discharge. 
They generally produce the electrostatic discharge when the intensity of the electric field exceeds 3MV / m 
(breakdown voltage ina ria) or if the surface reaches the maximum charge density equal to 2.7 ∙ 10-5 C / m2. 
However each of the discharges listed has a different capacity to trigger the ATEX as it can be seen from 
Fig. 2.4.5.1. 
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Fig. 2.4.5.1: Ignition effectivness of electrostatic discharge. 
 
2.4.6 Lightning 
Lightning can be a cause of ignition, especially in areas classified as type 0 or 20. For such zones, defined 
hazardous by CEI 81-10, it should be assessed the risk of electric shock. The CEI 81-10 indicates, however, 
some exceptions because, despite zone 0 or 20, it excludes the risk of explosion if: 
 The volume concerning the zone 0 or 20 does not exceed the limits set by the guidelines CEI 31-35 
and CEI 31-56; 
 No possibility of direct lightning strikes in the area with danger and are prevented in these areas due 
to shock hazard fraction of the lightning current or eddy current. 
 
In areas inside of the containment conditions, mentioned in previously, occur when: 
 The container is able to perform the functions of organ uptake and conduction of lightning currents, 
which may occur in the area where the container is installed, without giving rise to overtemperatures 
on the inner surface of the container itself capable of triggering the explosion; 
 Inside the container there are no internal systems or are otherwise no measures to prevent shock 
hazard. 
 
2.4.7 Electromagnetic waves  
In the industrial field may be present various sources of emission of electromagnetic radiation. Emissions are 
divided into the following categories (Table 2.4.7.1): principal electromagnetic emissions in working  places. 
 
Tab. 2.4.7.1: Main electromagnetic emissions present in the workplace. 
Type of electromagnetic emission Characteristics Typical industrial application 
ELF, VLF, LF 
f < 300 kHz 
λ > 1 km 
metal detectors, video terminals, 
appliances, power lines, telephone 
lines 
26 
 
Radiofrequenze (RF) 
300 kHz f < 300 MHz 
1 m < λ < 1 km 
broadcasting, welding, bonding, 
induction heating 
Microonde (MW) 
300 MHz f < 300 GHz 
1 mm < λ < 1 m 
Radar, telephone, cellular, microwave 
ovens, radio 
Infrarosso (IR) 700 mm < λ < 1 mm Thermal sources 
Visibile 400 nm < λ < 700 nm Laser 
UltraViolet (UV) 10 nm < λ < 400 nm Sterilization 
 
In addition there are sources of emission within the scope of the Legislative Decree. N. 81/2008, need further 
evaluation (EN 50499). 
 
2.4.8 Optical,  InfraRed (IR) and UltraViolet (UV) radiation 
In the visible, IR and UV, the ignition of the ATEX is due to the activation of mechanisms other than those 
of radio frequencies. Such radiation may be present in devices for measuring and monitoring, ray barriers, 
measuring a distance, optical fibers used for the transmission of dati.le optical fiber in case of breakage may 
cause a risk of ignition in conjunction fractured end (conversion of 'energy into heat). It is for this reason that 
the transmission via optical fiber can not be considered intrinsically safe. The trigger modes of ATEX are 
three topologies: 
 Resonant absorption. In the case of IR radiation the emission energy is absorbed dall'ATEX (gases, 
vapors, mists) with increase of heat while in the case of UV can be activated by a trigger mechanism 
photochemical; 
  Ignition due to laser. In the case of the issue consistent and low divergence typical laser it is 
achieved specific power of the order of 800-1000 MW/cm2 able to trigger any type of ATEX; 
 Absorption of heat in solids. The increase in temperature of a surface irradiated by an optical 
radiation depends on the absorption properties and thermal conductivity of the material, in case there 
are involved solid materials fuels, it is possible that this first heating ports to the combustion of the 
solid and subsequently ignition of the ATEX surrounding. 
 
2.5 Measures Of Prevention And Protection 
Measures of prevention and protection applicable and following the assessment of ignition sources reported 
following result from the application of the Decree. N. 81/2008 and have a general validity. Specific 
measures are set out in the harmonized technical rules to which it belongs the UNI EN 1127-1 which is 
mentioned in Schedule XLIX, Legislative Decree no. 81/2008. The general provisions applicable, placed in 
the hands of the employer, are shown below. 
 
2.5.1 Protection Measures 
Protection measures provide for the limitation of the effects of the explosion to an acceptable level by means 
of constructional measures  (in this case it is accepted the eventuality of the explosion). They consist of: 
 Explosion-resistant design. 
 Drain the explosion. 
 Suppression of the explosion. 
 Prevention of the spread of flame and explosion. 
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2.5.2 Prevention Measures 
Preventive measures are those whose aim is to reduce the probability of occurrence of the explosion. 
Anyway, they  reduce but do not eliminate the probability of an explosion, it is therefore almost always 
necessary to also adopt protective measures. This can be achieved by: 
 Replacement or reduction of the amount of substances capable of forming explosive atmospheres. 
  Limitation of the concentration. 
 Inerting by means of inert gases (nitrogen, carbon dioxide, noble gases). 
  Minimizing emissions of flammable substances. 
 Dilution ventilation. 
 Avoid accumulations of dust. 
The prevention of deflagration and detonation may be accomplished by inerting, or a procedure in which the 
concentration of oxygen present in the air is reduced by the addition of inert gases to a value below the 
limiting oxygen concentration (LOC).  
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Chapter 3. The context of the study. Analysis of the current 
situation 
3.1 Company spotlight 
Hubergroup is an international group consisting of 40 companies spread across the world. The group is 
recognized as a leading manufacturer of ink and is in possession of the necessary know-how to produce and 
sell printing paints, fountain solutions, additives and auxiliaries for printing and actually has the support of a 
specialized team and updated more than 3,600 employees who contribute directly to the achievement of a 
production capacity of over 340,000 tons of products a year. A company privately owned for 250 years has 
constantly redefined its quality standards through an intensive research and development and continues to be 
a market leader in the production of inks for offset printing and packaging printing. 
 
 
Fig. 3.1.1: Huber Italia S.p.a. 
The multinational devotes a lot of attention from time to sustainability through measures designed to reduce 
energy consumption and to rationalize use of solvents in its production lines. Research and use of raw 
materials from renewable sources and use of reusable containers and / or recyclable materials are already 
practice in their manufacturing processes. The Company has developed an internal system of quality 
management in compliance with UNI EN ISO 9001: 2008, moreover, aware of the growing sensitivity on 
collective respect and safeguard of the environment and the need to ensure a level of health and safety in the 
workplace more and more efficient, has decided to implement a system of managing health and safety 
company according OHSAS 18001: 2007 and an environmental management system according to UNI EN 
ISO 14001: 2004. It adopts an integrated management system that is based on some basic principles: 
 Develop company-wide "culture" of quality, environmental protection and the protection of the 
safety and health of workers, including contractors; 
 Search for the optimization of business processes in order to achieve the highest level of 
effectiveness and efficiency, while respecting environmental protection; 
 Improve their operating procedures for the prevention of possible environmental pollution; help 
reduce the risks associated with the transport and management of chemicals, ensuring the safety and 
limiting the impact on the road system; 
 Favor partners who share policy Huber Italy SpA safety, health and environment and verify, through 
the control of their work, which maintain conduct consistent; 
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 Establishing and reviewing quality objectives, environmental protection and the protection of the 
safety and health of workers to prevent the risks of major accidents; 
 Make available to stakeholders its Policy of Integrated Management. 
 
Environmentally, Huber Italy has obtained the following certificates of conformity: 
 Certificate of compliance OHSAS 18001 110302-2012-AHSO-ITA-ACCREDIA; 
 Certificate of compliance  UNI EN ISO 9001 2008 11591-2007-AQ-ITA-SINCERT; 
 Certificate of compliance UNI EN ISO 14001 2004 110644-2012-AE-ITA-ACCREDIA. 
 
3.2 Planimetric description 
The company is located in an area of 48.000 m2, 18.000 of which are covered, divided in three areas as 
follows, in order to avoid disturbing that can be during the production or in the event of an accident: 
 Plant 1; 
 Plant 2; 
 Caretakers house. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.2.1: Eye view of the company. 
 
Plant 1 is mostly dedicated to the mixing, grinding and refining process of raw materials (Fig. 3.2.2) and 
then, in the remaining one, are located offices and a laboratory. Plant 2, in addition to the production area,  
hosts a storage for water based and solvent based inks, a raw materials warehouse and a pigments warehouse  
(Fig. 3.2.3). 
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Fig. 3.2.2: Production area. 
 
 
Fig. 3.2.3: Ink’s Warehouse. 
Each plant is divided into bays, used for the production of inks. Each processing tank is equipped with a 
localized suction system for the conveying of vapors to a suction pipe and then to the after-burner for their 
abatement; the ventilation system in operation at the time, is described specifically in Section 3.4. Of lesser 
extent, but of considerable importance, are the buildings housing the fire prevention tank, the waste 
collection area, the local  boilers, generators, machine and the fire stations with motor pumps units and 
electric UNI / 9490 containing also the machines for the storage and generation of the foam. Outside the two 
factories, twelve cylindrical silos serves as solvents storage (Fig. 3.2.4), located in two separate containment 
basins, placed to clear sky, volume range between 2 and 10 m3. The tanks are built in AISI / 304 (stainless 
steel) , equipped with manual and automatic plant for cooling of the external surfaces with off via filming 
foam monitors controlled by UVR detectors. In the top of the tanks is installed the system and siphoning vent 
with formation of saturated air into the top. To communicate directly with the atmosphere, also the outer 
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surface is reflective to prevent solar rays to penetrate; alongside the twelve external tanks, pumps, located in 
a room protected  by foam systems aspires solvents measuring withdrawal. 
 
 
Fig. 3.2.4: Silos for sovents storage. 
 Finally, separate from the others, a bunker, constituted by two rooms built in reinforced concrete, houses the 
deposit of nitrocellulose used in the initial production phase. 
 
3.3 Production cycle   
Printing inks are made of four basic components:  
 
 Pigments - to colour the ink and make it opaque; 
  Resins - which bind the ink together into a film and bind it to the printed surface; 
 Solvents - to make the ink flow so that it can be transferred to the printing surface;  
 Additives - which alter the physical properties of the ink to suit different situations. 
The pigments and nitrocellulose flakes are stored in bags or big-bags of varying weights while solvents are 
stored in twelve cylindrical silos placed outside the plant, each of volume between 15 m3 and 22 m3. To help 
the dispersion of pigments in solvents, it is used various type of resins and in some types even nitrocellulose, 
nitric ester of cellulose, that is wet at 35% in ethanol in order to prevent its drying and so avoiding to activate 
its explosive hazard (its characteristics are reported in Chapter 3.5). The production cycle occurs in three 
phases: 
Step 1 - Varnish manufacture  
Varnish is the clear liquid that is the base of any ink.  Different varnishes are made for  different inks, but 
they are all made by mixing the resins, solvents and additives (often at  high temperatures) to form a 
homogeneous mixture.  The resins react together to some  extent  to  make  larger  molecules,  making  the  
varnish  more  viscous  the  longer  these  reactions are allowed to occur. This phase takes place in the 
mixing station (Fig. 3.3.1a)), consisting of a mixer, into which can be introduced various types of solvent 
from the distribution lines. 
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Fig. 3.3.1: a) Mixing station; b) Detail of the agitator and hatchway.  
 
Step 2 - Pigment dispersal  
The pigment is mixed into the varnish and then ground in a grinding mill (Fig. 3.3.2) to break up clumps of 
pigment and  to spread them evenly through the ink. The introduction of the pigments is by the mean of 
manual loading containers or big-bags through a hopper located on a hatch (Fig. 3.3.1 b)) ; these systems are 
supported by special electronic scales, properly calibrated, weighing the compound and blocking the spillage 
weight reached. During the spillage of substances, the operator directs, in correspondence of the hatch, the 
mechanical arm connected to the suction system (Fig. 3.3.3) in order to avoid inhalation and volatilization in 
the work environment of powdery substances; this protective meaure is required by law. Of fundamental 
importance is the type of exothermic nature reaction that is created inside the reactor that with the addition of 
pigments and nitrocellulose causes an increase of temperature up to about 40 °. As dispersion begins, also the 
mechanical work of the agitator, transfers to the mixture, the thermal energy allowing the constant 
maintenance of the temperature reached and thereby allowing to reach the homogeneity of the half – 
processed product. The duration of this initial phase is about two hours. 
 
 
Fig. 3.3.2: Grinding mill. 
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 Fig. 3.3.3: Mechanical arm connected to the suction system. 
 
Step 3 - Finishing 
After around two hours, the semifinished product is pumped to the finishing reactor. The finishing stage is 
the last step in ink’s production, having variable duration, typically one or two days, depending on the type 
of ink produced. In finishing reactors, to maintain the semifinished product under conditions of low 
viscosity, through a part of the energy produced by the post-combustion, they are heated and maintained at a 
temperature slightly higher than that in the initial phase, about 55/60 ° C. As emptying is completed, two 
coolers produce cold water in order to cool the reactors and the grinding mills and make them available to 
the next production.  
The laboratory is primarily involved in quality control, although it  is also involved in designing special ink 
formulations for unusual printing situations. Inks are tested for a variety of properties during and after 
manufacture process.  Most of the tests  are dictated by their end use.  Typical tests include:   
 Non volatile content  
 Viscosity  
 Dispersion  
 Shade  
 Adhesion  
 Slip  
 Scratch resistance  
 Gloss   
 Flexibility  
 Water resistance  
 Heat Resistance  
 Opacity 
 
3.4 Plant description 
During the production cycle, the reaction between the pigments, resins and solvents produce gas such as 
ethanol, methanol etc .. that must be evacuated to protect the health of workers, to prevent air pollution and 
avoid the creation of explosive atmospheres on workplace. In areas used for the ink manufacturing,above the 
process reactors, it is installed a plant for extraction and abatement of airborne dusts and volatile organic 
compounds divided in the following way (according to Fig. 3.4.2): 
 Line 1 (dusts and vapors collected together), red coloured, located only in the emission points. 
Process reactors for ink’s manufacturing, in which combustible dusts are used, are located in the 
following areas: Plant 1-Bay 1,2,3,4,5,6; Plant 2, Bay 1. Each point of aspiration  of powder state 
substances requires an air flow rate of 750 m3/h, therefore 26,500 m3/h for  dust suction, since 35 
points are present in the plant 1. In the plant 2, ink’s  process reactors  in which is used the powder 
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are in amounts significantly less, therefore, through the inverter, the suction fan works at the 50% of 
its nominal load, that means 9,000 m3/h. The two fans, designed according to the flow rates given 
above, are driven by inverters and equipped with suitable control unit exchange for the management 
of alternation, connected to the flow control system to that activate the second fan in case of failure 
of the first one. Upstream, a filter for the abatement of dusts is installed (Fig. 3.3.3); after filtration, 
the purified air is collected to the “clean” one, then conveyed together to the furnace by the mean of 
a single pipeline; 
  Line 2, light-blue coloured, 14.000 m3/h and 5.000 m3/h for Plants 1 and 2 respectively, but 
equipped only with a control flow valve for adjustments according to the actual needs. 
The system’s design is equal to the previous one. The Fig. 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 below show a lay-out and a picture 
of the entire suction line. 
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Fig. 3.4.1: Aspiration system lay-out. 
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 Fig. 3.4.2: Main air pipeline. 
 
To better permit the balancing and calibration of the two branches of each plant, downstream of each group 
of fans of the two sleeve filters, is placed a balancing damper operated manually. The damper ensures that it 
is equal depression of the two branches present in each of the two junctions between the vapor line and the 
other one. Diameters of the input suction pipes to the filters is 520 mm, corresponding a minimum of internal 
speed of 25 m / s guaranteed constantly during all phases of operation of the plant. This value must be 
ensured in order to avoid dusts deposit in the pipe; these deposits would be a potential source of  explosion 
since nitrocellulose dusts in drying conditions become an hazardous source (explained in Paragraph 3.5).  
To ensure that the flow rate and hence the speed never falls below this value, but to allow to close the suction 
towards the inside of sinks without that the pipe portions or the collector have decreased flow (and therefore 
speed livelihood), the system is provided with a system of descent, which simultaneously closes the valve 
towards the sink and opens a suction valve ambient air. 
 
 
   
Fig. 3.4.3: Reactor process equipped with aspiration system. 
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Fig. 3.4.4: Technical lay-out of the aspiration system. 
 
According to ATEX Directive (Chapter 2.3) and with reference to the particular shown above, it is 
emphasized that the valves (2 and 3) and the microswitch (1) are surrounded by an explosive zone. In 
particular the valve (3)  is located  in a zone 0 and 20 (category 1GD) and the microswitch  in 1 and 21 ones. 
The section of flexible pipe is of the type with coiled metal core, which is in perfect mechanical contact with 
the fixed piping upstream and downstream , and clamps to ensure electrical continuity; the overall resistance 
to earth of any point of the hose is below 106 Ohm. The ambient air inlet DN 80 is provided with flame 
arrester network and can be directed in such a way as to contribute to better the reclamation of the air present 
within the workplace. The total design air load of the suction plant is 40,000 m3 / h for the dusts and vapors 
lines in the Plant 1, and 15.500 m3 / h for the Plant 2. 
LEGEND 
1- Microswitch tire with wheel bearings for direct switching of mechanical 
and pneumatic valves 2:03 
2- Butterfly valve DN 80, with body butterfly stainless steel PN 16, 
stainless steel disc, coupled with single acting pneumatic actuator with 
spring return and pneumatic and mechanical position indicator - closed 
with tank lid open 
3- butterfly valve DN 100, throttle body with stainless steel PN 16 
stainless steel disc, coupled with single acting pneumatic actuator with 
spring return and pneumatic and mechanical position indicator - closed 
with tank lid open 
4 - piece with special detachment conical suction 
5 - clamping band of the inner coil to the flexible hose to be connected to 
electrical ground 
6 - check valve for fresh and exhaust air 
7 - part pneumatic manual switch for switching, two-button type 8 - station 
compressed air regulator with 8.5 to 0.2 bar net, filter cartridges for water 
and oil up to 0.01 nm, with manometer 
9 - exhaust hood from 30x16 cm, 15 cm high, steel AISI 304, with upper 
connection DN 65 coupled to the duct with end of dismantling the type to 
tighten 10 - control damper type guillotine  
 
39 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.4.5: Abatement filters. 
 
 The  post-combustor consists of two devices: firstly, the vapors, once conveyed to the boiler, via natural gas 
burners, are brought to temperatures of 600 °, 800 ° and 1000 °; reaching the maximum temperature. Then, 
the combustion gases pass in countercurrent, through a second device, consisting of ceramic beds, which 
have the task of absorbing the energy contained in the flue gases in order to reuse it for the continuous 
treatment of the"vapors"  line arriving from the pipe . Upon cooling, the fumes are emitted into the 
atmosphere through the chimney at about 250 ° / 300 ° C in accordance with legal limits. 
 
 
Fig. 3.4.6: Details of the furnace. 
 
Fig. 3.4.7: Chimney. 
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3.5 System’s preventive and protection measures  
For both lines, the following requirements, prevention and  protection measures, are met:  
 The filters for the abatement and suction lines are made of steel suitably resistant  against corrosion. 
In the contact points between different materials it is guaranteed the perfect metallic continuity; 
  The electrical resistance between the parts of the plant from the first suction point to the last filter 
protection of the afterburner and from any point to the ground is always less than 10 6 ohm; 
 The internal parts in contact with the sucked effluent (paint, anti-rust) and the internal surfaces of 
equipment next to or internal explosion zones, are free of coatings; 
  All plants are constructed in such a way that failure of a component to wear (bearings, fans, valves, 
filter sleeves, sensors, ..) does not cause the loss of availability of the ventilation. With this purpose, 
there are provided redundant fans that never allows the reduction of the flow for each line to below 
75% of nominal flow. 
 A possible black-out must not cause loss of the effectiveness of ventilation; in realizing the electrical 
system of exhaust systems therefore there have been prepared frameworks so that they can be fed 
through a prime line which maintains in tension, in case of blackout, at least the suction fans, for the 
time necessary to the interruption of all dangerous emissions. 
  To permit verification of the presence of any stratifications of powders, spaced hatches are available 
for quick inspection of the piping. 
  To prevent the formation of explosive atmospheres due to vapors, detectors of concentration of  
VOCs are installed on each line that monitor the concentration of solvents in continuous. 
 The detection system s are provided with double threshold; to pass the first threshold activates an 
alarm signal (in a safe area and the remote permanently manned) which mobilizes the process of 
securing (lids locking, emissions  interruption) for the branch which presents the anomaly. On 
exceeding the second threshold, it’s activated the bypass command which sends all gaseous waste 
directly into the atmosphere without going through the afterburner. In order to ensure redundancy of 
detection and control of the correct operation of the instruments installed, there is an additional 
detector SOV placed downstream of the main manifold in which are combined all four suction lines 
that guarantees not exceeding the limit concentration in entrance to the afterburner. 
 
In addition, for the lines "Vapors and dusts" containing both dust fumes, are implemented the 
following measures: 
 
 The micro switches used for direct switching of pneumatic valves and mechanical two-way are 
certified ATEX 94/9 and marked Ex "2G IIIC T95 ° C IP6X". The two-way pneumatic valves are 
certified ATEX 94/9 and marked Ex "2G IIIC T95 ° C IP6X". 
  A detection system with spark extinguishing water system is installed for each suction line powders, 
upstream of the station abatement, with subsequent second cell detection sparks for verification of 
switch-off. The nozzles are connected to the ring spark off the fire by pipeline suitably protected 
against freezing winter. 
 The abatement filters installed are of the multi section type with the sleeves replaceable without 
interruption of the operation. 
The filters and the parts subjected to excess explosion pressure  (pipes, input and output of the filters, 
check valves, airlock, screw conveyors, fans, basket door sleeves ..) are designed so as to withstand the 
stresses expected during a possible explosion in view of cost reduction systems of pressure explosion 
installed. The criterion used for sizing of the members and for the selection of mechanical components to 
be installed is the type EXPR (Explosion Pressure Shock Resistant). The characteristics of the powders 
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that can participate in the explosion are to be considered  in relation to the characteristics of  explosion of 
the nitrocellulose shown in Fig. 3.5.1 below:  
 
Fig. 3.5.1: Pressure rise vs. dust concentration.  
 
Fig. 3.5.2 : Rate of pressure rise vs. dust concentration. 
Following are the values obtained  in the test report _S102293R1V1 of Chilworth Technology and data of 
PMax and Kst of dust and nitrocellulose are extrapolated to various concentration. Pmax represents the 
destructive power of a dust the explosion develops; Kst is a measure of the nitrocellulose speed of the 
explosion pressure increase, in other words, also gives an indication of the rate of expansion of the flames 
associated with the explosion. The analysis has been performed on a sample as dried, ground and then sieved 
dust, in order to have a grain size less than 63 micrometers. This procedure, required by law, offers particular 
representativeness of the actual conditions that are established in the filter in which the effect of the flowing 
air dust naturally tends to dry out and in which the particles of higher granulometry tend to fall in the 
discharge hopper, whilst the finer ones remain more in suspension. Red indication states  the value chosen 
for the subsequent sizing of the installations of extraction and abatement. For security purposes,  it has been 
considered that the PMax = 12 bar and the Kst = 300 bar m / s are reached at a concentration of 300 g / m
3 
equal approximately to 1/3 of the concentration of 1.000 g / m3 to which are obtained such values for these 
parameters.  
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Tab. 3.5.1: Response of test report _S102293R1V1, Nitrocellulose explosiveness. 
Concentration Pmax (dP/dt)m Kst 
g/m3 barg bar/s 
bar 
m/s 
125 1,4 75 21 
250 4,6 230 63 
500 8,5 738 201 
750 11,3 930 253 
1000 12 1008 274 
1500 16,4 1416 385 
2000 20,2 1710 465 
3000 23,9 2345 637 
 
 In order to ensure that the explosion characteristics remain those indicated above and to ensure that you 
go with forming a cloud of dust in a concentration in excess of such values, is the cleaning of sleeves so, 
during this operation, it must be guaranteed its timing in order to ensure that the quantity of suspended 
dust and, therefore, the dust concentration is kept below the design limits.  
 The filters were designed and installed by providing a system of explosion "venting"; each panel is 
equipped with an alarm signaling device in case of opening of the membrane vent in order to stop in the 
event of explosion the operation of the fans. 
  To prevent the propagation of the explosion upstream of the abatement, at the entrance of each filter is 
installed a check valve of the explosion to be placed on the intake manifold upstream of the filter. It is 
guaranteed that the pressure P reached on the non-return valve in case of explosion is less than / equal to 
the pressure limit of the non-return valve (normally Plim of the valve is equal to 0.5 bar). It is emphasized 
that the section of tubing between the non-return valve of explosion and the filter is properly sized to 
resist the excess pressure which develops in case of explosion due also to the intervention of the valve. 
 To avoid or at least limit the propagation of the explosion downstream  of each abatement filters, they 
have a distance d in meters of pipe from subsequent parts of the plant calculated according to the 
following formula: 
        
 
  
where V is the internal volume of the filter. The portion of tubing up to this distance is dimensioned and 
secured to withstand the overpressure explosion produced. 
  The filtering devices are made of antistatic materials and in direct contact with the corresponding 
metal supports in order to ensure the continuity of the system (R <10 6 ohm). 
  There is an instrumentation to that verify the clogging of the filter by means of differential pressure 
gauge, between upstream and downstream of the filtering system which generates appropriate signal 
and in case of excessive decrease of the speed inside the ducts, interruption of the system. 
 To prevent the formation of explosive areas in case of breakage or deterioration of filtering devices 
is provided a suitable detection system dust inside the suction pipe downstream of each filter; the 
system is equipped with an alarm (acoustic-bright) set on two thresholds, the first signaling 
(occurrence of dust) will need to check and dissect the stretch of the filter in which the loss has been 
found, in the case of the extended alert or the achievement of a certain concentration of dust (less 
than 25% LEL, about 10 g / m3), will instead turn off the system and / or the sending of the gaseous 
effluents to the fireplace bypass without passing through the afterburner. 
  In order to ensure that there are no leaks even downstream of the Fabric Filters and to ensure the 
proper operation of the detectors listed in the previous paragraph, there is an additional detector 
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powders leaving the bag filter itself which is calibrated at lower thresholds but that possesses 
operating principle entirely similar to the previous one. 
 Control system of the filling level of the hopper (internal, zone 20; external 22).  
 Fire detection system  inside the filter that gives an alarm in the area "safe" and permanently manned 
by which it will be possible to activate a shutdown system to flooding of the filter. 
 In order to allow shutdown of a possible outbreak of fire in the filter is an appropriate nozzle system 
for flooding, correctly designed and installed in accordance with the regulations in force.The system 
is designed for the implementation of both automatic and manual flooding. 
At the automatic implementation of the system of flooding, the suction fans are instantly switched 
off and all the fire dampers upstream and downstream of the filter in which the anomaly occurs 
closed. The system must guarantee eliminate or at least minimize false alarms and thus any 
unnecessary intervention of the system of flooding. With this purpose, there are two sensors for 
detecting fire places inside the filters. Only in case of detection by both sensors it is automatically 
activated the system of flooding while, with only a sensor that detects the fire, is sent an alarm 
signal; 
 Exhaust system of the filtered product which conveys the material into a container by means of 
rotary valve which guarantee suitable compartmentalization against explosion. Discharge takes place 
preferably in big bags (FIBC-Fexible Intermediate Bulk Container, type C) and must be provided 
with detection system level (categorized 1D 3G) to prevent overfilling and/or the formation of  
cloggings. 
 Technical room has been realized in sandwich panel with transparent door access and skylight for 
internal control, where to place the bags during filling. It is equipped with fire detection and 
extinguishing system conceptually designed as that referred at the point previously mentioned 
(automatic start / manual and dual-detector system which, however, one of rise and a smoke, driven 
by the same logic and activating also the fan retainer and the closure of fire dampers) appropriately 
categorized 3GD. In the outside area, the conveying line is equipped with special water protection 
systems against freezing at least until the solenoid valve, also certified in category 3GD. The internal 
fire ring for the room is equipped with nozzles discharge (at least 2 k60) and external connection 
points are present for connection to the water mains fire. The electrical systems inside the unloading 
local (lights, motors, sensors, fire, ...) is cathegorized 3 GD for zone2/22. All equipment components 
of the plant, as well as expressed in each point, are classified as follows: 
A) The inside area of the sinks until the pneumatic valve exchange, is classified as zone 0 and 21; 
B) The section of pipe between the pneumatic valve of sharing of each sink and the main pipe is 
classified as zone 1 and 21; 
C) The main pipe upstream of the stations abatement zone is considered "clean." 
D) The "dirty" area of filters to be installed is classified  as zone 20. 
E) The installed and all the systems downstream of the afterburner areas are kept clean; 
F) The area outside the filter area is considered as a "clean" zone (not hazardous) always to compliance 
with appropriate maintenance and regular checks. 
G) The discharge area of the powders FIBC class C is to be considered zone 20 internally to the FIBC 
and 22 externally. 
 
The suction line in the plants 1 and  2 comply with the specific standards and product directives, in 
particular: 
DIRECTIVE ATEX 94/9 / EC 
MACHINERY DIRECTIVE 2006/42 / EC 
LOW VOLTAGE DIRECTIVE 2006/95 / EC 
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DIRECTIVE 2004/108 / EC ON ELECTROMAGNETIC COMPATIBILITY 
UNI EN 14491 
UNI EN 13463 
UNI EN 14797 
UNI EN 1127-1 
CEI CLC TR 50404 
CEI EN 60079-29 Components of the detection system 
CEI EN 50402 Detection System 
Following in Tab. 3.5.2 are the data related to the mass flow rate of total volatile organic compounds 
derived from the analyzes carried out to chimneys during the current operation: 
Tab. 3.5.2 : Current air flowrates. 
Maximum mass flow rate 125 Kg / h 
Mass flow average 275 Kg / h 
Mass flow idling 35 Kg / h 
 
The concentration in ducts  under "ordinary" conditions for nitrocellulose is less than 100 mg / m3. To satisfy 
the emission limits required by current legislation, filtering devices are sized according to BAT (Best 
Available Technologies), having abatement efficiency of about 99% for particles of particle size less than 0.2 
μm. Moreover, whereas the operation of three shifts, the entire system does not exceed stringent noise limits 
in the area (40 dB at night house of the nearby neighbors) . 
The extinguishing system in the areas used for production is of foam coating type, agent on the machines, in 
addition to the sprinkler type with high foam dispensing.The maintenance of the emergency is fundamental 
to the functionality and success of applying the safety rules of the system. The monitoring and maintenance 
is carried out periodically by staff, together with monthly shutdown and updating drills. 
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Chapter 4. Fire Risk Assessment 
4.1. Introduction to Fire Prevention and Protection (FP) 
 
The "Fire Prevention" is the discipline that studies, implementing measures, devices and modes of action to 
prevent, report and reduce the probability of occurrence of a fire and in any case to limit their consequences 
for people and the environment. The methods of fire prevention, therefore, pay particular attention to the 
factors that affect the causes of the onset of the fire.  
It is established that the fire prevention has a different cost depending on the stage in which it applies: 
 Work in design; 
 Work in progress; 
 Work realized. 
Except in cases of force majeure, fire prevention must be made during the design phase of the work. To 
reduce the likelihood of a fire, it is necessary to identify the risk factors for people and things, assess the 
level of risk, and thus eliminate the various causes. Moreover, to reduce the damage, once the event has 
occurred, in order to contain within certain limits the energies released by the fire, it is necessary to modify 
the conditions of propagation of combustion, creating difficulties in the combustion and by detecting in the 
shortest time possible to act before the "flash over" and allow the evacuation of people.  
This process allows the employer to take the necessary measures effectively to protect the safety of workers 
and other people in the workplace and include: 
 Prevent the risk of fire; 
 Information of workers and of the people; 
 Training for workers; 
 The technical and organizational measures intended to put in place the necessary measures. 
The "Fire Protection" is the discipline that deals with measures to minimize, in space and time, the damage 
caused by a fire in order to limit their consequences. The protection measures fires can be of two types: 
I. Passive protection: structural features, functional and topological of any hazardous fire, prepared for 
a preventive measure for the safety of life in the event of fire and to confine the propagation of 
combustion. Are those measures provided for in the design phase in the broadest sense of the word 
and that are activated not by the action of the person automatically incident. 
 For example: 
 Reduction of fire load 
 Creation of a suitable partitioning, an adequate fire resistance of premises and facilities; 
 Use of materials of furniture with appropriate class of fire resistance; 
 Design of appropriate escape routes and safe places within the building to be designed. 
 
II. Active Protection: set of facilities and fire fighting equipment, prepared in relation to the nature of 
the risk under the criteria of fire prevention, which can be activated manually and / 
or automatically to the onset of the fire and aim to contrast the spread of the flames and reach the 
extinction of the fire. 
For Example: 
 Automatic fire detection systems; 
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  Extinguishing manuals (fire extinguishers, hydrants networks, etc.) Or automatic; Smoke and heat 
extraction systems, automatic or manual. 
Preventing fires is directly linked to a proper assessment of fire risks in the workplace. The latter consists 
essentially of: identifying hazards, identify the people involved, to finalize the risk assessment and estimate 
the level of risk. The evaluation of the risk of fire is strictly linked to the type of activities and materials 
stored and handled, but also the equipment on, including the furnishings, the construction characteristics of 
the workplace and coating materials. It is therefore clear that in order to assess the risk of fire, it is necessary 
to preliminarily analyze the factors that characterize the process of combustion. Actually, the company 
examined, implements all kinds of active and passive protection. In this chapter, it is quantified in numerical 
terms the level of residual risk to which the factory is subject, which is defined as the level of risk remaining 
even though are applied devices, preventive, active and passive protection measures. 
 
4.2 Specific regulatory frame work  
The relevant legislation on the fire risk in the workplace was represented by the Legislative Decree n. 81 of 
April 9, 2008, better known as the “Testo Unico”, and Ministerial Decree 10/03/1998, entitled "General 
criteria for fire safety and emergency management in the workplace”. The Legislative Decree no. 81/08 
includes a number of requirements, intended for employers, on the prevention and protection from such risk 
within the company. The provisions contained in the T.U. relate to various aspects, such as: 
 Appointment of firefighters; 
  Presence of appropriate signage; 
  Conditions and number of fire extinguishers; 
  Provision of fire escapes; 
  Monitoring extinguishing systems. 
As a result, in particular, they have reported other decrees which discipline in detail the fire risk. 
 
4.2.1 D.M. 30/11/83. "Terms, general definitions and graphic symbols of FP" 
This provision can be considered as a starting point, in terms of fire prevention theme, to define the structural 
characteristics of a company subjected to fire and explosion risk. Indeed, it aims to give general definitions 
relating to specific expressions of FP in order to achieve a uniform application of the rules drawn up in 
accordance with the decree of the President of July 29, 1982, 577. In particular, for the purposes of a uniform 
language and uniform application of the rules drawn, it is defined the fire resistance of structures as aptitude 
of a construction element (component or structure) to store, according to a predetermined temperature 
program and for a determined time in whole or in part, the stability R, the seal E, the thermal insulation TI, 
defined as follows: 
 R: Ability of a building element to retain their mechanical strength under the action of the fire; 
 E: Ability of a building element to not let pass or produce (when subjected to fire on one side) 
flames, vapors or hot gases on the unexposed side; 
 TI: Ability of a building element to reduce, within a given limit, the transmission of heat.  
The structural elements will therefore be the subject of the following classes of fire resistance:  
       REI RE R        15 30 45 60 90 120 180 
where the number indicates, in minutes, the time during which the element should maintain, if exposed to a 
standard fire in the oven experimental, the required characteristics. 
For which: 
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 REI 15 indicates that the constructive element must retain stability, tightness and thermal insulation 
for 15 minutes first, and so on; 
 RE 15 indicates that the constructive element must preserve the stability and the seal and for 15 
minutes first, and so on; 
 R 15 indicates that the constructive element must preserve the stability for 15 minutes first, and so 
on; 
There are also introduced the definition of fire load, which will find a more extensive discussion in Circular 
n. 91/6, and the definition of the various safety distances and other terms relating to the systems of exodus. 
The Ministerial Decree concludes with definitions related to mobile means of fire extinguishing (fire 
extinguishers) and fixed fire-fighting (building blocks of networks of hydrants), introducing graphic 
symbols (Fig. 4.2.1.1) to be taken in the technical drawings and tolerances for measures of various kinds 
terms and definitions given in fire prevention. 
 
 
Fig. 4.2.1.1: Graphic symbols to be taken in tecnica drawings.  
 
4.2.2 D.M. 16/02/82. “Activities subject to the Fire Department control” 
This rule modifies the D.M. 27.09.65 concerning the determination of activities subject to fire prevention 
inspections. It also decrees the premises, assets, deposits, plants and hazardous industries whose projects are 
subject to examination and prior opinion of the provincial command of the Fire Department and the exercise 
of which is subject to examination and inspection for the issuance of the Fire Prevention Certificate (FPC); it 
is also established the frequency of subsequent visits to the renewal of the certificate. Those responsible for 
the activities under  the decree are required to request in advance the renewal, regardless of the expiration 
date of the certificates, in the case of:  
 New destination of the premises; 
 Qualitative and quantitative variations of existing dangerous substances in the establishments and / 
or deposits; 
  Every time they are in the changing security conditions previously accepted. 
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The transition from the old to the new decree is based on a careful and thorough analysis of the potential 
risks of fire, taking into account the available statistical data of experience in the activity of fire suppression 
since 1965 by the National Corps Fire Brigade. In drawing up the new list, it is also given updates due to the 
technological progress of the last twenty years. In addition to the various activities, both industrial and 
commercial, have been proposed more precise information based on the characteristics of the treated 
products and related processes in order to overcome difficulties and uncertainties which occurred in the past. 
Then, there are also introduced activities that, despite limited risk of fire, are to be considered dangerous for 
the consequences that events, also of limited relevance, may have because of crowding of people and their 
intended purpose. In reference to art. 5 Presidential Decree 151/2011 art. 5 DM 7.8.2012, the holder of 
activities subject to this classification must send to the Fire Command the request for periodic renewal of the 
compliance period fire every 5 years. 
 
4.2.3 Circular n. 91/61. "Specific fire load calculation and determination of the 
class" 
The standard is intended to provide designers and builders of manufactured civil with steel structure 
(subsequently extended to industrial buildings) the criteria for proportioning of protection against fire to be 
arranged in defense of steel structures, so that the burning of combustible material in the building is 
exhausted before the structures themselves reach temperatures that could compromise the stability and also 
important in the risk analysis carried out in the next chapter. First it must be considered the fire load to the 
premises or to the floor in question. Its value is obtained by calculating, for all combustible material present, 
the equivalent wood on the basis of the higher calorific value of the wood amounts to 4.400 Cal/kg. 
According to this parameter it is determined a classification of: 
Classe15 Classe20 Classe30 Classe45 
Classe60 Classe90 Classe120 Classe180 Classe 240 
The approximate number of each class expresses the virtual fire load in kg/m2 of standard wood. This 
number, also indicative, expresses in minutes the minimum duration of fire resistance from 
request to the structure or to the construction element in question. The classes are determined by the formula: 
        
where: 
c  number indicative of the class; 
q  fire load stated by the designer (kg wood/m²); 
k  reduction factor that takes into account the real fire of the floor space or in the building complex. 
 
4.2.4 D.M. 10/03/98. “General criteria for fire safety and emergency 
management in the workplace” 
The decree lays down the criteria for the assessment of fire risks in the workplace and indicates preventive 
measures and fire protection to be taken in order to reduce the occurrence of a fire and limit the 
consequences if it occurs. There are defined the workplaces to which law is applicable according to the 
activity carried out, as well as temporary or mobile sites. Then, are list  the names of the workers responsible 
for implementing fire prevention, fire fighting and emergency management or that of the employer. In Annex 
I, the basic guidelines for the assessment of fire risks are: 
 Identification of any fire hazards; 
  Identification of employees and other persons present in the places exposed to the risks; 
  Elimination or reduction of fire hazards; 
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  Assessment of the residual risk of fire; 
 Assessment of the adequacy of existing security measures or detection of any further steps and 
measures necessary to eliminate or reduce residual risks 
fire. 
 In accordance with these criteria, the employer shall assess the level of risk classifying it in one of the 
following categories: 
a) High risk; 
b) Medium risk; 
c) Low risk. 
The decree also distinguish the two definitions of: 
FIRE HAZARD: properties and intrinsic quality of certain materials or equipment, or methods and practices 
of work or use of a work environment, which have potential to cause a fire. 
RISK OF FIRE: probability that of  achievement the potential level of occurrence of a fire and occurring 
consequences on the occupants. 
 
4.2.5 D.P.R. 151/2011. “Rules for the regulation of measures relating to fire 
prevention” 
The Presidential Decree 151/11 (Rules for the regulation of the procedures relating to fire prevention), 
transposing the provisions of Law n. 122/2010 for the streamlining of administrative, identifies the activities 
subject to the rules of fire prevention and has simplified the various obligations on the part of stakeholders. 
DPR 151/11 sets a principle of proportionality, according to which the administrative are diversified in 
relation to the size, the sector in which the company operates and the actual need for protection of public 
interests. The new regulation on fire protection updates the list of activities subject to fire prevention 
inspections and, introducing the principle of proportionality, correlates the same ones to three categories, A, 
B and C, identified according to the level of  risk rather than size or, in any case, the degree of complexity 
that distinguishes the activity itself.  
 Category A: activities with 'technical regulation' reference and characterized by a low level of 
complexity, related to the consistency of the activity, crowding and the quantities of material 
present; 
 Category B: activities present in A, as a type, but characterized by a higher level of complexity, as 
well as activities devoid of a specific technical regulation of reference, but with a level of complexity 
lower than the assumed parameter for the 'top '; 
 Category C: activities with high level of complexity, regardless of the presence or absence of 
'technical regulation'.  
The latest version of the classification of activities subject to fire prevention is provided in Annex III of the 
DM 07/08/2012. Table 4.2.5.1 shows the activities in the corporate environment, subject to technical visits 
and inspections by the fire department and their classification according to the above mentioned:  
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Tab. 4.2.5.1 : Classification of activities according to the DM 07/08/2012. 
 
4.3 Fire Risk Assessment 
 
4.3.1 Introduction to the concept of risk  
The risk, according to the D.M. 10/03/98, is the likelihood of injury or damage to health in a hazardous 
situation; whereas the risk analysis can be defined as the process of evaluation of the possibility of accidents, 
their probability of occurrence and the analysis of possible consequences. In the chemical industry the risk of 
operating a plant generally has a high degree of occurrence, because of its peculiarity of producing  
dangerous substances: hydrocarbons are flammable and therefore can generate fire and explosion; organic 
liquids can be explosive or thermodynamically unstable, give rise to uncontrolled exothermic reactions, be 
corrosive or toxic and therefore dangerous if released. There are also the accidental overpressures inside the 
equipment and the failure of materials and structures. For these reasons, the chemical industry must be 
considered as a possible theater of major accidents. In principle, the risk assessment consists of four phases: 
a) Identification of fire hazards and people at risk. Systematic procedure to identify all the hazards 
associated with products and people involved in it. Once hazards have been identified, it can be 
changed the project in order to minimize them, whether or not it has been estimated the level of risk. 
If the danger is not identified, it will not be able to meet them at the design stage; 
b) Risk Estimation. Determination of the probability that it is realized the identified hazards (and the 
severity of any damage arising from such dangers, see also EN 1050 ); 
New classification 
D.P.R. 151/2011 
activity n. 
Typology Cathegory 
1.1 
Factories and plants where they produce and / or employ flammable and / or 
oxidizing with global quantities in cycle higher than 25 Nm3 / h. 
A B C 
  X 
10.2 
Factories and plants where are produced and / or used flammable liquids and / or 
fuel with a flash point up to 125 ° C with total quantities in the cycle and / or in 
storage ≥ 50m3. 
  X 
12.1 
Deposits and / or resale of liquids with a flash point above 65 ° C, with capacity 
from 1 to 9 m³ (excluding flammable liquids). 
X   
12.3 
Depots and / or retail of flammable liquids and / or fuel and / or lubricating oils, 
heat transfer, of any derivation, the overall geometric capacity up to 50 m³. 
  X 
15.3 
Depots and / or retail of alcohols with concentration higher than 60% by volume, 
of geometric capacity more than 50 m3. 
  X 
17 
Factories and plants where we produce, use or hold explosive substances 
classified as such in the Implementing Regulations of the consolidated public 
safety laws approved by Royal Decree May 6, 1940, n. 635, and subsequent 
amendments and additions. 
  X 
21.1 
Factories and plants where are produced, used or hold substances liable to 
spontaneous combustion and/or substances which in contact with water, emit 
flammable gases. 
  X 
46.2 
Factories and plants where they produce and / or use, flammable liquids and / or 
combustible with a flash point up to 125 ° C, with the total quantities in the cycle 
and / or storage exceeding 1 m3. 
  X 
49.1 
Groups for the production of electrical energy with subsidiary endothermic 
engines and cogeneration plants with total power from 25 to 350 kW. 
X   
74.1 
Equipment for the production of heat fired by solid fuel, liquid or gaseous power 
equal to 116 kW (up to 350 kW). 
X   
74.3 
Installations for the production of heat fired by solid fuel, liquid or gas with a 
potential greater than 700 kW. 
  X 
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c) Risk assessment. Comparing the estimated risk and criteria in order to decide whether the risk is 
acceptable or whether the product design must be modified to reduce the risk in question; 
d) Analysis of options for reducing risks. The last phase of risk assessment is the process of 
identifying, selecting and editing changes to the plan to reduce the overall risk from products. 
The starting point of this procedure is, in fact, a risk assessment of the current situation and the proposal of 
an alternative project that aims to reduce them significantly. This assessment is a "snapshot" of the actual 
situation. Although it is always possible to further reduce the risks, they can rarely be reduced to zero, if not 
eliminating activities. This term, named as “residual risk”, is the risk that remains after applying all the 
procedures for identification, elimination, reduction and control of hazards. 
 
4.3.2 Identification of fire hazards 
4.3.2.1 Combustible materials and/or flammable 
Combustible materials (cardboard packaging, wood pallets) are present in low quantities in laboratories and 
in production quantities in the warehouses of discrete storage of finished products and raw materials in the 
warehouse. These materials properly handled and stored safely, not be the subject of special evaluation.  
Flammable materials in significant amounts are deposited in metal containers and metal shelves in special 
warehouses. Some materials, present in the workplace, are potential danger because they are easily 
combustible and/or flammable or can facilitate the rapid development of a fire. 
 
4.3.2.2 Centers of danger 
There are the following centers of danger: 
 Heating plant with 1 - CT / 05-METHANE GAS boilers for space heating BUILDING N.02, total 
power of 25 kW burned. 
 
4.3.2.3 Ignition sources 
The premises in which they are deposited and processed the combustible or flammable materials previously 
described, there are no particular sources of ignition and heat sources that are potential causes of fire or 
which may favor the spread of fire. Internal movements are done through electric forklifts led by trained 
personnel. 
 
4.3.3 Identification of people at risk 
In the establishments covered by this report, and in particular in the areas of production, there are situations 
in which some operators may be exposed to risk of fire due to the treatment or to the materials (flammable 
solvents and inks). Carefully considered the various cases, will not be that one or more people will be 
exposed to special risks, in case of fire, because of their specific function or for the type of activity carried 
out at the place of work. In particular, it will not be provided for: 
 The presence of areas of rest; 
 The presence of occasional public in a number such as to determine the situation of overcrowding; 
 The presence of persons whose mobility, hearing or sight are limited; 
 The presence of people who are not familiar with the places and their escape routes; 
 The presence of workers in specific risk areas of fire. 
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4.3.4 Elimination or reduction of fire hazards 
As it regards the presence of combustible materials and flammable, both their quantity, both the deposit will 
entail adoption of particular actions to reduce the danger of fire and in particular: 
 Storage of flammable materials in local made with fire-resistant structures. 
It is still very careful when depositing combustible and flammable material so as to be separated between the 
various types available and that materials are deposited neatly on metal shelves, freeing passageways and 
escape routes. The measures to reduce the dangers caused by heat sources are summarized in the points 
below: 
 Check the conformity of electrical technical regulations in force; 
 Control on the correct maintenance of electrical and mechanical equipment; 
 Repair or replacement of damaged equipment; 
 Identification of the areas where smoking is prohibited and regulations on smoking in other areas; 
 
4.3.5 Fire Risk calculation  
To define the residual risk of fire in quantitative terms, it is used the Fire Safety Engineering software CPI 
win® FSE, by “BM Sistemi”,leader program that allows to apply the principles of safety engineering for fire 
fighting and for the evacuation of people to safe places. CPI win FSE, namely Fire Safety Engineering, 
allows to analyze the spread of fire and study the development of combustion products through the 
calculation engine developed by NIST. When integrated with the FSE Evac module allows to design and test 
the escape routes and the security plan correctness. It starts from the following mathematical model, that 
defines it as: 
            
where: 
Ci  Fire load expressed in Kg of wood or equivalent Standard/m
2; 
Fm Product of multiplying factors of risk that represent the parameters responsible for the increase in the fire 
risk. It is the term connected to the MAGNITUDO ; 
Fc  Factor of risk compensation related with all the parameters that contribute to the mitigation of risk. It is 
the term connected to the FREQUENCY. 
 
 
Fig. 4.3.5.1: Magnitudo and Frequency effect on risk estimation.  
 
Figure 4.3.5.1 shows how magnitude and frequency influence the risk analysis. 
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4.3.6 Fire load 
The specific fire load rating qf , expressed in Kg of wood or equivalent standard/m
2, is defined as: 
   
            
 
   
 
 
where: 
gi mass of the nth combustible material [Kg]; 
Hi lower calorific value of the nth combustible material [MJ/kg]; 
mi factor of combustion of the nth combustible material equal to 0.80 for wood and other cellulosic 
materials and 1.00 for all other combustible materials; 
ψi limiting factor of participation in combustion of the nth combustible material equal to 0 for materials 
contained in containers specially designed to withstand fire; 0.85 for materials contained in non-
combustible containers and are not specially designed to withstand fire; 1 in all other cases; 
A gross layout surface of the compartment [m2]. 
 
The specific fire load of design qf,d is given by: 
                  
Where: 
q1 is the factor which takes account of the risk of fire in relation to the size of the compartment and 
whose values are defined in the Tab. 4.3.6.1:  
Tab. 4.3.6.1: q1 factor values. 
Gross layout surface of 
the compartment (m2) 
q1 
Gross layout surface of 
the compartment (m2) 
q1 
A < 500 1,00 2.500 ≤ A <  5.000 1,60 
500 ≤ A < 1.000 1,20 5.000 ≤ A < 10.000 1,80 
1.000 ≤ A < 2.500 1,40 A ≥ 10.000 2,00 
q2  is the factor that accounts for the fire risk in relation to the type of activity performed in the compartment 
and whose values are defined in the Tab. 4.3.6.2: 
Tab. 4.3.6.2: q2 factor values. 
Classes of risk Description q2 
I 
Areas that present a low risk in terms of probability of initiation, propagation speed of 
the flames and the possibility of controlling the fire by the emergency teams 
0,8 
II 
Areas with a low fire risk as probability of ignition, rate of spread of a fire and the 
possibility of controlling the fire itself by emergency crews 
1,0 
III 
Areas with a high fire risk in terms of probability of ignition, rate of spread of the 
flames and the possibility of controlling the fire by the emergency teams  
1,2 
 n ni
i
 is the factor that takes into account the different protection measures and whose values are 
defined in the Tab. 4.3.6.3: 
 
Tab. 4.3.6.3: δni values. 
δni,   Function of protection measures 
Automatic fire 
extinguishing 
Evacuation 
systems 
Automatic 
detection, 
Corporate 
team 
Fire mains 
Protected 
routes of 
Accessibility 
to emergency 
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automatic 
smoke and 
heat 
alarm and 
fire alarm 
dedicated 
firefighting 
access vehicles 
Water 
system 
δn1 
Other 
δn2 
δn3 δn4 δn5 
Internal 
δn6 
Internal 
and 
external 
δn7 
δn8 δn9 
0,60 0,80 0,90 0,85 0,90 0,90 0,80 0,90 0,90 
 
The level of residual risk, based on the result obtained from the formula given above, can be obtained by 
applying the following criteria (Tab. 4.3.2.1.4):  
 
Tab. 4.3.6.4: Criteria for residual risk classification. 
RR LEVEL OF RESIDUAL RISK 
< 20 Low 
20-50 Medium 
>50 High 
 
4.3.7 Multiplying factors of risk 
The multiplying factors of risk are those parameters responsible of fire risk increase. They are directly 
connected to the concept of MAGNITUDO. The magnitude of the consequences can be expressed for 
example as a function of the number of parties involved in this type of risk and the level of damage caused to 
them. 
Tab. 4.3.7.1: Mutiplying factors of risk. 
Multiplying factors of risk  
PARAMETER DEFINITION VALUE 
Burning rate Rc 1,7 
Toxicity of the combustion products Pf 2 
Probability of initiation Pi 1,6 
Probability of personal injury Paff 1 
 
4.3.8  Risk compensation factor 
The compensation factor of the fire risk is related to the environmental conditions, the fire safety facilities 
and management organization of the work, in all aspects of fire prevention. The  parameters determining it 
are identifiable with the responses to each question, their text is reported in separate grids by subject in 
Annex 1. Each single response contributes for a portion equal to 1/n, where n is the total number of 
questions. The compensation factor is obtained, then, with the following algorithm: 
 
     
           
  
   
            
  
   
      
 
Tab. 4.3.8.1: Classification of areas according to specific fire load of design. 
Compensation factor 
PARAMETER DEFINITION 
Dok Number of questions with an affermative answer. 
Ntot 
Total number of questions to answer than "QUESTION IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE SECTOR 
UNDER CONSIDERATION". 
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The 10 parameters Ps originating the compensation factor of the fire risk are: 
 Probability of initiation; 
 Features of the buildings and premises; 
 Security operating procedures and working; 
 Conditions and likelihood of exodus; 
 Maintenance; 
 Alarm; 
 Antifire;  
 Control; 
 Security management and emergency; 
 Training and information 
 
In addition, considering the estimated fire load, areas are classified according to Tab. 4.3.5.2. 
 
Tab. 4.3.8.2: Classification of areas according to specific fire load of design. 
Specific fire load of design (qf,d) Class 
Not greater than 100 MJ/m2 0 
Not greater than 200 MJ/m2 15 
Not greater than 300 MJ/m2 20 
Not greater than  450 MJ/m2 30 
Not greater than 600 MJ/m2 45 
Not greater than 900 MJ/m2 60 
Not greater than 1200 MJ/m2 90 
Not greater than 1800 MJ/m2 120 
Not greater than 2400 MJ/m2 180 
Greater than 2400 MJ/m2 240 
 
4.3.9 Results 
In the following Tab. 4.3.9.1 are shown the protection measures on use and, so, the quantification of the δn7 
coefficient: 
Tab. 4.3.9.1: Protection measures as a function of δn. 
Description δn 
Automatic water and foam based fire extinguishing 0,48 
Corporate team dedicated firefighting 0,85 
Internal and external fire mains 0,8 
Protected routes of access 0,9 
Accessibility to emergency vehicles 0,9 
Then, recalling the definition of Residual Risk (RR): 
 
                       
 
The risk level of each area is summarized in Table 4.3.9.2: 
 
Tab. 4.3.9.2: Characterization of the Residual Risk of each area. 
Area/Sector Function 
Specific fire load 
of design 
MJ/m2 
Class Residual Risk 
Factory n.1- Bay 1 Production area 3.001 240 61 
Factory n.1- Bay 2 Production area 2.747 240 56 
Factory n.1- Bay 3 Production area 1.687 120 34 
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Factory n.1- Bay 4 Production area 4.760 240 98 
Factory n.2- Bay 1 Production area 5.451 180 55 
 
Detailed calculations are included in Annex I. The results have been plotted in the following graphs (Fig. 
4.3.9.1 and 4.3.9.2): 
 
 
Fig. 4.3.9.1: Risk quantification. 
 
 
Fig. 4.3.9.2: Risk comparison to the threeshold value. 
 
4.4 Classification of areas at risk of explosion 
The classification of areas at risk of explosion is a function of the degree of the emission source and the 
degree and availability of ventilation as indicated in Tab. 4.4.1. The classification of areas at risk of 
explosion, in and around the reactor, was drawn up in Fig. 4.4.1 according to Tab. 4.4.1. 
0 
20 
40 
60 
80 
100 
Warehouse facility n.1 Warehouse facility n. 2 
62 
47 
57 
35 
98 
RR 
Residual Risk 
Bay 1 Bay 2 Bay 3 Bay 4 
0 
0,5 
1 
1,5 
2 
Warehouse facility n.1 Warehouse facility n. 2 
1,2 
0,9 
1,1 
1,6 
0,7 
2 
RR 
Residual risk exceedance 
Bay 1 Bay 2 Bay 3 Bay 4 
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Fig. 4.4.1: Classification of areas surrounding the process reactor. 
Tab. 4.4.1: ATEX classification matrix.(CEI EN 60079-10-1) 
Emission 
degree 
Ventilation degree 
High Medium Low 
Availability of the ventilation system 
Good Appropriate Poor Good Appropriate Poor Good, Appropriate, Poor 
Continuos 
(Zone0NE) 
Not 
hazardous 
(Zone0NE) 
Zone 2a 
(Zone0NE) 
Zone 1a 
Zone 
0 
Zone 0 
+ 
Zone 2 
Zone 
0 
+ 
Zone 
1 
Zone 0 
First 
(Zone1NE) 
Not 
hazardous 
(Zone1NE) 
Zone 2a 
(Zone1NE) 
Zone 2a 
Zone 
1 
Zone 1 
+ 
Zone 2 
Zone 
1 
+ 
Zone 
2 
Zone 1 or Zone 0c 
Second 
(Zone2NE) 
Not 
hazardous 
(Zone2NE) 
Not 
hazardous 
Zone 2 
Zone 
2 
Zone 2 
Zone 
2 
Zone 1 and Zone 0c 
(a): Area 0NE, 1NE or 2NE indicate a theoretical area where, under normal conditions, the extension is 
negligible. 
(b): Zone 2 was a second degree emission may exceed that due to an issue of first degree or continuous; in that 
case, it should be considered to be the greater distance. 
(c) : It is zone 0 if the ventilation is so weak and the emission is such that an explosive atmosphere for the 
presence of gas exists practically on continuity (that is, it is close to a situation of "no ventilation". 
Zone 21 generated from 
the aspiration  
 
Zone 1 generated from the 
emission of the release 
valve of the reactor 
 
Zone 2 generated by the spreading of 
liquid from fittings and evaporation of the 
resulting puddle formed on the surface of 
the reactor and on the floor 
Zone 21 generated by 
the emptying of bags of 
powder 
 
Zones 22 generated by accidental 
spillage during loading or lifting of 
the layers in the upper part of the 
reactor and on land 
Zone 0 generated from 
the evaporation of the 
liquid surface 
 
Zone 2 generated by the aspiration of 
vapors, with the frequency of presence 
minor in view of the upstream occlusion 
of the tubing for production reasons 
 
At the moment in which it is to form 
the zone 21, it is also present zone 0 
60 
 
4.5 Need of action 
Despite taking all preventive and active and passive protective measures, following quantification of residual 
risk, it is concluded, according to Tab. 4.3.3, that the production area of the company is currently subject to a 
high level of risk, which is why it is proposed this project for the inertization of  process reactors. For the 
purpose of motivating the aforementioned need for intervention, it has been studied the chemical 
composition and the chemical and physical behaviour of the substances used for inks production. In the 
following paragraphs are studied the characteristics of the vapor phase by defining the parameters related to 
the explosion risk. The three temperatures to which reference is made to represent the limiting cases of the 
study are: 
T = 10 ° standard conditions at room temperature. Solvents temperature during reactor filling; 
T = 45 ° operating conditions in the mixing tank; 
T = 65 ° limit conditions of the system in case of failure. 
The temperature of 10 °C is studied referring to the worst unfavorable working conditions, that is during 
winter. 
 
4.5.1 Printing ink chemistry 
The ink is a mixture of variable consistency, from liquid to pasty, comprising solutions of dyes or 
suspensions of pigments in a dispersing fluid and worked with oil, with the feature of fixating on certain 
materials, such as paper or other suitable media by means of writing, printing or by the use of a stamp. Its 
chemical composition is as follows: 
 Colorants; 
 Binders; 
 Solvents;  
 Addittives. 
 
4.5.1.1 Colorants 
Pigment is a natural inert substance, obtained from quarries in India, China, Turkey, and is used to change 
color to a material; what distinguishes one from a pigment dyes, is its inability to being soluble in common 
solvents such as water, and that is precisely why the use of particular types of solvent-based alcohols and 
esters. 
   anorganic: titanium dioxide (white), carbon black (black) 
   organic: are classified with Colour Index C.I.. 
   special effect pigments: metallics, iriodines, fluorescent  pigments. 
Colour shade, transparency and purity are defined by the choice of pigment used and also numerous 
fastness/resistance properties.  
 
4.5.1.2 Binders 
Binders are those chemical substances that cause two other substances to form into one. The  ones used are 
from: 
 raw renewable materials: cellulose derivates, rosin derivates. Nitrocellulose, Maleic resin; 
  fully synthetic binders: based on crude oil: PVB, PVC, Polyurethane resin, Polyamid resin, Ketone 
resin, Acrylic resin. 
Properties conferred/influenced by the binder system are: 
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 Pigment wetting; 
 Viscosity; 
 Ink adhesion; 
 Laminate adhesion;  
 mechanical resistance properties (e.g. scratch resistance, rub resistance); 
 Gloss; 
 Solvent retention;  
 Sealability, sealing resistance. 
 
4.5.1.3 Solvents 
In the following Tab. 4.5.1.3.1 are shown solvents used for ink production and their Evaporation Index, 
Flash Point and Boiling Point. The Evaporation Index provides a  representative number which allows to 
predict the evaporation rate of the substance.  
Tab. 4.5.1.3.1: Characterictics of solvents used for ink production. 
Substance Evaporation Index Flash Point (°C) Boiling point (°C) 
Ethanol 8,3 12 78 
Isopropanol 8,3 12 82 
n-Propanol 16 22 97 
Ethyl acetate 2,9 -4 77 
Isopropyl acetate 4,2 3 88 
Methoxypropanol 22 32 120 
Ethoxypropanol 33 42 129 
Methoxypropyl acetate 44 44 146 
Ethoxypropyl acetate 70 54 158 
Methoxybutanol 160 60 161 
 
Properties conferred/influenced by the solvents: 
 Solubility properties; 
 Drying properties;  
 Solvent retention;  
 Viscosity: 
 Delivery viscosity;  
 Print viscosity.  
 
4.5.1.4 Addittives 
Addittives are substances added in order to easily create an  high performance to inks and toners and that 
deliver clear definition, striking visual impact and long-lasting color in flexographic, gravure, digital, 
lithographic, inkjet and other types of printing. 
 Plasticisers: impact the flexibility of the dry ink film, reduce the residual solvent content; 
 Adhesion promoters: improve adhesion of the ink film on the substrate; 
 Slip additives: adjust the slip properties for finishing; 
 Waxes : improvement of mechanical stability and of blocking resistance; 
 Matting agents; 
 Defoamers: reduce foaming phenomen; 
 Anti-static addittives : help to reduce electrostatic charging of films; 
 Anti-toning : reduce toning and tramlining in gravure applications. 
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According to Tab. 4.5.1.4.1, generally the composition of a printink ink is:  
Tab. 4.5.1.4.1: Printing ink’s composition. 
Organic pigments 5 - 20% 
Binders 10 - 20% 
Additives 1 - 3% 
Organic solvents 50 - 80% 
 
The Gecko Concept used to produce inks provides a maximum range of applications with few components 
and products. It involves a simple and quick formulation, simplified production, a consistently high level of 
quality, identical ink composition in all markets, condensed and improved know-how. Then the optimized 
use of resourses leave more room for more service, innovation and development together with the costumer.  
4.5.1 Type of inks products 
In detail, the production of ink concerns three types shown in the following Tab. 4.5.1.1: 
Tab. 4.5.1.1: Type of inks products. 
TYPE APPLICATION 
Process Printing inks solvent based for flexible packaging  
Raster Printing inks for high definition 
Monosolvent Printing inks for printing from the packaging 
As described in Chapter 3.2, each production is characterized by a first step of kneading/mixing, a short 
phase in a grinding mill and a final finishing. Being the grinding mill an isolated device from the surrounding 
environment, sampling was performed in the ink tank mixture, at the time of the substances load and at the 
end of the production cycle, that is the finishing process reactor. Therefore, the mixture, in the two situations, 
has different characteristics in terms of vapor pressure and volatile organic compounds. It has been described 
a result in the characterization of the three specific prototypes analyzing, in addition to the chemical-physical 
properties of a gradation for each type of paint, the data necessary for determining the LOC. 
 
4.5.1.1 Gecko process 
The line Process Ink constitutes a complete range of high pigmentation concentrated pastes based on 
nitrocellulose designed to obtain all the Series Gecko in compliance with most of the requests of the market 
in terms of fastness properties and pigmentation levels. Process Gecko is formed by a wide range of color 
index; the four-color process is available in a version PROCESS (Ethanol based) and in a retardant version, 
RASTER, for high definition printing (Ethoxypropanol based). 
 
4.5.1.2 Gecko base monosolvent 
The series monosolvent Gecko Base is the central part of the system Gecko, highly versatile and modular, 
offering flexibility according to the needs of the customer. The series Gecko Base monosolvent consists of a 
wide range of color index. They include a white and a full color, along with other special color index. 
 
4.5.2 Vapors flammability 
Hazards from processes using chemicals are assessed on the basis of: 
 Inherent chemical properties Toxic, flammable/explosive, reactive, unstable; 
 Chemical form Liquid, solid (briquette, flake, powder), gas, vapour, airborne 
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particulate (including mist, fume, froth, aerosol, dust); 
 Quantity in storage, held up in process stages, in the working atmosphere, as wastes, etc.; 
 Processing conditions; 
 Use of high or low temperature, high pressure, vacuum. 
 Possible hazardous reactions (polymerization, oxidation, halogenation, hydrogenation, alkylation, 
nitration, etc.). 
Hazards can often be foreseen from basic physicochemical principles, as summarized below. Since the 
processing temperature in the reactors decidedly superior to that environment, what will be analyzed in the 
present study will be the vapors generated by these inks and not the liquid inks themselves. It is therefore 
reasonable to consider attributable to volatile solvents the generation of the explosive atmosphere in the 
surrounding reactors and places of work. Therefore studying the explosivness  of the liquid mixture means 
studying its components in the vapor phase. Following it is studied the behavior of the vapor phase above the 
free surface of the liquid in contact with the atmospherere whether or not flammable. The solution procedure 
is divided into the following three steps shown following. 
 
4.5.2.1 Vapor pressure 
The vapour pressure of a chemical provides an indication of its volatility at any specific temperature. As an 
approximation, the vapour  pressure P of a pure chemical is given by the Antoine’s equation that correlates 
vapor pressure as a function of temperature as follows: 
        
 
     
                                                                                                                      Eq. 4.1 
Where: 
P            vapor pressure, mmHg; 
A, B, C  Antoine’s coefficient; 
T            °C. 
The coefficient tabulation is based on both literature (“Antoine coefficients relate vapor pressure to 
temperature for almost 700 major organic compounds, C. L. Yaws and H.-C. Yang, Lamar University, 
Beumont, Texas”) and estimated values. Hence the vapour pressure of a chemical increases  markedly with 
temperature. What already said, has been applied to the different tipologies of liquid mixtures and vapor 
phase composition determined. For simplicity only the BLUE GECKO_RASTER ink  has been studied since 
what really matters is understanding properties connected to hazardous chemicals. However, all calculations 
have been reported in Annex I., in addition, ink’s vapor phase in mixing and finishing reactors have shown 
equal behaviour, so the same calculations have been adapted to both of them. Antoine’s coefficients have 
been taken from literature and the vapor pressure curve as a function of temperature have been built up. The 
vapor pressure of a liquid changes with its temperature, as the following Tab. 4.4.2.1.1  and Fig. 4.4.2.1.1 
shows for the color already mentioned. 
Tab. 4.4.2.1.1: Singular compounds and mixture’s vapor pressure. 
T (°C) Vapor pressure (Pa) 
 
Ethanol* 
Ethyl 
Acetate* 
EthoxyPropanol* Ink 
0 1.589 3.381 296 927 
10 3.139 5.988 553 1.814 
20 5.873 10.105 991 3.370 
30 10.474 16.341 1.710 5.975 
40 17.900 25.450 2.854 10.168 
50 29.447 38.340 4.622 16.676 
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60 46.816 56.068 7.280 26.456 
70 72.177 79.843 11.177 42.464 
*[Antoine coefficients relate vapor pressure to temperature for almost 700 major organic compounds, C. L. 
Yaws and H.-C. Yang, Lamar University, Beumont, Texas] 
 
 
Fig.4.4.2.1.1: Ink’s vapour pressure as a function of temperature. 
 
4.5.2.2 Dalton’s law 
For a component ‘a’ in a mixture of vapors, its partial pressure Pa is the pressure that would be exerted by 
that component at the same temperature if present  alone in the same volumetric concentration. So with a 
mixture of two components, ‘a’ and ‘b’, the total pressure, according to the Dalton’s law, is: 
P = Pa + Pb                                                                                                                                                             Eq. 4.2 
If an inert gas is also present, its pressure is additive: 
P = Pa + Pb + Pinert                                                                                                                                   Eq. 4.3 
According to Rault’s law, in an ‘ideal mixture’, the partial pressure Pa is proportional to the mole fraction ya 
of the component in the gas phase: 
Pa = ya*P                                                                                                                                                   Eq. 4.4 
 
and this partial pressure is also related to the concentration in the liquid phase expressed as mole fraction xa 
by: 
Pa = Pa* xa                                                                                                                                                  Eq. 4.5 
where P is the vapour pressure of component ‘a’ at the prevailing temperature. So, if all the components are 
miscible in the liquid phase the total pressure P of a mixture is: 
P = Pa xa + Pb xb + Pc xc                                                                                                                             Eq. 4.6 
As a result: 
 The flash point of any flammable liquid will be lowered if it is contaminated with a more 
 volatile, flammable liquid; 
0 
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65 
 
 Application of heat to a flammable liquid (e.g. due to radiation or flame impingement in a fire, or 
because of ‘hot work’) can generate a flammable vapor-air mixture; 
 The composition of the vapor in equilibrium with a miscible liquid mixture at any temperature, will 
be enriched by the more volatile components.  
Then, applying  Dalton’s and Rault’s law at T=10°, the molar and gas phase have been determined as shown 
in Fig. 4.4.2..1.2: 
 
 
 Fig.4.4.2.2.1: Liquid molar composition of ink. 
  
Each component of the mixture was analyzed individually, and finally the overall volatile explosives were 
quantified to determine and study the vapor phase (Fig.4.4.2.1.3) : 
 
Fig.4.4.2.2.2: Volatile components of the ink: a) liquid composition; b)  vapor composition. 
 
At this point, some conclusions can be drawn, representing the assumptions of the project. Firstly, it can be 
noted, from Fig. 4.4.2.2.2, that 84% of the vapor phase of the mixture consists of ethanol and the remaining 
16% of ethoxypropanol; furthermore, by comparing the vapor pressures, Tab. 4.4.2.2.1, it can be noticed the 
greater volatility of ethanol with respect to ethoxypropanol. It has been, therefore, decided to assume, in 
favor of safety, that the vapor phase is 100% ethanol gas. In fact, comparing the vapor pressures of ethanol 
and mixture, establishing this assumption means attributing to the mixture a higher volatility with respect to 
the real one, thus acting in favor of safety. This also allows the use of tabulated data and thus more reliable 
and real than those ones obtained theoretically. 
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4.5.3 Flammability identification 
Flammable gases and volatile liquids are particularly hazardous because of the relative ease with which they 
produce mixtures with air within the flammable range. An increase in the surface area of any liquid 
facilitates vaporization. For each substance there is a minimum concentration of gas or vapour below which 
flame propagation will not occur (i.e. the mixture is too lean). There is also a concentration above which the 
mixture is too rich to ignite. Starting with basic definitions, the lower and upper flammability (or 
explosibility) limits (LFL and UFL, respectively) are the limiting fuel concentrations in air that can support 
flame propagation and lead to an explosion. Fuel concentrations outside those limits are non-flammable. The 
limits of flammability are influenced by temperature and pressure (e.g. the flammable range expands with 
increased temperature. Recalling the theory of combustion for previously discussed, it shows the 
flammability characteristics of the mixture under examination: 
Tab. 4.5.3.1: Flammability iidentification  of the ink. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The previous Tab. 4.4.3.1 reports LEL and UEL at T=20° determined experimentally and other physical 
parameters necessary for flammability characterization. In performing the flammability tests were taken from 
the following legislation, previously reported: 
 
I. UNI EN 1839 (LEL and UEL for gases and vapors); 
II. UNI EN 14034-3 (LEL for combustible dusts).  
Analyzing the individual components of the mixture, it is shown in the following Tab. 4.5.3.2: 
Tab. 4.5.3.2: Flammability limits of ink’s components. 
 
 
Some empirical equations used to correlate the explosion limits to the temperature (“Zabetakis, 1965; Crowl 
et al., 2002”): 
 
          
    
   
                                                                                                                         Eq. 4.7 
Ehoxy 
propanol 
Vernice 
NITRO 
34A 
Resins Pigments 
Vernice 
Nitro 30A-
EEA 
Ethanol 
LFL (%) 1,3 3,50 2,1 0 3,5 3,3 
UFL (%) 12 15 11,5 0 15 19 
0 
5 
10 
15 
20 
(%) 
Flammability characterization  
Flash point 20 °C 
Autoignition Temperature 425 °C 
LFL 3,3 % 
UFL 19 % 
Vapor pressure 3.370 Pa 
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                                                                                                                        Eq. 4.8 
 
Where: 
    is the net heat of combustion (kcal/mol); 
T  Temperature (°C), the subscript 25 indicates the reference to the ambient temperature. 
 
The pressure influences the field of explosion, with the modification UEL, according to the following 
relationship: 
                                                                                                                                 Eq. 4.9 
 
Where: 
P  pressure (absolute MPa). 
Curves of flammability limits as a function of temperature and pressure has been built up as shown in Fig. 
4.5.3.1. The temperature greatly influences the characteristics of flammability, as it acts on the vapor 
pressure, on the reaction rate, limits of flammability, on the speed of flame propagation, the tendency to self-
ignition, etc. Usually, a temperature increase produces a widening of the interval of flammability, that the 
lower limit is lowered while the top is raised. The limits vary linearly with the temperature and the effect is 
felt mainly on the upper limit. 
 
 
Fig. 4.5.3.1: LFL and UFL as a function of Temperature. 
 
 
Fig. 4..3.2 : LFL and UFL as a function of Pressure. 
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Also the pressure influences the reaction rate, the speed of propagation of the flame and the limits of 
flammability. In general, higher pressures tend to widen the range of flammability, lower pressure to narrow 
it. By reducing the pressure, the flammability limits approach each other: at a very low pressure level, flame 
spread can be prevented so that the mixture becomes not explosive (meaning negative numbers %). 
Increasing the pressure, instead, the range of flammability extends, particularly as a consequence of 
increasing the upper limit. In practice, however, the effect of pressure on the limits of flammability is not 
always easily predictable, since it is not always exerts the same direction but and very specific situation of 
each mixture. The percentage achieved by the vapors of the mixture in the air is as follows (Tab. 4.5.3.3): 
      
    
 
                                                                                                                                       Eq. 4.10 
Tab. 4.5.3.3: Percentage of volume in air of vapor mixture.  
 T = 10° T = 40° T = 65° 
Vapour Pressure 3.200 Pa 17.900 Pa 58.342 Pa 
V (%) in air 3,4 % 18 % 57 % 
LFL 3,3 % 3,25 % 3,2 % 
UFL 18,9 % 19,3 % 19,6 % 
As it is possible to observe from the Tab. 4.4.2.1.1, at the operating temperatures of 40° and 10°, the % of 
vapors of the mixture falls in the flammability zone defined by the Lower Flammability Limit and the Upper 
Flammability Limit. The progressive additions of an inert gas to a fuel-air mixture causes the narrowing of 
the flammability range to the point where the two limits coincide. 
 
4.5.4 Limiting Oxygen Concentration 
The limiting oxygen concentration (LOC) is the minimum O2 concentration in a mixture of fuel in air that 
will propagate flame. The individual component to the vapor phase, was calculated stoichiometric oxygen 
for complete combustion, whereas the following stoichiometry: 
 
C2H5OH+3O2                                       3H2O+2CO2 
Tab. 4.5.4.1: Moles of oxygen request for complete combustion of ethanol vapor. 
 
According to the method proposed by Crowl and Louvar (Crowl et al., 2002), it is, therefore, been calculated 
the total amount in terms of moles of oxygen, determining the LOC of the mixture according to the formula: 
 
    
                                                   
                          
                                                               Eq. 4.11 
 
In the case of ATEX mixtures, composed of more flammable substances, the overall LEL and UEL is 
determined with the aid of the Le Chatelier’s law: 
 
    
 
 
  
    
                                                                                                                               Eq. 4.12 
 Vapor phase (%v/v) Mol of O2/mol of compound Mol of O2 request 
Ethanol 100 3 3 
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Where Xi is the mole fraction or volume of the ith substance. According to Eq. 4.12, thus assuming 100% 
Ethanol and on the basis of Eq. 4.11, LOC value has been calculated: 
 
    
                  
                
 
     
 
      
It’s easily understandable that the mixture in contact with air is flammable, since air oxygen composition is 
21%. The European Printing Inks Association, to which reference is made in this study, recommend strongly 
to maintain an inert atmosphere in tanks containing flammable hazardous liquids, ensuring a minimum 
oxygen concentration below 8%; this guideline has been issued by the European Printing Inks Association 
(EUPIA) on september 2007- replaces the july 2004 edition - for all industries handling flammable liquids in 
coatings and printing inks manufacturing sites, as raw materials, finished products or others. 
 
Tab. 4.5.4.1: Limiting Oxygen Concentration: theoretical and experimental calculation. 
 Stoichiometric moles of O2 LFL (%) LOC (%) 
T = 20° 3 3,3 9,9 % 
T = 45° 3 3,25 9,51 % 
T = 65° 3 3,2 9,75 % 
 
The lower accuracy attributable to the results obtained at T = 45 °C and T= 65 °C is connected to the fact 
that the LFL were obtained by a theoretical interpolation (Eq. 4.7 and 4.8), while the result is an 
experimental data. That rule is less adequate, still generally conservative in predicting the UFL of mixtures, 
but unfortunately it is not of interest this parameter.  
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Chapter 5. Alternative solution – Tanks blanketing 
 
Preventing the formation of ATEX in workplaces imposes specific obligation in place head to the Employer. 
In this sense, the art.289, paragraph 1 of Legislative Decree. N. 81/2008 is particularly explicit, reciting: 
"For the purpose of prevention and explosion protection, based on an assessment of risks and the general 
principles of protection under Article. 15, Leg. n. 81/2008, the employer shall take technical and 
organizational measures to the nature of the business: in particular, the employer prevents the formation of 
explosive atmospheres. " 
Strategies aimed at preventing the formation of potential ATEX consist mainly of technical solutions:  
 Adoption of a general ventilation with the following characteristics: HIGH degree of ventilation and 
GOOD availability; 
 Containment or vacuum dust with GOOD availability; 
 GOOD level of maintaining or cleaning of dust layers; 
 HIGH (or MEDIA) Local exhaust or degree of effectiveness and GOOD availability; 
 Minimization of the emissions through the adoption of high efficiency seals (eg. spiro metal in place 
of the compressed fiber); 
 Maintenance of facilities aimed at the minimization of releases; 
 Adoption of explosion control system which limit the classification of the far field; 
 Inerting gas; 
 Concentration of flammable mixture outside the explosion range LEL-UEL; 
  Substitution or reduction of the amount of substances capable of forming ATEX (dilution of 
flammable with water, the presence of sufficient moisture in powders). 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the prevention of the formation of ATEX in production areas, is actually 
implemented through local exhaust with HIGH degree of effectiveness; however, as estimated in the fire risk 
assessment, Chapter 4, this measure is not yet sufficient to obtain an acceptable residual risk. It is therefore 
proposed, following, the study of the inertization technique as a preventative measure, alternative to the 
current one, in order to reduce the residual risk to a more acceptable value. Particular reference is made to 
NFPA 69 (National Fire Protection Association, 1997), Standard on Explosion Prevention Systems: this 
standard provides requirements for installing systems for the prevention and control of explosions in 
enclosures that contain flammable concentrations of flammable gases, vapors, mists, dusts, or hybrid 
mixtures. 
 
5.1 Inertization 
As already mentioned, the Title XI (“protection from explosive atmospheres”) of Legislative Decree no. 
81/2008 lists the various measures that companies need to take to assess and prevent risks from explosive 
atmospheres, where "explosive atmosphere" means mixtures with air at atmospheric conditions, of 
flammable substances in the form of gases, vapors, mists or dusts in which, after ignition, combustion 
spreads throughout the unburnt mixture. The flammability diagram, presented in the following Section 5.2, 
provides target gas concentrations to avoid the flammability zone. Inerting and purging procedures are used 
to achieve that concentration. The inerting is the main strategy to prevent the formation of explosive 
mixtures inside the containment process. It consists in adding an inert gas to the point to which is reached an 
oxygen concentration such as to allow the closure of the explosion range (LEL-UEL). This concentration of 
oxygen is defined LOC (defined and determined in Chapter 4.4.4) and is a function of the inert gas used 
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(Tab 5.1.1). The power of the inerting gas is a function of the chemical species used and decreases in the 
following order: 
1. Carbon dioxide; 
2. Water vapour; 
3. Exhaust gases produced by motors; 
4. Nitrogen; 
5. Argon or helium. 
Not all inert gases are, however, usable in industrial systems. In particular, the water vapor and the carbon 
dioxide can react with the light-metal dusts (eg. Aluminum, magnesium, titanium) while nitrogen promotes 
exothermic reactions at high temperature with powders of magnesium. The effectiveness inerting of the 
water vapor, also, is strongly conditioned by the presence of cold walls on which the vapor condenses; this 
phenomenon can occur especially during startup of process plants not preheated. The carbon dioxide, finally, 
promotes the generation of electrostatic charges that can provoke serious risks of ignition in cases where the 
mixture is not completely inert. Tab. 5.1.1 shows the main advantages and disadvantages of using the most 
common inerting gas. 
Tab. 5.1.1: Advantages and disadvantages of most common inerting gas. 
Gas Advantages Disadvantages 
Carbon 
dioxide 
It is available in the form of compressed gas 
cylinders or through the recovery of exhaust 
gases of the process. The actual percentages of 
oxygen are allowed higher than required using 
nitrogen. It has a moderate cost (almost nil if 
produced by the process). 
Some metals may react violently (Al, Mg). The CO2 
stream may generate a considerable accumulation of 
electrostatic charges. 
Water 
vapour 
It can be generated by technological processes 
in the system. 
It may not be available during the phases of start and 
stop of the plant. The water vapor is incompatible with 
many combustible dusts. Condensation can disable the 
neutralizing process. 
Exhaust 
gas 
Usually available as exhaust of the combustion 
process. Very modest cost. 
It is necessary to install heat exchangers, scrubbers, 
sensors that detect the presence of flammable vapors, 
sensors that intercept any hot coals. Prò react with some 
dust. The storage is not practiced so that the availability 
of the gas is linked to the operation of the process that 
generates the exhaust gas. 
Nitrogen 
It is available in the form of cryogenic gas 
compressed and, in some cases, as a waste 
product of the process. 
It is less effective, in terms of concentration, compared 
to carbon dioxide. It reacts at high temperatures with 
the magnesium. 
Argon 
and 
Helium 
They do not contaminate the products and does 
not react with them. 
Very expensive. 
Of course the choice of the inert gas should be realized considering some factors including: 
 Efficacy or inerting gas; 
 Possibility of storage; 
 Ability to supply; 
 Cost of gas; 
 Process conditions; 
 Risks related to the safety of workers. 
Anyway, inerting techniques exist for a great variety of tasks as list following: 
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Purging usually refers to the process of changing the gas concentration within a vessel or process, usually 
with either an inert gas (to decrease the oxygen concentration) or a fuel gas (to increase the fuel 
concentration). Inerting usually applies to maintaining an inert gas blanket in a vessel or process. The two 
terms are frequently used interchangeably.  
Blanketing, or padding, is the technique of continuously maintaining an atmosphere that is either inert or fuel 
rich in the vapor space of a container or vessel. An inert gas is admitted to an apparatus or pipeline in order 
to displace a process gas from it. The operation is monitored through the flow rate and pressure of the inert-
gas stream and/or the oxygen level in the gas exiting the vessel.  
Sparging means passing finely dispersed gas through a liquid in the form of bubbles in order to improve 
mixing and to increase the surface area for gas-liquid mass transfer. The technique finds use in chemical and 
biological reactions and also in stripping.  Purging and blanketing process vessels and equipment are two 
common, yet distinctive, practises to control the concentrationof oxygen, thereby reducing fire and explosion 
hazards. 
 
Fig. 5.1.1: Example of inertized process reactors. 
 
Blanketing helps protect plant personnel, products, and plant assets by reducing the oxygen content in the 
vapor space of a storage tank or process vessel, making it inert. This eliminates the possibility of fire or 
explosion, decreases evaporation, and protects the tank from structural corrosion damage caused by air and 
moisture. It also prevents air, moisture, or other contaminants from entering the vapor space and causing 
product degradation. It provides flammable products from coming into contact with the oxygen in air, 
thereby creating a nonflammable environment that prevents fire and explosion.  
 
5.2 Flammability range of the mixture 
As it is known, so that a gas or a vapor infiammabile or a combustible powder mixed in air, give rise to an 
explosion, it is necessary that the following conditions occur simultaneously: 
 The flammable substance is on the air in the field of explodibility (Flash); 
 There is any source of ignition effective (eg. Source of mechanical, electrical, electrostatic). 
 
The ignition energy of the majority of flammable gases and vapors is very low, in the order of 0.2 MJ, while 
in the powders ranges (depending on the material and particle size) between 1 and 10 mJ. It is therefore clear 
that , in particular, in the presence of flammable gases or vapors, it is very difficult to exclude a priori any 
possible cause of ignition and should therefore act on the first of the two elements; what it is required to 
ensure that the substance is not flammable is never mixed in the air within the explosion limits. The 
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elimination of ignition sources is not sufficient to prevent fires and explosions, the ignition energies are too 
low and ignition sources too plentiful to use this as the primary prevention mechanism. A more robust design 
alternative is to prevent the existance of flammable mixtures as the primary control, followed by the 
elimination of ignition sources as the secondary control. The flammability diagram is an important tool for 
determining if a flammable mixture exists, and to provide target concentrations for inerting and purging 
procedures presented in Section 5.5. The explosion range of a flammable substance mixed with the air is less 
and less extensive than that of the same with the only flammable oxygen, as the nitrogen present in the air 
(about 79%) does not react chemically in the combustion and is therefore to consider a diluent which reduces 
the flammability of the mixture. The presence of inert gases (N2, CO2, etc.) substantially lowers the upper 
explosion limit of the fuel, without varying significantly lower. The flammability triangle (Fig. 5.2.1) 
describes this connection in order to represent the behavior of mixtures fuel/oxidant/inert. 
 
 
Fig. 5.2.1: Fire triangle. 
The axis of the diagram represent the concentrations of each of the three components - fuel, oxygen and 
nitrogen. At any point on the figure, the concentrations must add up to 100%; most flammable materials 
demonstrate a flammability zone (the shaded area in figure 5.2.1) where the mixture is flammable at all 
concentrations. The blue line represents the air line. This line runs from point at the top of the triangle (i.e. 
100%)  to the point on the diagram that corresponds to a concentration of 79% nitrogen and 21% oxygen 
(i..e., pure air) and represents all possible concentrations of a fuel and air mixture. The red one represents the 
stoichiometric line. This line runs from the point on the diagram corresponding to a concentration of 100% 
nitrogen to the oxygen axis and represents all possible stoichiometric concentrations of a fuel and oxygen 
mixture. The point at which the stoichiometric line intersects oxygen axis depends on the stoichiometry of 
the general reaction: 
CmHxOy + zO2  −−> mCO2 + (x/2) H2O 
For this reaction the stoichiometric line intersects the oxygen axis at: 
     
 
   
  
The air line intersects the flammability zone at the flammability limits (i.e., LFL and UFL). The LOC is 
found at the point where a line parallel to the fuel axis just touches the flammability zone; its value is read 
from the oxygen axis. Triangle flammability diagrams is useful to determine wheter the flammable mixture 
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will form during normal operation. The hatched area bounded by the air line and stoichiometric line is all the 
points that correspond to mixtures whose composition allows the spread of flame; outside, all the points 
correspond to non-flammable mixtures. The pressure and temperature have an effect on the flammability 
diagram similar to the dependence of the flammable limits; an increase in temperature causes a decrease of 
the LEL% and a consequent reduction of the LOC. In the previous section,  instead, it has shown the increase 
of the LOC increasing temperature. On the other hand, an increase in temperature causes an increase of the 
UEL% that altogether amplifies the field of flammability of the mixture. 
In contrast to this, however, the dosage of inert gases (N2, CO2, etc.) affects the Limiting Oxygen 
Concentratiom, substantially lowers the upper flammability limit of the fuel, without varying significantly 
the lower one. In this way the flammable range narrows; the progressive addition ends until the two limits 
practically coincide, inertizing the mixture. Figure 5.2.2 shows the procedure for placing the vessel into 
service. The vessel begins with air, shown as point A. Nitrogen is pumped into the tank until point S is 
reached. Then fuel is pumped in, following line SR until point R is reached. Point S starting values are 
shown in Tab 5.2.1. A wider analysis of how to determine this value will be discussed in Chapter 5.11.  The 
in-service oxygen concentration (ISOC) represents the maximum oxygen concentration at point S on Figure 
5.2.2 that just avoids the flammability zone. From a practical stand point, an oxygen concentration some 
what less than the values would be desired to ensure that the concentrations stay well away from the 
flammability zone. 
 
Fig. 5.2.2 : A procedure for avoiding the flammability zone for placing the process reactor into service. 
 
According to Chapter 4.4.4, The LOC value of ethanol vapors in air is 9,9%, which lies between the LOC 
obtainable with the addition of nitrogen and that one obtained with the addition of carbon (Tab. 5.2.1). 
Tab. 5.2.1: Ethanol LOC values according to addition of inert gas.(NFPA 69) 
LOC 
Nitrogen 9 % 
Carbon dioxide 11,0 % 
 
Care must be taken to ensure that the flammability zone for all operations is avoided by an appropriate safety 
margin. NFPA 69 (1997) requires a target oxygen concentration for storage vessels of at least 2% below the 
measured LOC, if the oxygen concentration is continually monitored. If the LOC is less than 5%, the target 
oxygen concentration is no more than 60% of the LOC. If the oxygen concentration is not continuously 
R 
76 
 
monitored, then the equipment must not operate at more than 60% of the LOC, or 40% of the LOC if the 
LOC is below 5%. 
5.3 Type of vessels 
 
When considering a new blanketing design or an upgrade of an existing installation, the first factor to 
consider is the type of vessel. Vessels are of two types: 
 Fixed roof tank (Fig. 5.3.1 a)); 
 Floating roof tank (Fig. 5.3.1.b)).  
In this case, the inertization will be carried out on existing tanks, using cover and then carry out 
pressurization. The ones of interest are of fixed roof type. When flammable or sensitive materials are stored 
in fixed-roof tank, blanketing infact is highly recommended. Floating-roof tanks usually are not blanketed 
because there is no headspace where vapor could buid up. The headspace above in the internal roof of a 
covered floating-roof tank (or internal-floating-roof tank) is occasionally blanketed. It is commonly used to 
store large quantities of petroleum products such as crude oil or condensate.  
 
  
Fig. 5.3.1: a) Fixed and b) floating roof tanks.  
 
5.4 Possible systems configurations 
The objective of the system of distribution of the inert gas is to ensure that oxygen is always maintained 
below the LOC in all zones of the protected facility. NFPA 69 provides a detailed approach to the problem of 
supply, distribution and monitoring of inert gas. To impurities such as rust and moisture it must not be 
allowed to enter the plant to be protected; It is for this reason that the gas is filtered in such a way as to 
minimize the rate of dust and moisture transported. The system must also be equipped with non-return valves 
which prevent gas contamination caused by possible lowerings of pressure in the pressure line, or pressure in 
the vessel to be protected. This precaution is necessary in particular if there are many points of introduction 
of inert gas in the plant. It must also be kept under control the excessive flow of gas due to valves and control 
devices of the pressure continuously. In the case of recycling of inert gas, particular attention should be paid 
to the capture of combustible dust in it transported through a fabric filter systems (sub-sleeved). 
There are essentially two power supply systems (inert gas): 
 A fixed power ratio (Fig. 5.4.1): the advantages of this system are the extreme simplicity of the plant (in 
fact installed are not sophisticated and expensive devices such as pressure regulators) and the low cost of 
maintenance while the main disadvantage consists in the excessive amount of nitrogen used; 
 A variable-rate-purging  (Fig. 5.4.2): this system is commonly used and regulates the supply of inert gas 
to the fluctuation of demand. The advantages of this system consist in the feeding of inert gas only when 
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requested by acting, for example in the case of discharge of material (decrease of pressure in the 
container), increasing the flow of inert gas inlet. The disadvantages are due to the malfunctioning of 
control valves differential that may not work at times, under conditions of low pressure differential. In 
general, due to high volumes of inert gas involved, the inertization process can be realized only in 
installations confined or semiconfined, which may be only an exchange of gaseous volume reduced unit 
time. 
 
 
Fig. 5.4.1: Method of flow control for Use with Fixed-Rate Purging. 
 
 
Fig. 5.4.2: Method of flow control for Use with Variable-Rate Purging. 
 
5.5 Purging methods 
5.5.1 Siphon Purging 
In this method, equipment might be purged by filling with liquid and introducing purge gas into the vapor 
space to replace the liquid as it is drained from the enclosure. The volume of purge gas required is equal to 
the volume of the vessel, and the rate of application can be made to correspond to the rate of draining. 
5.5.2 Pressure purging 
The pressure purging is a particularly efficient system of inerting. It is normally used in the recipient process 
able to withstand overpressures (sometimes also relevant). In this method, enclosures might be inerted by 
increasing the pressure within the enclosure by introducing purge gas under pressure and, after the gas has 
78 
 
diffused, venting the enclosure to the atmosphere. More then one pressure cycle might be necessary to 
reduce the oxidant content to desired percentage.  
The concentration of oxygen decreases with the increasing number of cycles of purging until reaching the 
value of security provided for the process. Particular attention should be paid to the maximum purging 
pressure; it must always be lower than the calibration pressure of the rupture discs or safety valves 
are installed on the reactor. The concentration after n purging cycles, assuming an isothermal compression, is 
the following: 
 
               
    
    
 
 
                                                                                            Eq. 5.1 
Where: 
Cn   is the oxygen concentration after n purging cycles; 
Ci   is the oxygen concentration in the inert gas; 
C0   is the initial oxygen concentration; 
Pmin is the minimum pressure of the cycle; 
Pmax is the maximum pressure of the cycle; 
n     is the number of purging cycles. 
In the case where the oxygen concentration in the inert gas is negligible, the equation simplifies to the 
following: 
       
    
    
 
 
                                                                                                                   Eq. 5.2 
If the maximum pressure of the cycle are relevant or are present rapid changes in pressure, the process can 
no longer be considered isothermal but adiabatic and the cycles will be calculated as follows: 
               
    
    
 
 
                                                                                            Eq. 5.3 
Where: 
k is the ratio of specific heats at constant pressure and volume. 
A particular form of the above equations, provided by Barton also introduces the value of mixing efficiency 
M. There is, then: 
  
   
  
  
 
   
    
    
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                  Eq. 5.4 
Where two or more containers or tanks are joined by manifold and should be purged as a group, the vapor 
content of each container or tank should be checked to determine that the desired purging has been 
accomplished. Where a container filled with combustible material is to be emptied and then inerted, purge 
gas might be applied to the vapor space at a pressure consistent with equipment design limitations, thus 
accomplishing both the emptying of the vessel and the purging of the vapor space in the same process. In the 
hypothesis in which there are systems of direct monitoring of the percentage of oxygen inside the 
containment, it will be unnecessary to perform checks of the indirect type according to the following 
procesura valid for reactors in positive pressure: 
 Check that the containment, the rupture disc and the safety valves are compatible with the overpressure 
to be created; 
 Close the bottom valve, the hatch and manual valves vent; 
 Pressurize the reactor up to the required pressure; 
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 Wait for at least 5 to 15 minutes making sure that the pressure does not drop; 
 If the reactor does not hold pressure it can be due to the rupture disc can be broken, or the hatch is not 
properly tightened or valves have failed. In this case, stop the operation and notify the person in charge 
who will intervene to maintenance personnel. Do not carry the load; 
 If the pressure holds, vent up by opening the manual valve till to bring to zero the pressure gauge; 
 Repeat the n. times required by the procedure; 
 Proceed to load the flammable substance. 
 
5.5.3 Vacuum swing purging 
The vacuum purging is used only in containers able to withstand variations of negative pressure, connected 
to one or more groups of vacuum. In this method, equipment that normally operates at reduced pressure, or 
in which it is practical to develop reduced pressure, might be inerted during shut down by breaking the 
vacuum with purge gas. If the initial pressure is not low enough to ensure the desired low oxidant 
concentration, it might be necessary to re-evacuate and repeat the process. The cycle, repeated several times 
allows to reach with a few cycles the oxygen level of security. The amount of inert gas required is 
determined by the number of applications required to develop the desired oxidant concentration. Where two 
or more containers or tanks are joined by a manifold and should be purged as a group, the vapor content of 
each tank should be checked to determine that complete inerting has been accomplished. The equations 
governing the process are the same as the ones described for pressure purging with the specification that, 
being the vacuum process relatively slow, it can be excluded the presence of adiabatic transformations. The 
main advantage of vacuum purging compared to that in pressure is the savings in the use of inert gas. In view 
of this important positive aspect, the vacuum process occurs during cycle much more, being much more 
rapid pressurization of the creation of the vacuum in a container. Both vacuum and pressure purging are 
particularly critical in the conditions of maintaining inerting in the presence of the following conditions: 
 Containment or vented into the atmosphere. The presence of faults in the vent valves may jeopardize 
the proper generation of an inert atmosphere; 
 or introduction of liquids and gases in the containment. Operations of this type, as a rule, do not 
compromise inerting, if the input of substances is sealed to the atmosphere; 
 Introduction of solids in containment. This operation, unlike the previous one, always involves the 
contact with the atmosphere, unless not to use load box also inertized. If uploads hatch will be 
essential to provide a flushing interior coupled with an effective local exhaust outside the opening; 
  Emptying of the containment. The emptying of the containment will always be made by 
compensating with inert gas the volume output from the reactor bottom. During vacuum purging, if 
there are no systems of direct monitoring of the percentage of oxygen inside the containment, it will 
be unnecessary to perform checks of the indirect type by following, for example, the following 
procedure (valid for reactors negative pressure): 
 Check that the containment, the rupture disc and the safety valves are compatible with the vacuum to 
be created; 
 Close the bottom valve, the hatch and manual vent valves; 
 Put the reactor or vacuum up the necessary pressure; 
 Close the vacuum valve and wait for at least 5-15 minutes and found that depression does not drop; 
 If the reactor does not maintain the vacuum can be broken rupture disc, the hatch is not properly 
tightened or valves have failed. In this case stop and tell your manager that will intervene to 
maintenance personnel. Do not carry the expected load; 
 If the vacuum is maintained, vented with nitrogen at low pressure until bringing to zero the pressure 
gauge; 
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 Repeat as many times as required by the procedure; 
 Proceed to load the flammable substance. 
 
5.5.4 Sweep-Through purging 
In the case in which the containment is not able to guarantee an adequate resistance to vacuum or to pressure, 
as in the case of tanks of flammable, it is possible to use the methodology of flushing with inert gas. This 
method involves introducing a purge gas into the equipment at one opening and letting the enclosure content 
escape to the atmosphere through an other opening, thus sweeping out residual vapor. The quantity of purge 
gas required depend on the physical arrangement. A pipeline can be effectively purged with only a little 
more than one volume of purge gas if the gas can be introduced at one end and the mixture can be released at 
the other. However, vessels require quantities of inert gas much in excess of their volume. If the system is 
complex, involving side branches through which circulation cannot be established, the sweep-through 
inerting method might be impractical, and pressure or vacuum purging might be more appropriate. Assuming 
that within the system to be inerted is present a perfect mixing between air and the inert gas, it is possible to 
calculate the duration of the flushing through the following equation: 
    
 
 
    
     
     
                                                                                                                                   Eq. 5.5 
Where: 
t    time required for inerting; 
f    factor of efficiency of the ventilation variable from 2 to 5; 
V   volume of the system; 
Q   flow rate of inert gas; 
Cf   oxygen content after the flushing; 
Co   initial concentration of oxygen; 
Ci   content of oxygen in the inert gas.  
In the case where the content of oxygen in the inert gas is negligible, the above equation is reduced to the 
following: 
    
 
 
    
  
  
                                                                                                                                        Eq. 5.6 
The relationship between the number of volumes of purge gas circulated and the reduction in concentration 
of the critical component in original tank contents, assuming complete mixing, is shown on the graph in Fig. 
5.5.4.1.  
 
  Fig. 5.5.4.1: Dilution Ratio – Purging at atmospheric pressure. 
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It should be noted that the total quantity required might be less than that for a series of steps of pressure 
purging; moreover, four to five volumes of purge gas are sufficient to almost completely displace the original 
mixture, assuming completely mixing. 
 
5.5.5 Criteria for the selection of proper solution 
The method of Inerting chosen will depend upon several factors, as follows: 
1. The process itself, continuous or batch (or simple storage); 
2. The design pressure of the equipment, i.e. its suitability to withstand pressure 
or vacuum; 
3. The financial implications of the various types of Inerting: demand, price, type of generation, constant 
flow or intermittent flow, etc. ; 
4. Health and ecological considerations. 
In addition, there are several different types of inert gases available, as seen previously, for instance carbon 
dioxide and nitrogen, which are the usual gases, but also on-site exothermic gas generators, endothermic gas 
generators, noble gases, steam and flue gases from boilers, furnaces etc. They all have different 
characteristics, but the choice of inert gas is usually led by (a) availability of supply, and (b) costs. It is usual 
to use nitrogen, but it must be realised it is not the only gas available, and others may be more obscure, but, 
for given functions, may be more desirable. The purpose of the choice of inert gas is to satisfactorily ensure 
that the concentration of oxygen in the atmosphere never reaches the level at which an explosion can be 
supported. In order to ensure this aim is achieved, the Inerting system must be appropriately designed.  
 
5.6 Reliability of the system of monitoring and control 
The security of the entire strategist prevention ot the ATEX atmosphere through inerting is based on the 
reliability of monitoring systems, where they are provided. A system of monitoring and control is essential to 
establish and maintain the safety conditions achievable with inerting. The reliability of this system is 
therefore essential to reduce the risk from explosive atmospheres. The reliability of the system of monitoring 
and control must be ensured with the application of the technical standards of the series IEC 61508 and IEC 
61511 [CEN / TR 15281, art. 8]. Three methods are commonly used for inert gas control: 
 Continuos purge; 
 Inferential methods; 
 Oxygen concentration control. 
Continuos purge systems employ a constant flow of nitrogen. This approach, while sample, has several 
disadvantages. First, its inert gas consumption rate is high. In addition, the flowing gas may strip the vapors 
in the headspace and place an additional load on the plant’s air-emission control system. And, air can 
infiltrate the headspace if the tank discharges too quickly and the liquid level drops too fast. Despite these 
shortcomings, however, it’s very common since can be implemented quickly and easily. Anyway, for this 
project, in order to give a solution to replace the current existing system, costs must be minimized, thus it 
will not be considered a possibility; pressure or concentration controls will certainly reduce costs. 
 
5.6.1 Concentration control 
Concentration control is suitable for unsealed tanks, which cannot hold pressure. It is very efficient: inert gas 
usage is optimized because it is only added when it is needed.  
An oxygen analizer (Figure 5.6.1.1 a)) directly measures the actual oxygen concentration in the headspace 
vapor and uses it to control the flow of inert gas to the tank. The conditions of most processes are much too 
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harsh to permit the use of an in situ oxygen sensor. Thus, the sample-conditioning equipment (Figure Fig. 
5.6.1.1 b)) is an integral part of the analyzer system. A properly designed sample-conditioning system allows 
the analyzer to measure reliably over a wide range of process conditions, including extremes in pressure, 
vacuum, and temperature, as well as in heavy-particulate and high-moisture environments. 
 
 
Fig. 5.6.1.1: Concentration control a) lay-out; b) equipment. 
 
The advantage of continuous concentration monitoring and control is that it conserves inert gas by 
optimizing its usage. The savings can provide an accelerated payback on the cost of the monitoring and 
control equilpment. Several commercially available systems are on the market, with varying degrees of 
complexity and in various price ranges. The determination of the LOC for the system shall be based on the 
worst credible case gas mixture yielding the smallest LOC. A safety margin shall be maintained between the 
LOC and the normal working concentration in the system. It shall take into account the fluctuations 
occurring in the system, the sensitivity and reliability of monitoring and control equipment, the probability 
and consequences of an explosion. One of the following requirements shall be met where the oxygen 
concentration is continuosly monitored and controlled with safety interlocks: 
1. Where the LOC is greater than or equal to 5 percent a safety margin of at least 2 volume percent 
below the worst credible case LOC shall be maintained; 
2. Where the LOC is less than 5 percent, the equipment shall be operated at no more than 60 percent of 
the LOC.  
In the following Tab. 5.6.1.1  are shown advantages and disadvantages of concentration control method. 
 
Tab. 5.6.1.1: Advantages and disadvantages of concentration control method. 
Advantages Disadvantages 
Direct measurement of the safety parameters of the 
process 
Inadequate level of reliability of sensors that require  
additional security measures (continuous control of both 
pressure 
the flow of inert gas) 
Minimization of the consumption of inert gas 
Contamination of the sensors with the process fluid 
Rapid detection of leaks and anomalies 
 
Because of the danger to which the production area is subjecte, is not eligible the possibility that the sensors 
measuring oxygen go out of order and therefore do not provide the proper monitoring atmosphere in the 
reactor. It is therefore recommended as a best method suited to the present situation, the inferential methods 
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exposed in Paragraph 5.6.2. The inertization can be considered effective if the oxygen content is measured 
and maintained below the LOC, taking account of the fluctuations of the concentration of oxygen or other 
abnormalities that may occur during the exercise. To that end should be checked the following parameters 
(Figure 6): 
 LOC: Limiting Oxygen concentratio (already defined); 
 MAOC - (Maximum Allowable Oxygen Concentration): the maximum concentration of oxygen 
allowed in the machine / container that must not be exceeded, even in the presence of expected 
errors of operation. 
 TP - Trip Point: oxygen concentration at which, the control system stops the process and puts the 
machine in safety / container; 
 SP - Set Point: oxygen concentration at which the system controls the flow, pressure or qunato inert 
gas. 
 
The relationship between these process parameters is illustrated in Fig. 5.6.1.1. 
 
 
Fig. 5.6.1.1: Operating parameters of an inerting system. 
 
The operational parameters should be recorded; e.g. length of time of purge, or number of pressure (or 
vacuum)/relief cycles. In the design calculations, it is necessary to introduce an appropriate safety margin on 
the LOC, already mentioned previously. 
. 
5.6.2 Inferential methods 
Among the inferential methods the prevailing, in the operations of purging, is to control the parameters of 
pressure within the containment of process (Fig.5.7.2.1 a)). Based on the number of cycles of purging, it is 
possible to determine the oxygen concentration in the final containment. These operations can be realized 
manually with the operator on board the reactor or, in the case of complex systems, supported by automatic 
systems that will have to possess certified reliability. In any case it is needed periodic monitoring with 
portable instrumentation, which verifies that the concentration of oxygen inside the container complies with 
the calculated. Pressure-control systems are employed for sealed tanks, which hold pressure: valve senses the 
pressure in the headspace of the tank and delivers inert gas accordingly. The headspace pressure can be set in 
order to guarantee a slight overpressure- but within 0,5 bar in order to not fall within the scope of the 
“Pressure Equipment Directive” (PED), product directive (no. 97/23 / EC) issued by the European 
Community, and implemented in Italy by Legislative Decree no. 93/2000. As the tank discharges, the liquid 
level falls, the pressure drops, and nitrogen or CO2 is added; as the tank is filling, the pressure rises, and the 
gas exits through a vent valve. Several pressure-control systems are available in the marketplace, an example 
is shown on Fig.5.7.2.1 b).  
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Fig. 5.7.2.1: a) Typical pressure control system; b) Pressure control valve. 
 
5.7 Existing guideline 
The following guidelines summarizes some prevention and protection measures for inerting systems (D.Lgs. 
n. 81/2008) and the classification of  inerting systems according to the task (D.P.R. n. 126/1998). 
 
5.7.1 Inertization and the D.Lgs. n. 81/2008 
These provisions result from the application of Decree. N. 81/2008 and have a general validity. Specific 
measures are set out in the harmonized technical rules to which it belongs the UNI EN 1127-1 which is 
mentioned in 'Annex XLIX, Legislative Decree. N. 81/2008. The general provisions applicable, placed in the 
hands of the employer, are as follows: 
 Choice, installation, testing, operation, inspection, testing and maintenance of work equipment, 
Personal Protective Equipment and electrical equipment in accordance with Title III of Legislative 
Decree. n. 81/2008; 
 Prevention of the formation of ATEX (art. 209, paragraph I, Legislative Decree. n. 81/2008); 
 Areas at risk of release of inerting gas must be fitted with alarms optical/acoustic token start and stop 
the system, both during the normal cycle, both during an emergency act (art. 293, D. lgs. n. 
81/2008); 
 Coordination between D.d.l. integrative compared to Art. 26, Legislative Decree. N. 81/2008 (art. 
292 and Appendix L, Part A, Legislative Decree. N. 81/2008); 
 Information and training of workers (art. 294-bis and Annex L, Part A, Legislative Decree. n. 
81/2008); 
 The emergency plan and evacuation must be integrated with the risk from explosion; 
 
5.7.2 Inertization and the D.P.R. n. 126/1998 
As regards the application of Directive 94/9 / EC to inerting systems must consider the three cases described 
below. 
 
5.7.2.1 Preventing an explosive atmosphere 
The inerting systems are designed to reduce or totally prevent the existence of an explosive atmosphere in 
specific areas. However, the inerting systems are not intended to stop or block incipient explosions, so they 
are not systems of protection under Directive 94/9 / EC. The purpose of inerting systems is different from 
that of the systems of explosion suppression, which can sometimes have similar parts, but which are intended 
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to limit incipient explosion. In broad terms: inerting systems used during operation of plants etc. Not 
normally fall within the scope of Directive 94/9/EC. 
 
5.7.2.2 Systems as inerting equipment 
A system of inerting may (in part) also consist of parts intended to be used in a potentially explosive 
atmosphere and equipped potential source of ignition. These parts are to be - individually or possibly 
combined - in the scope of the Directive 94/9 / EC as "equipment". Again, their function of preventing a 
potentially explosive atmosphere by inerting is not to be assessed in the context of this Directive. 
 
5.7.2.3 Systems of inerting as part of the system of protection against the trigger 
This device, together with its inerting system, comes within the scope of Directive 94/9 / EC as part of the 
appliance. This inerting system is not a system of protection under Article 1.1. The component parts may be 
safety, control and regulation within the meaning of Article 1.2 of Directive 94/9 / EC when they are placed 
on the market separately. In broad terms: Directive 94/9 / EC applies to an inerting system, if this system is - 
or is intended to be - built-in protection system from the start of the unit and thus serves to avoid ignition 
sources of 'device. In some cases, these systems can be part of the system of protection against the onset of a 
hearing "protected by the explosions," to meet the requirements of Annex II of Directive 94/9 / EC, ie if they 
work as a means to protect potential sources of ignition from contact. 
 
5.8 Industrial application – Huber process reactors 
5.8.1 Inerting system choice 
The type of system choosen depends on the situation of application, the following considerations were made. 
First of all, conditions required to use pressure purging are satisfied: the maximum and minimum pressure to 
which the tanks resist are, respectively, 1.5 bar and 0.1 bar. It was also calculated, as a further reason  to 
choice, the time needed for the flushing of process reactors as following: 
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Starting from this calculation and considering the cospicuos amount of inert gas required for the flushing 
process, it has been choosen the vacuum-swing purging, representing an advantage in terms of time and cost. 
5.8.1 Calculation of pressure and vacuum purging cycles 
In the following  are calculated the numbers of cycles of theoretical purging be realized with different 
operating modes (pressure and vacuum) with different parameters and assumptions. The calculation is made 
according to the following assumptions: 
 The device or from inert initially contain only atmospheric air (inerting is made before each upload); 
 Transformations of gas (both in pressure is vacuum) are considered isotherms; 
 Since there are no obstacles to movement or inside the units, considering the gases are mixed 
perfectly with each cycle, whether under pressure or depression; 
 Pressures indicated (maximum and minimum) are compatible with the resistance of containments, 
sealing and rupture discs; 
 The inerting or is made with technically pure nitrogen. It should not therefore be present initial 
contamination of oxygen. 
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Preliminarily is determined the LOC of the mixture N2 / air and CO2 / air using an adequate margin of safety 
in the experimental value CC (Tab. 5.2.1) according to Standard NFPA 69. It is: 
         
Tab. 5.11.1.1: Limiting Oxygen Concentration in Nitrogen and Carbon Dioxide. 
 
 
Given these assumptions, purging cycles calculated  are shown in Table 5.11.1.1. 
Tab. 5.11.1.1: Simulation of the concentrations of oxygen to vary the number of cycles of 
inerting. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Inert gas N2 CO2 
CN 7 % 11 % 
Minimum and 
Maximum 
Pressure 
(Absolute) 
Oxygen concentration (% VOL.) variation according to 
number of cycles  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Pmax=3,0 bar 
Pmin=1,0 bar 
21,00 7,0 2,33 0,78 0,26 0,09 0,03 0,01 
Pmax=2,5 bar 
Pmin=1,0 bar 
21,00 8,40 3,36 1,34 0,54 0,22 0,09 0,03 
Pmax=2,0 bar 
Pmin=1,0 bar 
21,00 10,50 5,25 2,63 1,31 0,66 0,33 0,16 
Pmax=1,5 bar 
Pmin=1,0 bar 
21,00 14,00 9,33 6,22 4,15 2,77 1,84 1,23 
Pmax=1,0 bar 
Pmin=0,7 bar 
21,00 14,70 10,29 7,20 5,04 3,53 2,47 1,73 
Pmax=1,0 bar 
Pmin=0,6 bar 
21,00 12,60 7,56 4,54 2,72 1,63 0,98 0,59 
Pmax=1,0 bar 
Pmin=0,5 bar 
21,00 10,50 5,25 2,63 1,31 0,66 0,33 0,16 
Pmax=1,0 bar 
Pmin=0,4 bar 
21,00 8,40 3,36 1,34 0,54 0,22 0,09 0,03 
Pmax=1,0 bar 
Pmin=0,3 bar 
21,00 6,30 1,89 0,57 0,17 0,05 0,02 0,00 
Pmax=1,5 bar 
Pmin=0,3 bar 
21,00 4,6 1,32 0,66 0,53 0,5 0,5 0,5 
Pmax=1,0 bar 
Pmin=0,2 bar 
21,00 4,20 0,84 0,17 0,03 0,01 0,00 0,00 
Pmax=1,0 bar 
Pmin=0,1 bar 
21,00 2,10 0,21 0,02 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
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Fig 5.11.1.1: Oxygen decrease according to purging cycles. 
 
In Tab. 5.11.2.7.1 are shown the volumes value of tanks located in the workplace area. As it can be 
seen from the table, sixtyfour process reactors need to be inerted. 
 
Tab. 5.11.2.7.1: Tank’s volume in production area. 
Plant 1 Plant 2 
Bay 1 Bay 2 Bay 3 Bay 4 Bay 5 Bay 1 
Proces
s tank 
Volum
e 
(m3) 
Proces
s tank 
Volum
e 
(m3) 
Proces
s tank 
Volum
e 
(m3) 
Proces
s tank 
Volum
e 
(m3) 
Proces
s tank 
Volum
e 
(m3) 
Proces
s tank 
Volum
e 
(m3) 
I5 6,9 I7 6,9 F35 8,2 ST6 10 I20 50 D10 23 
F5 6,9 F7 6,9 I27 7,1 ST5 10 F20 50 D6 11,7 
F4 6,9 D3 5 I26 7,1 ST4 10 ST8 60 D/ 11,7 
I4 6,9 D2 5 F33 8,2 D5 10,5 ST7 60 F29 6,5 
I3 6,9 I10 10 F38 8,2 F19 8 F21 15 F30 6,5 
F3 6,9 F10 11,1 I28 7,1 I19 6   F31 6,5 
F2 6,9 I9 11,1 F36 8,2 I18 10,5   F32 6,5 
I2 6,9 F9 11,1 F34 8,2 F18 10   F24/A 12,8 
I1 6,9 F8/A 9,8 F37 8,2     F24/B 12,8 
F1 6,9 I8 9       I23 11,7 
F6 8,2 F8/B 9,8       I22 11,7 
I6 11,1 I11 9,9       F23/A 12,8 
D1 11,1 F11 10,5       F23/B 12,8 
          F22/A 12,8 
          F22/B 12,8 
          I21 11,7 
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In the light of the results it can be made the following considerations: 
 At constant pressure jump, the vacuum operations require a smaller number of cycles to reach the 
concentration of oxygen demand. For example, by comparing the cycle under vacuum at 0.3 bar with 
that in pressure to 1.5 bar only one cycle is needed to reach the concentration of oxygen of 6,3 % 
through vacuum purging, on the other hand it requires  n. 3 cycles in the case of pressure purging; 
 The average concentration at the end of each cycle is only dependent on the ratio of the pressure and 
is independent from the volumes to be inertized. The parameter that varies will instead be the 
duration of the cycle, depending on this parameter the ratio between the inerting volume and the 
flow of inert gas. 
 
5.11.2 Inert gas requirement 
The amount of gas  required to blank a tank under pressure control is the sum of the gas required based on 
tha tank’s working throughput (NW) and the one required by thermal breathing, i.e., the rise and fall of the 
liquid level due to the external temperature changes (NTB).  So the total gas requirement: 
 
                                                                                                                                                Eq. 5.9 
Defining: 
   
  
    
                                                                                                                                                Eq. 5.10 
         
         
   
   
 
    
                                                                                                     Eq. 5.11 
NT   Total volume of gas required per production;  
Nw   Inert Gas required by the material flow through the tank; 
NTB  Inert Gas required by thermal breathing; 
VT    Total volume of material discharged from the tank per production; 
VHS  Average empty space; 
Tmax Maximum temperature in the tank; 
Tmin  Minimum temperature in the tank; 
F      Estimated number of temperature swings per production. 
Peak nitrogen usage is associated to rapid temperature changes: 
                                                                                                                              Eq. 5.12 
Where: 
Nmax Maximum nitrogen flowrate  
P      Pump-out rate 
C     Total tank capacity 
 
In terms of numbers, in the Tab. 5.11.2.1 are reported estimations of inert gas: 
Tab. 5.11.2.1: Inert gas quantities estimation. 
PARAMETER VALUE U.M. 
VT 9,4 m
3 
NTB 0,3 m
3 
Tmax 70 °C 
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Tmin 6 °C 
F 1 
VHS 2,3 m
3 
 
Requirements of gas has been calculated (Tab. 5.11.2.2 and Tab. 5.11.2.3) for both mixing and refining 
reactors of all the production area. Referring to the calculations performed, it is stressed that it has been 
considered the volume due to the emptying of the mixing vessel and the volume due to the emptying of the 
finishing tank multiplied by the number of steps required for the concentrated pulp manufacturing. Infact, 
during the finishing phase, the ink undergoes turnovers from one reactor to another one for the purpose of 
achieving the desired product characteristics. These turnovers range from color to color and from series to 
series. The tables reported in Annex II  show the quantities of total inert gas required for each production, 
number of turnovers of the finishing phase, total production per year; taking also into account the annual 
production of inks for the year 2014, it is estimated an average annual need: 
 
Tab. 5.11.2.7.1: Yearly inert gas requirement estimation. 
Machine 
Number of 
turnover/output 
Losses/production  Total production in year 2014 
Total Inert 
gas 
requirement  
Bay 1 
Drais 1 2 22,6  Nm3 26 1.581 Nm3 
Drais 2  2 17 Nm3 15 1.860 Nm3 
Drais 3  15 93 Nm3 17 1.581 Nm3 
Drais 4  13 93 Nm3 20 2.551 Nm3 
Drais 5  15 93 Nm3 17 588 Nm3 
M13 2 18 Nm3 72 1.296 Nm3 
D1 1 9,3 Nm3 113 1.051 Nm3 
Bay 2 
N10 13 81 Nm3 15 1.215 Nm3 
D3 / 4 Nm3 173 Nm3 
D2 / 4 Nm3 191 764 Nm3 
N9 7 52 Nm3 26 1.352 Nm3 
N8 5 25 Nm3 35 875 Nm3 
N12 4 41 Nm3 92 3.772  Nm3 
N6 9 59 Nm3 27 1.585 Nm3 
Bay 3 
N18 5 33 Nm3 167 5.477 Nm3 
N19 9 52 Nm3 102 5.232 Nm3 
N20 5 33 Nm3 129 4.257 Nm3 
Bay 4 
D5 / 6,5 Nm3 191 1.242 Nm3 
M11 2 27 Nm3 15 5.477 Nm3 
N14 5 24 Nm3 44 5.232 Nm3 
ST6 / 8,4 Nm3 Variable 8,4 Nm3 
ST5 / 8,4 Nm3 Variable 8,4 Nm3 
ST4 / 8,4 Nm3 Variable 8,4 Nm3 
Bay 5 
M12 2 153,7 Nm3 72 2.808 Nm3 
Plant 2-Bay1 
D10 / 21 Nm3 287 6.027 Nm3 
D6 / 9,7 Nm3 222 2.153 Nm3 
D7 / 9,7 Nm3 222 2.153 Nm3 
F29 / 5,3 Nm3 108 572 Nm3 
F30 / 5,3 Nm3 68 360 Nm3 
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F31 / 5,3 Nm3 80 424 Nm3 
F32 / 5,3 Nm3 36 191 Nm3 
N16 5 65 Nm3 77 7.884 Nm3 
N13 5 65 Nm3 62 4.030 Nm3 
N15 13 146 Nm3 54 5.005 Nm3 
Yearly estimation gas requirement 69.609 Nm3 
 
 
5.11.3 Powder substances loading 
5.11.3.1 Inert gas flowrate 
The addition of solids through the loading hopper (Fig. 5.12.1) within an inertized vessel involves opening 
towards the atmosphere and inevitably the entry of air, therefore a raising of the level of oxygen that might 
exceed the value of LOC and generate, then, an explosive atmosphere.  
 
Fig. 5.12.1: Loading hopper. 
With reference to section 5.11.1, they were quantified purging to reach the desirable LOC security. 
Assuming an a vacuum purging, it is seen that to reach the LOC of 6,3 % is required a cycle of pressurization 
(Pmax = 1.0 bar and Pmin = 0.3 bar). The data in characterizing the loading of pigments are the following: 
Tab. 5.11.3.1: Pigment and nitrocellulose input data. 
 Nitrocellulose Pigment Blu  
Density 1.650 Kg/m3 860 Kg/m3 
Mass of solid 4.161 Kg 3.200 Kg 
Big-bag weight 25 Kg 250 Kg 
Big-bag loading time 0,08 h 0,08 h 
Solid flowrate 312,5 Kg/h 3.125 Kg/h 
Oxygen content in air 21 % 
Two systems for loading management has been evaluated. 
a. Double valve device 
To avoid the entrance of air into the tank, it can be used a device with double valve: with bottom valve 
closed, the valve top is open and are paid out in space inter-valves solids; subsequently it is closed again the 
upper valve and opened the lower one by dropping the solids into the vessel. In this way it is introduced into 
the inerted atmosphere of the vessel only the air contained in the bodies of the incoherent solid. 
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Vn  volume of oxygen after n loadings of solids; 
V* = 0,03 m3  
Volume of oxygen during each loading of solids (250 Kg bags).The value is 
determined by considering the density of powder = 1.553 kg / m3, 
assuming the fraction of air in the mass of powder = 0.5 and the fraction of 
oxygen in air = 0.21, which yields: 
   
   
     
                
 
; 
Q = 3,5 
  
 
     Inert gas flowrate; 
n = 12,8           Number of solids loading; 
t* = 1,06 h     Solids loading time (t* = (12,8*5 min)/(60min) = 1,06 h); 
U = 6 m3        Free volume; 
V0 = 0,24 m
3   Initial volume of oxygen in the tank (V0 = 3,8 m
3 · 6,3%). 
At the end of the n positions the oxygen concentration in the machine applies: 
  
  
 
     
     
     
      
b. Inertization of the loading hopper 
The Volumetric Flow (VF) input required to maintain the mixture below the LOC is the following: 
   
               
       
    
  
 
 
Assuming that 50% of this volume is composed of air, it is obtained that the oxygen (G) input is equal to: 
  
   
 
          
  
 
 
If the input amount of oxygen must be proportional to the value considered safe for the mixture (7 %), it is 
obtained that the flow (FT) must be equal to: 
   
       
 
     
  
 
 
The total nitrogen flow input will be equal to: 
              
  
 
 
Given that the incoming air has about 79% of nitrogen, the flow rate of nitrogen additional to keep the 
mixture inerted will be equal to: 
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The load of dust from the manhole is inherently dangerous to both the possibility of losing the inert 
atmosphere to the risk of suffocation staff (anoxia). To mitigate the first risk it is necessary to ensure a slight 
overpressure, in order to obstruct the entry of oxygen during the opening of the manhole; with regard to the 
second risk, it will install a system of local exhaust, suitably sized, near the manhole. 
 
5.11.4 Injection verification 
Once an inert atmosphere has been established, its presence needs to be verified before any flammable 
materials are admitted. There is the possibility of stratification with flow through inerting, and air ingress 
with all methods of creating the inert atmosphere. Assuming a stationary condition at temperature of 10 °, 
that is the one referred temprature when download is completed, the mixture vapor - inert gas mixture is the 
following: 
 
Ptot =  Pvapors + Pinert gas  = 0,03 bar + 1,1 bar ~ 1,1 bar 
 
This verification is valid for any temperature, the latter being represented only a multiplicative factor in the 
relationship of an ideal gas. In both cases the result is that the density of the inert gas is greater than the 
vapor therefore it is advisable insufflation from the top down to avoid stratification inside the head of the 
tank thereby suppressing the creation of hazardous atmospheres. Anyway, this represents only a theoretical 
result, in order to verify on reality, it's advisible to perform gas sampling within the vessel even to confirm 
the adequacy of the vessel inerting process. Test for density stratification within the vessel by taking 
measurements at different elevations. If at all possible, measurements should be taken all the way down to 
the floor of the vessel. 
 Test for stagnant zones within the vessel by taking measurements at different horizontal locations. 
 Test for changes in gas composition over time. do not assume that the gas composition is constant 
over time. 
Anyway, continuos mixing process would help to avoid stratification and guardìantee an homogenous inert 
atmosphere. 
 
5.11.5 Measures to be taken in case the inerting system fails. Existing guideline 
The modification of the current Exhaust System, in terms of fire risk, does not change the Fire Prevention 
Certificate. As soon as this system has been adepted and installed, a new risk assessment document must be 
drafted, entering the change to the current system. Several guidance documents exist to aid the designer in 
inerting vessels: 
 Factory Mutual. Property Loss Prevention Data Sheets. 7-59. 1977, recised 1998. Inerting and 
Purging of Tanks, Process Vessels and Equipment. 
 2. VDI 2263 Part 2, 1992. Dust Fires and Dust Explosions: Hazards – Assessment – Protective 
Measures. 
 3. Guide to Dust Explosion Prevention and Protection. Part 2 – Ignition Prevention, Containment, 
Inerting, Suppression and Isolation. C. Schofield and J. A. Abbott. Institution of Chemical 
Engineers. 
 NFPA 69, 1997. Standard on Explosion Prevention Systems 
 ESCIS Booklet 3, 1994. Inerting. Methods and Measures for the Avoidance of 
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No single document, however contains all the necessary information. The goal of all these documents is the 
same: provide guidance on how to displace or dilute the vessel’s, equipment’s, or pipe’s internal oxygen 
and/or flammable vapor concentration. 
 
5.11.6 Losses estimation 
In order to estimate emission losses during a production activity, has been applied a software,  which is 
suitable for the situation in exam. TANKS PROGRAM is a computer-based software developed by the 
American Petroleum Institute (API) to use site-specific information to predict emissions from petroleum 
production storage tanks according to API650 and API 653 codes. It estimates flashing, working and 
standing losses and calculates losses using specific operations for each user’s tank. It has been developed for 
petroleum products, but it is adopted for the design of tanks containing organic liquid storage too. 
Total emissions are quantified as two contributions:  
                                                                                                                                                 Eq. 5.16 
 
 
Fig. 5.11.6.1: Reactors emissions.  
 
5.11.6.1 Volumetric expansion losses 
The "ingredients" required for the processing are loaded in the tanks at a temperature similar to that 
external, therefore considering the winter months as those most unfavorable conditions, it is 
referred to a temperature of the product corresponding to about 6-10 °. The heating of the reactors 
and the subsequent mixing, increases the temperature of the liquid mixture to around 40-45 °. 
During this heating occurs a thermal expansion volume which will cause the loss of gas through the 
vents. 
By defining the volume change according to the equation following:                                                                                          
           
Where: 
ΔV  Volume variation due to thermal expansion; 
α      Thermal expansion coefficient; 
V0    Initial volume; 
ΔT   Temperature variation. 
Losses due to thermal expansion has been calculated: 
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Tab. 5.11.6.1: Volume expansion due to temperature increase. 
Process reactor V0 ΔT α ΔV 
Mixing 2,3 m3 50 °C 3,6*10-3 °C-1 0,4 m3 
Finishing 2,5 m3 50 °C 3,6*10-3 °C-1 0,45 m3 
 
5.11.6.2 Working losses 
Losses due to the lowering of the liquid level whereas the pressure within the tank equal to 1,1 bar which is 
equal to that in the liquid level and assuming the tank in the case of higher temperature ie at T = 45 ° in 
phase dough and T = 65 ° in the finishing phase: 
                                                                                                                               Eq. 5.17 
Applying  Eq. 5.17, the losses of the mixing tank are quantified as follows (Tab. 5.11.6.2.1 and Fig. 
5.11.6.2.1): 
Table 5.11.6.2.1: Working losses of mixing reactor. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.11.6.2.1: Components vapor losses. 
Losses of the finishing tank are quantified as follows (Tab. 5.11.6.2.2 and Fig. 5.11.6.2.2): 
Table 5.11.6.2.2: Working losses of finishing reactor. 
0 
2 
4 
6 
Ethanol Inert gas 
V (m3) 
Vapor losses 
Vapor  losses 
 
Meaning Value U.M. 
MVA Vapor molecular weight 29,8 g/g*mol 
PVA Vapor pressure at daily average liquid T 1,1 bar 
Q Production net throughput 9,42 m3 
KN Working loss turnover 1 
N Number of turnovers 1 
VLX Tank maximum liquid volume 9,4 m
3 
KP Working loss product factor 1 
TLA Daily average liquid surface 45 °C 
WV Vapor density 0,1 Kg/m
3 
LW Working losses 4,5 m
3/output 
 
Meaning Value U.M. 
MVA  Vapor molecular weight 29,8 g/g*mol 
PVA  Vapor pressure at daily average liquid T 1,1 bar 
Q production net throughput 10,4 m3 
KN Working loss turnover 1 
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Fig. 5.11.6.2.2: Components vapor losses. 
The losses of the tanks are also overestimated of about 2-3 m3/production during emptying due to an 
hypotetical delay of the worker  (5-10 s) to close the valve. The Tab. 5.11.6.3 provides an estimate of losses 
of tanks (64) in the production area.  
 
Tab. 5.11.6.3: Process reactor’s yearly working losses estimation. 
Machine 
Number of 
turnover/output 
Losses/production 
Total production in 
year 2014 
Total Inert gas 
requirement 
Bay 1 
Drais 1 2 7,3  Nm3 26 190 Nm3 
Drais 2 2 7,3 Nm3 15 110 Nm3 
Drais 3 15 40 Nm3 17 680 Nm3 
Drais 4 13 35 Nm3 20 700 Nm3 
Drais 5 15 40 Nm3 17 677 Nm3 
M13 2 7 Nm3 72 504 Nm3 
D1 1 4,2 Nm3 113 475 Nm3 
Bay 2 
N10 13 38 15 570 Nm3 
D3 / 2 173 346 Nm3 
D2 / 2 191 382 Nm3 
N9 7 20 26 520 Nm3 
N8 5 16 35 560 Nm3 
N12 4 19 92 1.748 Nm3 
N6 9 23 27 621 Nm3 
Bay 3 
N18 5 14 167 2.338 Nm3 
N19 9 17 102 1.734 Nm3 
N20 5 14 129 1.806 Nm3 
Bay 4 
D5 / 2 191 382 Nm3 
N10 2 8 15 120 Nm3 
N14 5 23 44 1.012 Nm3 
0 
2 
4 
6 
Ethanol Inert gas 
V (m3) 
Vapor losses 
Vapor  losses 
N Number of turnovers 1 
VLX Tank maximum liquid volume 10,4 m
3 
KP Working loss product factor 1 
TLA Daily average liquid surface 57 °C 
WV  Vapor density 0,1 Kg/m
3 
LW  Working losses 5 m
3/output 
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Bay 5 
M12 2 39 72 2.808 Nm3 
Plant 2-Bay1 
D10 / 9,8 287 2.813 Nm3 
D6 / 4,4 222 977 Nm3 
D7 / 4,4 222 977 Nm3 
F29 / 2,4 108 260 Nm3 
F30 / 2,4 68 163 Nm3 
F31 / 2,4 80 144 Nm3 
F32 / 2,4 36 86 Nm3 
N16 5 31 77 2.387 Nm3 
N13 5 29 62 1.798 Nm3 
N15 13 67 54 3.618 Nm3 
Overall Losses 31.555 Nm3 
 
Tab. 5.11.6.3: Yearly tank’s losses estimation. 
Losses due to an hypothetical delay of the worker 
(~2 Nm3/ production) 
37.105 Nm3 
Tank’s losses 31.555 Nm3 
Losses due to vapor expansion 2.028 Nm3 
Total losses 70.688 Nm3 
 
One consideration is the amount of losses if related to CO2 or N2. Carbon dioxide has a molecular weight 
than nitrogen maggiroe therefore you will have more losses during the emptying of the tanks, the other side 
instead of N losses predominate during tankage therefore to consider taking the same loss, but please 
consideration that the carbon dioxide is semza doubt preferable, both for volatility that for dangerousness. 
 
5.11.6.2 Standing losses 
Standing losses are a result of tank vapor space breathing. They are the most hardly characterizable because 
depend on the setting pressure range etc .. The program quantifies the losses for storage TANKS therefore 
subject to the containment of the mixture for too long time and continuous that has no veracity in being 
compared to the case in question; in fact the mixing process has a duration of about two hours therefore, in 
first approximation, they can be neglected. The same reason applies for the finishing tank, but in this case, 
being the duration of the latter phase of the order of days, it is applied a correction factor of 1.2 / 1.5 to the 
working losses 
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Chapter 6. Inertization Risk Assessment and Results 
comparison 
 
Huber Italy is a chemical that daily employs flammable and explosive substances for the production of inks, 
so the risk in working environment can never be reduced to a level lower than the high. Recalling the 
Machinery Directive 459/96, "The machinery must be designed and constructed to avoid any risk of 
explosion posed by the machinery itself or by gases, liquids, dust, vapors or other substances produced or 
used by the machinery. To this end the manufacturer must take the necessary measures to: 
 Avoid a dangerous concentration of products, 
 Prevent combustion of the explosive, 
 Reduce the consequences of a possible explosion so that it does not endanger the surroundings. If 
the manufacturer foresees the use of the machine in an explosive atmosphere, the same precautions 
will be taken. " 
In addition, "The machinery must be designed, constructed and / or equipped as to minimize the risks due to 
gases, liquids, dusts, vapors and other waste products. Where a hazard exists, the machinery must be 
equipped in such a way can be contained and / or evacuated these products. " 
This last sentence was intended to refer to the preventive system in current use, but to demonstrate the 
benefit that this proposed design solution brings, it is performed a risk analysis, in accordance with the 
Machinery Directive 459/96, of the process reactor. The risk analysis is conducted according to the following 
criteria: 
 Determination of the operation of the machine. 
 Hazard identification. 
 Risk Estimate 
 Risk assessment and the potential serious consequences. 
Figure 6.1.1 represents the steps for the choice of integrated preventive measures. If the machine works 
under an inert atmosphere, the technical file must be drawn up and inserted: 
 A copy of the manual of instructions for use of the machine. (Res all.1 1.7.4). (Document to be 
delivered to the user together with the declaration of conformity) 
 Construction drawings; 
 Calculations; 
 Sizing machine; 
 The risk analysis performed by the manufacturer; 
  The measures to eliminate the risks; 
 Any residual risks can not be eliminated and the related instructions to avoid dangers 
deriving from the latter. 
The Instruction Manual must: 
 Take into account the safety of the operators during the entire life cycle of the machine; 
 Provide technicians, operators, and maintainers all the information and warnings 
relating to 'use in safety conditions of the machine. 
General information: 
 Field of use of the machine; 
 Operators required (specialist); 
 Arrangements by the user 's; 
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 Technical assistance; 
 Mode of handling. 
Description of the machine: 
 Illustrations; 
 Technical data; 
 Guaranteed performance 
Injury Prevention: 
 Conditions for safe use; 
 Personal protective equipment prescribed; 
  Intended uses; 
  Use not provided; 
 Work zones; 
 Hazardous areas; 
 Plates; 
Residual risks installation: 
 Packaging; 
 Shipping; 
  Transport; 
Operation: 
 Set-up for the first start; 
 Commands and dangerous areas; 
 Description of the framework and layout of the controls; 
  Operating modes; 
 Normal stop and emergency; 
  Management of the material used and the product; 
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Fig. 6.1.1: Schematic representation for the choice of preventive integrated measures. 
6.1 Risk quantification 
With the purpose of demonstrating in concrete terms the actual improvement of the adoption of the 
inertization, it was determined the residual risk of tanks blanketed. Risk assessment is made in accordance 
with the following assumptions: GOOD availability of inertization service or assuming in case of 
interruption of service, the adoption of substitute protection. (f.e. automatic shutdown of the process). The 
same procedure used for risk quantification defined in Chapter 4 has been adopted and results obtained. To 
define the residual risk of fire in quantitative terms, it is used the mathematical model of BM systems that 
defines it: 
            
where: 
Ci  Fire load expressed in Kg of wood or equivalent Standard / m2; Standard/m
2; 
Fm  Product of multiplying factors of risk that represent the parameters responsible for the increase in the fire 
risk. It is the term connected to the MAGNITUDO ; 
Fc  Factor of risk compensation related with all the parameters that contribute to the mitigation of risk. It is 
the term connected to the FREQUENCY. 
 
6.1.2 Fire load 
Inerting tanks eliminate one of the three elements of the fire triangle, the comburent (oxygen), however, the 
fire load is unchanged. Tab. 6.1.2.1 shows the fire load already defined in Chapter 5. The specific fire load 
rating qf expressed in Kg of wood or equivalent standard/m
2 is defined as: 
Tab. 6.1.2.1: Specific fire load of design. 
Area/Sector Function 
Specific fire load of design 
MJ/m2 
Class 
Factory n.1- Bay 1 Production area 3.001 240 
Factory n.1- Bay 2 Production area 2.747 240 
Factory n.1- Bay 3 Production area 1.687 120 
Factory n.1- Bay 4 Production area 4.760 240 
Factory n.2- Bay 1 Production area 5.451 180 
Factory n.2- Bay 2 Production area & Warehouse 2.254 240 
Factory n.2- Bay 3 Warehouse 7.835 240 
Factory n.2- Bay 4 Warehouse 7.835 240 
Factory n.2- Bay 5 Warehouse 8.075 240 
Factory n.2- Bay 5 Warehouse 7.613 240 
 
The level of residual risk, based on the result obtained from the formula given above, can be obtained by 
applying the following criteria (Tab. 6.1.2.2):  
Tab. 6.1.2.2: Criteria for residual risk classification. 
RR Level of residual risk 
< 20 Low 
20-50 Medium 
>50 High 
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6.1.3 Multiplying factors of risk 
The multiplying factors of risk are those parameters responsible of fire risk increase. They are directly 
connected to the concept of MAGNITUDO. The magnitude of the consequences can be expressed for 
example as a function of the number of parties involved in this type of risk and the level of damage caused to 
them. 
Tab. 6.1.3: Mutiplying factors of risk. 
Multiplying factors of risk  
PARAMETER DEFINITION VALUE 
Burning rate Rc 1,5 
Toxicity of the combustion products Pf 2 
Probability of initiation Pi 1,6 
Probability of personal injury Paff 1 
 
6.1.4 Risk compensation factor 
The compensation factor of the fire risk is related with the environmental conditions, the fire safety facilities 
and management organization of the work, in all aspects of fire prevention, these parameters, identifiable 
with the responses to each question, the text of which It is reported in separate grids by subject. Each single 
response contributes for a portion equal to 1 / n, where n is the total number of questions. The compensation 
factor is obtained, then, with the following algorithm: 
     
           
  
   
            
  
   
      
 
Tab. 6.1.4.1: Risk compensation factor parameters. 
Compensation factor 
PARAMETER DEFINITION 
Dok Number of questions with an affermative answer  
Ntot 
Total number of questions to answer than "QUESTION IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE SECTOR 
UNDER CONSIDERATION" 
The 10 parameters Ps originating the compensation factor of the fire risk are: 
o Probability of initiation; 
o Features of the buildings and premises; 
o Security operating procedures and working; 
o Conditions and likelihood of exodus; 
o Maintenance; 
o Alarm; 
o Antifire;  
o Control; 
o Security management and emergency; 
In addition, considering the estimated fire load, areas are classified according to fire resistance classes. 
 
6.1.5 Results 
Residual Risk (RR) has been quantified as: 
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The risk level of each area, so, is summarized in Tab. 6.1.5.1: 
 
Tab. 6.1.5.1: Characterization of the Residual Risk of each area. 
Area/Sector Function Residual Risk 
Factory n.1- Bay 1 Production area 39 
Factory n.1- Bay 2 Production area 36 
Factory n.1- Bay 3 Production area 22 
Factory n.1- Bay 4 Production area 49 
Factory n.2- Bay 1 Production area 29 
Factory n.2- Bay 2 Warehouse 51 
Factory n.2- Bay 3 Warehouse 102 
Factory n.2- Bay 4 Warehouse 102 
Factory n.2- Bay 5 Warehouse 105 
Factory n.2- Bay 6 Warehouse 99 
 
Detailed calculations are included in Annex I. The results have been plotted in the following graphs (Fig. 
6.1.5.1 and 6.1.5.2): 
 
 
Fig. 6.1.5.1: Residual risk after tank’s inertization. 
 
 
Fig. 6.1.5.2: Risk threshold value exceedance. 
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6.2 Risk comparison 
It can be seen, recalling the Machinery Directive 2006/42/CE, the residual risk decrease to a value below the 
limit value of all process tanks located in the production area, thus classifying them in a MEDIUM level of 
risk as it can be seen in Fig. 6.2.1. 
 
 
Fig. 6.2.1: Residual risk reduction. 
 
6.3 Classification of areas at risk of explosion 
Recalling Chapter n.2 (Classification of areas at risk of explosion, 2.3.1) in this paragraph a new 
classification of areas at risk of explosion is done, adopting inerting systems. Both the guideline CEI 31-35 
CEI 31-56 are focused particularly on the consequences that inerting can have in the classification of areas at 
risk of explosion on the outside of the compartment inert. It thus defines the inerting system availability 
through the following descriptors: 
o Availability GOOD. The inerting available continuously; 
o Availability ADEQUATE. The inerting is available during normal operation. Interruptions are 
permitted provided they are infrequent and of short duration; 
o Availability POOR: inerting does not meet the availability requirements or GOOD ADEQUATE, 
although there are no breaks for long periods. 
The availability GOOD is obtaines through the redundancy of inerting systems or with technical measures 
that prevent the emission sources in the event of absence of inerting. The influence of the inertization system 
on the areas outside the containment protected is given by the following Tab. 6.3.1: 
 
Tab. 6.3.1 : Influence of inerting systems on the types of zones. 
DEGREE OF 
EMISSION 
WITHOUT 
INERTIZATION 
AVAILABILITY OF INERTING SERVICE 
Good Appropriate Poor 
Continuous 
(Zone 2NE) 
(Gas,vapors, 
mists) 
(Zone 22NE) 
(Combustible 
dust) 
Zone 1 
(Gas,vapors, 
mists) 
Zone 21 
(Combustible 
dust) 
Zone 0 
(Gas,vapors, 
mists) 
Zone 20 
(Combustible 
dust) 
First Not-hazardous area 
Zone 2 
(Gas, vapors, 
mists) 
Zone 22 
(Combustible 
dust) 
Zone 1 
(Gas, vapors, 
mists) 
Zone 21 
(Combustible 
dust) 
Second Not-hazardous area Not-hazardous area Zone 2 Zone 22 
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(Gas, vapors, 
mists) 
(Combustible 
dust) 
 
Assuming the redundancy of the inerting systems, as is seen from Table 6.3.1, the area previously classified 
as area 0, now is classified as area 2, that is an area which an explosive atmosphere due to the presence of 
gas is not likely to be present during normal operation but, if this is done, it is possible to persist only for 
short periods. On the other hand, the area surrounding the process reactors, previously classified as Zone 1, 
through inerting, it becomes a not-hazardous area. The guideline also provides a series of recommendations 
on actions to be taken in cases where inerting fails. In general the planned interventions will be of three 
types, and speed request from the action will be a function of the category of the equipment and the potential 
danger zone that takes place in the absence of containment. The procedures provided for cover the following 
aspects: 
 Presence of optical-acoustic alarms; 
 Actions aimed at restoring the efficiency inerting; 
 Decommissioning of equipment (electric and non-electric). 
The Tab. 6.3.2 is a summary of the actions to be performed.  
Tab. 6.3.2 Measures to be taken in the event of interruption of the inerting system. 
Type of zone in the absence 
of depression 
Equipment classification in accordance with Directive 94/9 / EC 
II 2D II 3D Not suitable for hazardous areas 
Zone 1 
(Gas, vapors, mists) 
Zone 21 
(Combustible dust) 
No 
action 
1) Visual and audible alarm; 
2) Immediate action to restore 
inerting; 
3) Equipment automatic 
disconnecting. 
1) Visual and audible alarm; 
2) Immediate action to restore 
inerting; 
3) Equipment automatic 
disconnecting. 
Zone 2 
(Gas, vapors, mists) 
Zone 22 
(Combustible dust) 
No 
action 
No action 
1) Visual and audible alarm; 
2) Immediate action to restore 
inerting; 
3) Equipment automatic 
disconnecting. 
All systems with inert environment must carry the following sign:  
 
They will also be provided with written instructions for use and maintenance. In this regard, the CEN/TR 
15281 indicates that the manufacturer of the inerting is required to supply the following information: 
 Definition of the operating limits of use (substances, temperatures, pressures); 
 Conditions of supply of the inert gas (oxygen, concentration, storage, flows); 
 Checks and maintenance required to ensure the system for leaks; 
 Requirements for the regular maintenance, calibration and monitoring system; 
  Protective equipment; 
 Controls on changes or replacements of process equipment; 
 Details of the recordings from the original design, the changes, process changes and calibrations. 
 
ATTENTION - PROTECTED CONTAINER WITH INERTING 
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6.4 The risk to the health of workers 
A possible reduction in the percentage of oxygen in the air can cause death in a few seconds. In this regard, 
the effects of oxygen concentration on human life are reported in Tab.. In Europe, it was proposed the 
classification of areas at risk of asphyxia (“Johnson, 2008”) (Tab. 6.4.2) according to the criteria of near-
field and far-field, already applied to the release of poison gas. The descriptors of these areas are summarized 
in Tab. 6.4.1. 
Tab. 6.4.1: Effects of oxygen concentration on human life. 
Oxygen 
percentage ( vol) 
Effects and syntoms 
23,5 Maximum level of security. 23% is the level of alarm for many oxygen sensors on the market. 
21 Typical oxygen concentration. 
19,5 minimum security level. 19% is the level of alarm for many oxygen sensors on the market. 
15-19 
First signs of hypoxia. decreased ability to work. They can be induced symptoms particularly 
serious in people with coronary problems, lung and circulation. 
respiration increases with marked stress, tachycardia. 
12-14 
Respiration increases with stress, tachycardia, marked decrease of muscle coordination, 
perception. mental confusion. 
10-12 It increases breathing speed and depth. Mental confusion. Blue lips. 
8-10 Nausea, vomiting, fainting. unconsciousness. ashen face. blue lips. 
6-8 
6 minutes - 50% chance of death. 
8 minutes - 100% chance of death. 
4-6 Coma in 40 seconds, convulsions. cessation of breathing. Death. 
 
Tab. 6.4.2: Definition of zones of asphyxiation. 
Zone 
type 
Description Examples 
30 
Area is present continuously or for long periods or frequently 
atmosphere to limited oxygen content (suffocating). 
This condition is typical of the interior of 
the containment inert. 
31 
Area in which an atmosphere in limited oxygen content 
(asphyxiating) is likely to occur occasionally during normal 
activities. 
This pattern can be found in the areas of 
access to confined spaces and inert. 
32 
Area in which during normal activities is not likely to form an 
atmosphere in limited oxygen content (asphyxiating) or, quallora 
it does occur, only short-term. 
The situation may occur in the vicinity of 
the piping and containment process 
placed indoors. 
 
At the end of the classification of areas of asphyxiation it proceeds, as in the case of the classification of 
areas ATEX, the graphic description of the results of classification. However, the classification of areas of 
asphyxiation is not provided in any Community rule. 
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Chapter 7. Costs – Benefits analysis 
The cost-benefit analysis is carried out with the aim of quantifying, assessing and comparig the costs and 
benefits that the three solutions A, B, C offer. Such analysis is fundamental to understand, currently, the 
most advantageous, in terms of costs, safety and environmental protection. 
 
7.1 Aspiration plant consumption and mantainance costs (Scenario A) 
The aspiration system conveys the vapors suction from the tanks to a post-combustor which, fueled by 
methane, is active on average 282 days per year, daily 13 hours and 10 minutes. The data relating to the air 
flow rates and the operation of the afterburner are reported in Fig. 7.1.1: 
Tab. 7.1.1: Methane consumption, year 2014. 
 
Through the MAX function, it has been calculated the maximum value of the data set already shown and 
costs estimation reported in Tab. 7.1.1: 
 
Tab. 7.1.1: Methane consumption 2014, at flowrate of 30.000 Nm3/h. 
Current methane consumption, 2014 
Methane consumption 208,014 m3 
Cost 0,53 €/m3 
Methane consumption costs 110,247 € 
 
Based on the increase of air flow rate expected for the end of the current year 2015, the total cost of the 
consumption of natural gas and electricity is as follows: 
 
Tab. 7.1.2: Methane consumption 2014, at flowrate of 30.000 Nm3/h. 
Methane consumption expectations, 2016 
Methane consumption 374,425 m3 
Cost 0,53 €/m3 
Methane consumption costs 198,445 € 
 
The fans, governing the apiration pipeline, are activated on demand during the production processes. 
Systems operating time is reported as follows (Tab. 7.1.2):  
 
Tab. 7.1.3: Systems operating time. 
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 Day/year Hours/day Hours/year 
Post-combustor 282 11 3,102 
Aspiration plant 1 282 10 2,820 
Aspiration plant 2 282 10 2,820 
 
Electrical energy has been estimated according to operating time, power and electrical energy cost verified 
on 2015, June 14, of 0,16 €/kWh (Tab. 7.1.3). Knowing that Electricity cost is calculated according to the 
following equation: 
                                                                        
 
   
  
 
Tab. 7.1.4: Electrical energy consumption. 
 Power Electrical energy cost Yearly costs 
Post-combustor 200 kW 
0,16 €/kWh 
99,264 € 
Aspiration plant 1 224 kW 101,069 € 
Aspiration plant 2 113 kW 50,985 € 
 
Tab. 7.1.5: Aspiration plant costs economic balance. 
Costs estimation 
Annual aspiration plant electrical energy  251,318 € 
Annual methane consumption  198,445 € 
Annual aspiration plant maintainance 8.000 € 
Every 10 years, thermal oxidizer’s ceramic beds substitution and disposal 100.000 € 
Every 5 years, bag filters mantainance 40.000 € 
 
Tab. 7.1.3: Aspiration plant, 10 years economic balance, 
Consumption and mantainance 4,757,630 € 
 
7.2 Inertization application costs (Scenario B) 
In order to quantify the cost of applying blanketing solution to the process tanks, it was conducted an 
approximate economic balance based on the total quantity of ink produced in 2014, then the estimated 
process losses and the number of emptying and filling of the tanks during the production phase; for losses 
quantification, reference is made to Chapter 5.11.6, while for ink production, reference is made to Chapter 
5.11.2. To give an initial estimation of costs for inerting of tanks, it has been consulted the SIAD Company, 
leader in the production and marketing of the entire range of industrial gases. 
 
7.2.1 Inertization plant using Nitrogen (N2) 
The nitrogen, typically provided in liquid phase, it is stored in cryogenic containers insulated vacuum, and 
kept at very low temperatures (-196 ° C): the tanks are equipped with level controls and pressure with remote 
sensing (optional) for automatic reordering of the product. The nitrogen liquid in the cryogenic tank, is 
gasified in suitable atmospheric evaporators the desired pressure and between ~ 2:12 barg. The inertisation 
plant will consist of one cryogenic storage of liquid nitrogen, to a vaporizer capable of delivering up to 120 
Nm3 / h of nitrogen gas and by the control devices and safety. The title of liquid nitrogen and 99.95%. The 
cryogenic tank and the vaporization systems are materials provided on loan of use, throughout the period of 
contract of purchase by SIAD product liquid nitrogen. The nitrogen gas will be reduced to a pressure P1 ≤ 5 
bar from the first stage reducer mounted on the first section line of transportation of nitrogen gas. The 
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reducers of stage II will further reduce the pressure to P2 equal to about 20 mbar and feed the three groups of 
tanks containing the different solvents while maintaining the interior of the storage an inert atmosphere and 
free of moisture. In the loading phase of the solvents, the double-acting valves will discharge the mixture 
nitrogen and vapors solvents into the atmosphere if within the limits of law; otherwise you'll have to direct 
them to provide an appropriate abatement system (eg through a closed circuit for their recovery, 
or starting them at Vs. combustor). For the storage and dispensing of liquid nitrogen will put at disposal, 
such as material loaned for use, n ° 1 cryogenic container from 6,000 l, complete with suitable evaporator air 
pollution. Liquid nitrogen necessary for the operation of the proposed plant will be provided with the 
following 
economic conditions: 
 
Tab. 7.2.1.1: Nitrogen inertization plant: installation and service cost. 
 Yearly balance 10 year balance 
Price of materials 249,960 € / 
Yearly charge service 3.000 € 30.000 € 
Transport charge 1.800 € 18.000 € 
Cost of total Sm3 of nitrogen 21.044 € 210.445 € 
Overall cost 275,804 € 2,758,045 € 
 
7.2.2 Nitrogen self-production 
Compared to traditional ways of supplying, there are no hidden costs with nitrogen self-production  
generator: the only raw materials it uses are air and electricity, in quantities which depend on the output 
required. CLAIND company has been selected as a suitable supplier of a nitrogen self-production system. 
The company offers a series of products and services designed to fulfill essential requirements associated 
with hydrogen, nitrogen and zero air. The CLAIND solution for self-production of nitrogen makes use of 
Pressure Swing Adsorption technology (PSA), which, through the use of specially selected molecular sieves 
(CMS), makes it possible to obtain extremely pure nitrogen (up to 99.999%) at very moderate cost. Pressure 
Swing Adsorption (PSA) uses, in most cases, two vessels, packed with carbon molecular sieve (CMS). The 
CMS adsorbs Oxygen as compressed air flows upward through one of the vessels while the other vessel is 
depressurized and a small amount of the nitrogen output is flowing downward (counter flow) to drive off or 
desorbs the oxygen and moisture collected by the vessel when it was online removing oxygen from the air. 
The vessels alternate this adsorption and desorption process. There are several steps in the process; 
equalization, pressurization/depressurization, adsorption/purge, then back to equalization. This is a basic 
description of the process, but there are several things happening at various times throughout the time cycle 
which is generally a 2 minute cycle total. 
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Fig. 7.2.2.1: Self-production technology flowsheet. 
 
Tab. 7.2.2.1 below compares a high flow, low purity membrane (HFLP), a high purity lower flow membrane 
(HPLF) and pressure swing adsorption (PSA) type nitrogen generators. In the table there are some 
abbreviations that need to be defined here. SCFM N2 is an arbitrary flow rate used for the basis of these 
examples. SCFM is nitrogen and air flow at atmospheric conditions that the nitrogen and the compressed air 
manufacturers use as their standards. Multiply this number by the N2 SCFM to get the SCFM Air required. 
CCF is the Compressor Correction Factor. Size the compressor 1.25-1.3 times the required compressed air 
SCFM to allow for winter/summer ambient, variations in membrane performance, flow unit conversion, as 
well as the compressor manufacturer’s flow tolerance. 
 
Tab. 7.2.2.1: Effects of purity selection on energy required. 
 
 
Pressure of air inlet is a parameter involved in energy requirement. By raising the pressure, smaller systems 
could be utilized to save on capital costs for the nitrogen generator, but the compressor will usually go to the 
next compressor HP size by going from a 125 PSI to a 150 PSI compressor. In general, the compressed air 
industry has used a “rule of thumb” of 1% kW increase for every 2 PSI increase. Finally, the purity has a not 
less important weight. The higher the percent nitrogen required, the larger the system to obtain a given flow 
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rate. More compressed air will be required and more electricity consumed. Capital cost, long term 
maintenance cost, and floor space will increase as well. Whereas, a 95% N2 system will take approximately 
2 SCFM of compressed air for 1 SCFM of nitrogen, the ratio of air to nitrogen could be as high as 12:1 at 
99.999% N2 in some older systems. Here are a few “Rule of Thumb” Nitrogen species for some industries 
(For Comparison Only): 
1. Blanketing to prevent hazardous conditions – Approximately 95-97% for most applications; 
2. Blanketing edible vegetable oils – approximately 99.9%; 
3. Food Packaging – approximately 99.5% for most applications; 
4. Printed Circuit Boards – Traditionally has been in the 99.9%+ range, but long term testing shows 
that this application can be done at 97% with no visible or long term effects; 
5. Heat treating metals – Depending on materials and process, can be 97% to as High as 99.999% (10 
PPM of O2). 
 
Over the life of the equipment, approximately 90% of its life costs will be in the energy required to run it. 
Capital costs, installation and maintenance costs are small compared to the power consumption. That is why 
it is so important to make wise decisions on your nitrogen equipment selections. That is why it is so 
important to make wise decisions on the necessary nitrogen equipment selections. 
 
7.2.3 Inertization plant using Carbon Dioxide  
The carbon dioxide, supplied in liquid phase, and stored in cryogenic containers insulated vacuum, and 
maintained at temperatures of -20 ° C at a pressure of about 18 bar. The tanks are equipped with level 
controls with remote sensing and pressure (optional) for the automatic reordering the product. The liquid 
carbon dioxide, contained in the cryogenic tank, is gasified in suitable evaporators atmospheric to the desired 
pressure and between ~ 2:08 barg. The inertisation plant will consist of one cryogenic storage of liquid 
carbon dioxide, from a vaporizer capable of delivering up to 50 Nm3 / h of gaseous carbon dioxide and the 
control devices and safety. The cryogenic tank and the vaporization systems are materials provided on loan 
of use, throughout the period of contract of purchase of the product by SIAD carbon dioxide. The carbon 
dioxide will be reduced to a pressure P1 ≤ 5 bar from the first stage reducer mounted on the first section of 
the line of transport of carbon dioxide. For the storage and dispensing of liquid carbon dioxide will put at 
disposal, such as material loaned for use, one cryogenic container of 6.000 l, complete with suitable 
evaporator. Liquid carbon dioxide necessary for the operation of the proposed plant will be provided with the 
following economic conditions. 
 
Tab. 7.2.3.1: Carbon Dioxide inertization plant: installation and service cost. 
 Yearly balance 10 year balance 
Price of materials 390,000 € / 
Yearly charge service 3.000 € 30.000 € 
Transport charge 1.800 € 18.000 € 
Cost of total Kg of CO2 15.587 € 155.870 € 
Overall cost 410,387 €  4,103,870 € 
 
7.3 Rotary concentrator costs (Scenario C) 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, scenario B includes the installation of the concentrator, for polluted air with a 
high concentration of solvent. It is therefore expected, the installation of a new filter, a new fan and a rotary 
concentrator that will be capable of self support combustion in the after-burner (Fig. 7.3.1 and 7.3.2). The 
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flow of air is reduced from the input stream of 54,000 Nm3 / h of air to one output of 7,000 Nm3 / h having a 
high concentration of solvent.  
 
 
Fig.7.3.1: Rotoconcentrator. 
 
 
Fig. 7.3.2: Rotoconcentrator: operating principles. 
 
Management and maintenance costs of scenario C are shown in Tab. 8.1: 
 
Tab. 8.1: Rotary concentrator yearly economic balance. 
Installation and Management 1,800,000 € 
Electrical Energy Consumption 219,054 € 
Methane Consumption 10,000 € 
Every 5 years Rotoconcentratore Substitution 280,000 € 
Yearly maintainance 20,000 € 
Every 5 years, bag filters substitution 40,000 € 
 
Tab. 8.2: Rotary concentrator costs, 10 years economic balance. 
Installation and management 1.800.000 € 
Consumption and maintainance 3,130,540 € 
 4,930,540 € 
 
7.3 Energetics benefits and Environmental benefits 
7.3.1 Energetics benefits 
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It was previously introduced the benefits that the adoption of the inerting process involves the entire plant. It 
is shown, in practice, that it reduce fire and explosion risk, in fact eliminating the explosive atmosphere due 
to the presence of combustion air at the liquid-vapor; from the energy point of view this application 
translates the shutting down of the post-combustor and two possible ways to treat the aspiration gases, 
downstream the filters, during the stages of powder loading. This, can be done by the mean of two possible 
systems: 
1. Cryogenic condensation with liquid nitrogen; 
2. Adsorption on activated carbon with nitrogen regeneration. 
Applying these two possible systems, they cancel therefore the costs related to the use of natural gas and 
electricity used for the operation of the suction system and the after-burner itself. 
 
7.3.1.1 FREEZE-FLO: the cryogenic system for the removal of volatile off-gases 
FREEZE-FLO is the result of research, know-how and SIAD experience in cryocondensation technology, it 
is is designed and realized "ad hoc" to purify small and medium gas flows, in the field of flow rates between 
0 and 100Nm3 / h. The process of cryogenic condensation is based on the possibility to cool the gaseous 
effluents polluted by volatile organic compounds (VOCs) at very low temperatures, of the order of -100 ° C, 
using the liquid nitrogen as energy source. The separation of the pollutants is obtained thanks to the drastic 
reduction of the vapor pressure at the equilibrium values of the liquid / vapor or solid / vapor made to 
minimum temperatures reached by cryogenic. It is therefore possible to condense and "recover" as many 
organic pollutants present in the gaseous stream, widely used in many areas of industrial production. The 
special conformation of the heat exchangers in indirect nitrogen flow, in countercurrent with the stream 
polluted, having large heat exchange surface, favors the formation and evacuation of the condensate, which 
is collected in a dedicated tank, or retrieved directly inside the reactors by it comes from. The format adopted 
for "indirect cooling" also allows to reuse the nitrogen flow exiting the column rio condensation such as 
inerting agent: it is the case of reactors, mixers process and storage tanks so properly equipped to the 
environment and operational safety. Flow rate and pressure of the nitrogen and outlet temperatures of the 
various streams are the main parameters for measurement and control: operations and settings are provided 
in manual or automatic. If tratment flows are more than 100 Nm3 / h, SIAD has other system solutions based 
on the same technology however condensation (Paragraph 7.3.1.2). 
 
Fig. 7.3.1.1: Freeze-Flo Plant. 
116 
 
7.3.1.2 Adsorption on activated carbon with nitrogen regeneration. 
SIAD has developed systems for adsorption / adsorption with active carbon (or other adsorbent materials) of 
emissions containing organic pollutants, using a new regeneration technique "beds" adsorption. This 
technique consists in heating with hot nitrogen in closed circuit, and in the subsequent desorption under 
vacuum, to achieve the removal of the adsorbed substances. The flow that is generated, of modest volumetric 
flow rate (about 1 ÷ 2% that of the treated flow) but saturated with the substances desorbed, is sent to a 
cryogenic condenser in which these substances are separated and recovered. Thanks to this technique, all the 
flows of the treatment plant, the treaty main flow and those produced during the regeneration treatment, are 
discharged into the atmosphere absolutely free of pollutants. 
 
 
Fig. 7.3.1.2: Adsortion plant. 
 
7.3.2 Environmental benefits 
The application of the technique of inerting process tanks benefits, as we have seen, both from the point of 
view of the risk, the economic and energy; last but not least, the environmental one. The current system, 
from the environmental point of view, involves the operation of the thermal oxidizer that receives vapors 
from the working areas that, through the process of combustion, reduces the volatile organic substances 
allowing the company to comply with the legal limits set by Decree 152/2006 for emissions into the 
atmosphere. Sampling conducted by Ecoricerche comply with maximum projected emissions, but 
nevertheless contribute to air pollution annually. Thanks to the data provided by the same laboratory, it was 
possible to develope the following Tab. 7.4.1 containing the results of sampling carried out on 2014, 
Semptember 22. All results in concentration refer to the volume of dry effluent compared to normal physical 
conditions of 0C, 101.3 kPa and dry gas, average flow rate 24,600 Nm3/h; test methods are consistent with 
those provided by the Provincial Council resolution n. 173 of the 2012, May 22. The results obtained are 
derived from sampling continued for at least 60 minutes. 
 
7.3.2.1 Aspiration system emissions 
INPUT to the thermal oxidizer 
 
Tab. 7.3.2.1: Total substances Table D Class III. 
 Aspiration system 
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Compound mg/Nm3 g/h 
n-esane 1,0 24,8 
Tetrahydrofuran 0,51 12,4 
Isobutyl alchool 0,10 2,5 
1-methossi-2-propanol 1,8 44,4 
Ethilbenzene 0,096 2,3 
1-Methossi-2-propilacetate 0,46 11,2 
Total substances class III 4,0 98 
 
Tab. 7.3.2.2: Total substances Table D Class IV. 
 Aspiration system 
Compound mg/Nm3 g/h 
Methyl Acetate 0,44 10,7 
Isopropyl Acetate 3,3 80 
MethylEthylKethone 8,4 204 
Isopropil Alchool 1,6 37,8 
n-propylic Alcool 0,72 17,5 
Toluene 4,2 102 
Butyl Acetate 0,26 6,4 
Xylenes 0,34 8,2 
Total substances class IV 19,3 467 
 
Tab. 7.3.2.3: Total substances Table D Class V. 
 Aspiration system 
Compound mg/Nm3 g/h 
n-heptane 1,8 44,4 
Acetone 1,2 28,6 
Ethyl Acetate 1.711 41.406 
Ethanol 87 2.113 
Other organic substances espressed as n-heptane 8,5 206 
Total substances class IV 1.810 43.798 
 
OUTPUT of the thermal oxidizer 
The values shown in Tab. 7.4.2.1 are experimental values measured at the chimney referred to the current 
intake aspiration system. The yield abatement of the post-combustor is approximately 98%.  
 
Tab. 7.3.2.4: Total substances Table D Class III: comparison between the two systems. 
 Aspiration system 
 mg/Nm3 g/h Kg/year 
Total substances Table A1 Class  III <0,091 <2,2 / 
Substances Table C Class V   / 
Nitrogen oxydes  (Horiba) 0,22 71 262 
Total substances Table C Class V 2,9 71 262 
Total substances Table D Class II 0,2 <4,9  
Total substances Table D Class III 0,27 <6,6  
Substances Table D Class IV    
Methyl Ethyl Ketone 0,11 2,8 10 
Toluene 0,077 1,9 7 
Total Substances Table D Class IV 0,19 4,7 17 
Substances Table D Class V    
Ethyl Acetate 22,3 548 2.024 
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Ethanol 2,6 64 236 
Other organic substances espresse as heptane 0,19 4,7 17 
Total Substances Table D Class V 25,1 617 2.279 
Total organic carbon 22,8 561 2.072 
Carbon Monoxide (HORIBA) 129 3.181 11.751 
 
Tab. 7.3.2.5: Comparison with limits referred to test report. 
 Aspiration system Limit value 
 mg/Nm3  (mg/Nm3) 
Total Organic Carbon 22,8 40 
Carbon Monoxide (Horiba) 129 295 
Substances Table A1 Class III <0,091 754 
Substances Table C Class V 2,9 140 
Substances Table D Class II <0,20 65 
Substances Table D Class II+III <0,47 377 
Substances of  Table D Class II+III+IV 0,66 24 
Substances of Table D Class II+III+IV+V 25,8 3 
 
Tab. 7.3.2.6: Dust comparison with limits referred to test report. 
 Aspiration system Regulatory limit 
 mg/m3 Kg/y g/h  (mg/Nm3) 
Total dust 0,22 0,4 0,11 20 
 
As can be seen from the tables above, the vapors leaving the afterburner are in accordance with the legal 
limits during each sampling. Fig. 7.4.1 gives a visual idea of emission quantities for each compound.  
 
Fig. 7.3.2.1: Emissions reduction: comparison between the two considered preventive measures. 
 
As explained earlier, the inerting process, following the shutdown of the afterburner, eliminates annual 
emissions of gaseous pollutants. Through the cryogenic condenser can be the liquefaction of the gaseous 
effluent and the recovery of solvent at the same time to the regeneration of inert gas. 
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Chapter 8. Final evaluation and conclusions 
 
In the first chapter, it is exposed the problematic to understand what is among the three solutions A, B and C 
under the best profile: 
 Economic; 
 Risk; 
 Environmental. 
 
From an environmental and fire hazards point of view, scenarios A and B are equal; scenario C, however, 
improves the current situation, both in terms of risk (Chapter 6), environmental and economic (Chapter7).  
At this point, it is therefore reasonable to compare the three scenarios to choose and implement what, more 
improves the three profiles previously reported (Fig. 8.1). 
 
 
 
Scenario A 
Aspiration System 
Scenario B 
Blanketing 
Scenario C 
Rotary Concentrator 
Economic XX XXX X 
Risk X XX X 
Environemntal & 
Energetics 
X XX X 
Fig: 8.1: Scenario Assessment. 
 
 
As can be seen from Fig. 8.1, the scenario C from an economic, environmental and fire risk profile, is the 
most beneficial one and which can only improve the business environment, the health of workers, and reduce 
the annual management costs that may reflect an improvement in production margins.  
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ANNEX A. Risk Assessment 
1.1 Warehouse facility n.2, bay 1 
 
Surface area 1.489,6 
δq1 1,40 
δq2 1,20 
 n ni
i
 0,26 
Specific fire loading rate (nominal) qf 3.410 Kg wood/m2 
Specific fire loading rate of design qf,d 1.489,6 Kg wood/m2 
Class fire 240 
 
Multiplying factors of risk 
PARAMETER DEFINITION VALUE 
Burning rate Rc 1,5 
Toxicity of the combustion products Pf 2 
Probability of initiation Pi 2,2 
Probability of personal injury Paff 1 
 
     
   
    
 
 
Dove: 
 Dok = Number of questions with an affermative answer = 193 
 Ntot = Total number of questions to answer than "QUESTION IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE 
SECTOR UNDER CONSIDERATION"= 196 
 
     
   
   
     
 
 
                                  
 
 
Since RR > 50, as first defined the area is characterized as HIGH RESIDUAL RISK. 
 
1.2 Warehouse facility n.2, bay 2 
 
Surface area 1.469,6 
δq1 1,40 
δq2 1,20 
 n ni
i
 0,26 
Specific fire loading rate (nominal) qf 250 Kg wood/m2 
Specific fire loading rate of design qf,d 109,4 Kg wood/m2 
Class fire 240 
 
Multiplying factors of risk 
PARAMETER DEFINITION VALUE 
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Burning rate Rc 1,5 
Toxicity of the combustion products Pf 2 
Probability of initiation Pi 1,6 
Probability of personal injury Paff 1 
 
     
   
    
 
 
Dove: 
 Dok = Number of questions with an affermative answer = 193 
 Ntot = Total number of questions to answer than "QUESTION IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE 
SECTOR UNDER CONSIDERATION"= 196 
 
     
   
   
       
 
 
                           
 
 
Since RR > 50, as first defined the area is characterized as HIGH RESIDUAL RISK. 
 
1.3 Warehouse facility n.2, bay 3 
 
Surface area 1.489,6 
δq1 1,40 
δq2 1,20 
 n ni
i
 0,26 
Specific fire loading rate (nominal) qf 555 Kg wood/m2 
Specific fire loading rate of design qf,d 242,4 Kg wood/m2 
Class fire 240 
 
 
Multiplying factors of risk 
PARAMETER DEFINITION VALUE 
Burning rate Rc 1,5 
Toxicity of the combustion products Pf 2 
Probability of initiation Pi 1,6 
Probability of personal injury Paff 1 
 
     
   
    
 
 
Dove: 
 Dok = Number of questions with an affermative answer = 193 
 Ntot = Total number of questions to answer than "QUESTION IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE 
SECTOR UNDER CONSIDERATION"= 196 
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Since RR > 50, as first defined the area is characterized as HIGH RESIDUAL RISK. 
 
1.4 Warehouse facility n.2, bay 4 
 
Surface area 1.469,6 
δq1 1,40 
δq2 1,20 
 n ni
i
 0,26 
Specific fire loading rate (nominal) qf 751 Kg wood/m2 
Specific fire loading rate of design qf,d 328 Kg wood/m2 
Class fire 240 
 
Multiplying factors of risk 
PARAMETER DEFINITION VALUE 
Burning rate Rc 1,5 
Toxicity of the combustion products Pf 2 
Probability of initiation Pi 1,6 
Probability of personal injury Paff 1 
 
     
   
    
 
 
Dove: 
 Dok = Number of questions with an affermative answer = 193 
 Ntot = Total number of questions to answer than "QUESTION IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE 
SECTOR UNDER CONSIDERATION"= 196 
 
     
   
   
     
 
 
                          
 
 
Since RR > 50, as first defined the area is characterized as HIGH RESIDUAL RISK. 
 
1.5 Warehouse facility n.2, bay 5 
 
Surface area 1.447,2 
δq1 1,40 
δq2 1,20 
 n ni
i
 0,26 
Specific fire loading rate (nominal) qf 601,5 Kg wood/m2 
126 
 
Specific fire loading rate of design qf,d 262,7 Kg wood/m2 
Class fire 240 
 
Multiplying factors of risk 
PARAMETER DEFINITION VALUE 
Burning rate Rc 1,5 
Toxicity of the combustion products Pf 2 
Probability of initiation Pi 1,6 
Probability of personal injury Paff 1 
 
     
   
    
 
 
Dove: 
 Dok = Number of questions with an affermative answer = 193 
 Ntot = Total number of questions to answer than "QUESTION IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE 
SECTOR UNDER CONSIDERATION"= 196 
 
     
   
   
     
 
 
                           
 
Since RR > 50, as first defined the area is characterized as HIGH RESIDUAL RISK. 
 
 
 
1.6 Warehouse facility n.1, bay 1 
 
 
Surface area 530 m2 
δq1 1,20 
δq2 1,20 
 n ni
i
 0,26 
Specific fire loading rate (nominal) qf 433,7 Kg wood/m2 
Specific fire loading rate of design qf,d 162,4 Kg wood/m2 
Class fire 240 
 
 Dok = Number of questions with an affermative answer = 193 
 Ntot = Total number of questions to answer than "QUESTION IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE 
SECTOR UNDER CONSIDERATION"= 196 
 
Multiplying factors of risk 
PARAMETER DEFINITION VALUE 
Burning rate Rc 1,5 
Toxicity of the combustion products Pf 2 
Probability of initiation Pi 2,2 
Probability of personal injury Paff 1 
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Since RR > 50, as first defined the area is characterized as HIGH RESIDUAL RISK. 
 
 
1.7 Warehouse n.1, bay 2 
 
 
Surface area 550 m2 
δq1 1,20 
δq2 1,20 
 n ni
i
 0,26 
Specific fire loading rate (nominal) qf 397,2 Kg wood/m2 
Specific fire loading rate of design qf,d 148,7 Kg wood/m2 
Class fire 240 
 
 Dok = Number of questions with an affermative answer = 216 
 Ntot = Total number of questions to answer than "QUESTION IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE 
SECTOR UNDER CONSIDERATION"= 219 
 
Multiplying factors of risk 
PARAMETER DEFINITION VALUE 
Burning rate Rc 1,5 
Toxicity of the combustion products Pf 2 
Probability of initiation Pi 2,2 
Probability of personal injury Paff 1 
 
     
   
   
     
 
                                            
 
 
Since RR > 50, as first defined the area is characterized as HIGH RESIDUAL RISK. 
 
1.8 Warehouse n.1, bay 3 
 
 
Surface area 510 m2 
δq1 1,20 
δq2 1,20 
 n ni
i
 0,26 
Specific fire loading rate (nominal) qf 244 Kg wood/m2 
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Specific fire loading rate of design qf,d 91,4 Kg wood/m2 
Class fire 120 
 
 Dok = Number of questions with an affermative answer = 216 
 Ntot = Total number of questions to answer than "QUESTION IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE 
SECTOR UNDER CONSIDERATION"= 219 
 
Multiplying factors of risk 
PARAMETER DEFINITION VALUE 
Burning rate Rc 1,5 
Toxicity of the combustion products Pf 2 
Probability of initiation Pi 2,2 
Probability of personal injury Paff 1 
 
     
   
   
     
 
 
                            
 
 
Since RR > 50, as first defined the area is characterized as HIGH RESIDUAL RISK. 
 
1.9 Warehouse n.1, bay 4 
 
 
Surface area 1.455 m2 
δq1 1,40 
δq2 1,20 
 n ni
i
 0,26 
Specific fire loading rate (nominal) qf 589,7 MJ/m2 
Specific fire loading rate of design qf,d 257,6 Kg wood/m2 
Class fire 240 
 
 
 Dok = Number of questions with an affermative answer = 216 
 Ntot = Total number of questions to answer than "QUESTION IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE 
SECTOR UNDER CONSIDERATION"= 219 
Multiplying factors of risk 
PARAMETER DEFINITION VALUE 
Burning rate Rc 2 
Toxicity of the combustion products Pf 2 
Probability of initiation Pi 1,6 
Probability of personal injury Paff 1 
 
     
   
   
     
 
                           
 
Since RR > 50, as first defined the area is characterized as HIGH RESIDUAL RISK. 
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ANNEX B 
 
Tanks Volumes distribution and inks density 
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Tab. B.1: Tank’s volumes and ink’s density. 
Machine Tank 
Tank Volume 
(m3) 
Density of ink produced 
(t/m3) 
Max Liquid Volume 
(m3) 
Ullage Vapor space 
(m3) 
Bay 1  
Drais 1 I1 6,9 0,909 5,5 1,4 
F1 6,9 0,909 5,5 1,4 
Drais 2 I2 6,9 0,909 5,5 1,4 
F2 6,9 0,909 5,5 1,4 
Drais 3 I3 6,9 0,909 5,5 1,4 
F3 6,9 0,909 5,5 1,4 
Drais 4 I4 6,9 0,909 5,5 1,4 
F4 6,9 0,909 5,5 1,4 
Drais 5 I5 6,9 0,909 5,5 1,4 
F5 6,9 0,909 5,5 1,4 
M13 
I6 11,1 72 4,5 2,2 
F6 8,2  5,3 2,5 
D1 D1 11,1 113 8,8 4,2 
Bay 2  
N10 I7 6,9 0,916 5,2 2,5 
F7 6,9 0,91 5,5 2,7 
B11 D2 5 Variable 4 1 
D3 5 Variable 4 1 
N9 I10 11,1 0,9 5 2,4 
F10 10 0,89 5,6 2,7 
N8 I9 11,1 0,986 5 2,4 
F9 11,1 0,98 5 2,4 
N12 
I8 9 1,087 7,3 3,5 
F8/A 9,8 1,07 7,8 3,8 
F8/B 9,8 1,07 7,8 3,8 
N6 I11 10,5 0,96 4,3 2,1 
F11 9,9 0,97 4,8 4,8 
Bay 3  
N18 
I27 7,1  4,2 2 
F35 8,2  4,8 2,4 
F36 8,2  4,8 2,4 
N19 
I26 7,1  3,2 1,5 
F33 8,2  3,6 1,7 
F34 8,2  3,6 1,7 
N20 
I28 7,1  4,2 2 
F37 8,2  4,8 2,4 
F38 8,2  4,8 2,4 
Bay 4  
D5 D5 10,5  Variable Variable 
N10 
I19 6  5,5 2,7 
F19 8  5,5 2,7 
N14 
I18 10,5 0,901 7,4 3,6 
F18 10 0,89 8 3,9 
Bay 5  
M12 
I20 50  31,3 15,1 
F20 50  37 17,8 
F21 15  12,5 6 
Plant 2-Bay1  
D10 D10 23 287 20,4 9,8 
D6 D6 11,7  9,2 4,4 
D7 D7 11,7  9,2 4,4 
F29 F29 6,5  5 1,5 
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F30 F30 6,5  5 1,5 
F31 F31 6,5  5 1,5 
F32 F32 6,5  5 1,5 
N16 
I24 11,7  10,9 5,3 
F24/A 12,8  10,6 5,2 
F24/B 12,8  10,6 5,2 
N13 
I23 11,7  9,42 4,5 
F23/A 12,5  10,4 4,8 
F23/B 12,8  10,4 4,8 
N15 
I22 11,7  9,6 4,6 
F22/A 12,8  10 4,8 
F22/B 12,8  10 4,8 
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ANNEX C 
 
Inert gas requirements 
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Plant 1 
 
MONOSOLVENT type inks, Bay 1 
 
Tab. C.1: Mixing reactors inert gas dosage. 
 
 
 
 
Tab. C.2: Refining reactors inert gas dosage. 
 YELLOW 
F1 
RED 
F3 
BLUE 
F4 
BLACK 
F5 
ORANGE 
F2 
WHITE 
F6 
U.M. 
Ntot 5,8/turnover 5,8/turnover 5,8/turnover 5,8/turnover 5,8/turnover 5,9/turnover Nm
3 
 
Tab. C.3: Annual inert gas requirement. 
Ink 
Number of 
turnover/output 
Inert gas 
requirement/production  
Total production in 
year 2014 
Total Inert gas 
requirement  
Drais1 
YELLOW 
2 22,6 Nm3 26 588 Nm3 
Drais 4 BLUE 13 93 Nm3 20 1.860 Nm3 
Drais 3 RED 15 93 Nm3 17 1.581 Nm3 
Drais 5 
BLACK 
15 93 Nm3 17 1.581 Nm3 
Drais 2 
ORANGE 
2 17 Nm3 15 2.551 Nm3 
WHITE M13 2 18 Nm3 72 1.296 Nm3 
D1 1 9,3 Nm3 113 1.051 Nm3 
 
RASTER+ PROCESS type inks, Bay 2 
 
Tab. C.4: Mixing reactors inert gas dosage. 
 
 
 
 
 
Tab. C.5: Refining reactors inert gas dosage. 
 
 
Tab. C.6: Dispersors inert gas dosage. 
 D2 D3 U.M. 
Ntot 4 4 Nm
3 
 
 YELLOW 
I21 
RED 
I3 
BLUE 
I4 
BLACK 
I5 
ORANGE 
I2 
WHITE 
I6 
D1 U.M. 
Ntot 5,5 5,5 5,5 5,5 5,5 5,9 9,3 Nm
3 
 VIOLET 3 
I11 
GREEN 7 
I10 
RED 
I9 
BLACK 
I8 
VIOLET 23 
I7 
U.M. 
Ntot 5,6  6,2  4,8  7,7 
 5,6  Nm3 
 VIOLET 3 
F11 
GREEN 7 
F10 
RED 
F9 
BLACK 
F8A/F8B 
VIOLET 23 
F7 
U.M. 
Ntot 5,9 /turnover 6,5/turnover 4,1/turnover 8,2/turnover
 5,8/turnover  Nm3 
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Tab. C.7: Annual inert gas requirement. 
 
Number of 
turnover/output 
Inert gas 
requirement/production 
(Nm3) 
Total 
production in 
year 2014 
Total inert gas 
requirement/year 
(Nm3) 
N6 VIOLET3 9 59 Nm3 27 1.585 Nm3 
N9 GREEN7 7 52 Nm3 26 1.352 Nm3 
N8 RED 5 25 Nm3 35 875 Nm3 
N12 BLACK 4 41 Nm3 92 3.772 Nm3 
N10VIOLET23 13 81 Nm3 15 1.215 Nm3 
D2 / 4 Nm3 191 764 Nm3 
D3 / 4 Nm3 173 692 Nm3 
 
 
PROCESS type inks, Bay 3 
Tab. C.8: Mixing reactors inert gas dosage. 
 
 
 
 
Tab. C.9: Refining reactors inert gas dosage. 
 YELLOW 
F35-F36 
RED 
F33-F34 
BLUE 
F37-F38 
U.M. 
Ntot 5,6/turnover 5,2/turnover 5,5/turnover Nm
3 
 
Tab. C.10: Annual inert gas requirement. 
 
Number of 
turnover/output 
Inert gas 
requirement/production  
Total production 
in year 2014 
Total inert gas 
requirement/year  
N18 
YELLOW  
5 33 Nm3 167 5.477 Nm3 
N19 RED  9 52 Nm3 102 5.232 Nm3 
N20 BLUE  5 33 Nm3 129 4.257 Nm3 
 
PROCESS type inks and storage tanks, Bay 4 
Tab. C.11: Mixing reactors inert gas dosage. 
 
 
 
 
Tab. C.12: Refining reactors inert gas dosage. 
 
 
 
 
Tab. C.13: Annual inert gas requirement. 
 YELLOW 
I27 
RED 
I26 
BLUE 
I28 
U.M. 
Ntot 4,8 4,5 4,8 Nm
3 
 BLACK 
I19 
BLUE 
I18 
U.M. 
Ntot 4,5 4,8 Nm
3 
 BLACK 
F19 
RED/ORANGE 
F18 
U.M. 
Ntot 4,5/turnover 4,8/turnover Nm
3 
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Number of 
turnover/output 
Inert gas 
requirement/production  
Total production 
in year 2014 
Total Inert gas 
requirement 
M 11 BLACK  2 27 Nm3 15 405 Nm3 
N14 
RED/ORANGE 
5 24 Nm3 44 1.056 Nm3 
D5 / 6,5 Nm3 191 1.242 Nm3 
 
Tab. C.14: Storage tanks inert gas dosage. 
 
 
 
White Monosolvent, Bay 5 
Tab. C.15: Mixing reactors inert gas dosage. 
 
 
 
 
Tab. C.16: Refining reactors inert gas dosage. 
 WHITE 
F20 
WHITE  
F21 
U.M. 
Ntot 52,7/turnover 13/turnover Nm
3 
 
Tab. C.17: Annual inert gas requirement. 
 Number of 
turnover/output 
Inert gas 
requirement/production  
Total production in 
year 2014 
Total Inert gas 
requirement  
M12 
WHITE 
2 153,7 Nm3 72 7.378 Nm3 
 
Tab. C.18: Storage tanks inert gas requirement. 
 
 
 
 
Plant 2 
 
RASTER type inks, Bay 1 
 
Tab. C.19: Mixing reactors inert gas dosage. 
 
 
 
 
 Storage tanks foundation for gravure 
 ST6 ST5 ST4 D5 
Ntot 8,4 Nm
3 8,4 Nm3 8,4 Nm3 8 
 WHITE 
I20  
U.M. 
Ntot 35,2 Nm
3 
 Storage tanks foundation for gravure 
 ST7 ST8 
Ntot 12 Nm
3 12 Nm3 
 YELLOW 
I23 
RED 
I21 
BLUE 
I22 
U.M. 
Ntot 11 10 9,9 Nm
3 
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Tab. C.20: Refining reactors inert gas dosage. 
 YELLOW 
F24/A-F24B 
RED 
F22/A-F22/B 
BLUE 
F23/A-F23/B 
U.M. 
Ntot 10,7/turnover 10,4/turnover 10,9/turnover Nm
3 
 
Tab. C.21: Dispersors inert gas dosage. 
 
Tab. C.22: Colour’s mix. 
 
 
Tab. C.23: Annual inert gas requirement. 
 
Number of 
turnover/output 
Inert gas 
requirement/production  
Total 
production 
in year 
2014 
Total Inert 
gas 
requirement  
N13 BLUE 5 65 Nm3 62 4.030 Nm3 
N16 YELLOW 5 65 Nm3 77 5.005 Nm3 
N15 
RED/ORANGE 
11-13 146 Nm3 54 7.884 Nm3 
F29 / 5,3 Nm3 108 572 Nm3 
F30 / 5,3 Nm3 68 360 Nm3 
F31 / 5,3 Nm3 80 424 Nm3 
F32 / 5,3 Nm3 36 191 Nm3 
D10 / 21 Nm3 287 6.027 Nm3  
D6 / 9,7 Nm3 222 2.153 Nm3 
D7 / 9,7 Nm3 222 2.153 Nm3 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 D10 D6  D7 U.M. 
Ntot 21 9,7 9,7 Nm
3 
 F29 F30 F31 F32 U.M. 
Ntot 5,3 5,3 5,3 5,3 Nm
3 
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